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ABSTRACT—Policy discussions about the affordability of prescription drugs 
in the United States are infused with the theme that drug prices are 
unconscionably high. Many of the policy interventions proposed in 
Congress, the White House, and the states adopt this frame, authorizing 
regulatory action when prices exceed particular thresholds or otherwise 
constitute “price gouging” on the part of drug companies. Unsurprisingly, 
such initiatives have prompted legal challenges by the biopharmaceutical 
industry. State laws in particular are vulnerable to challenges on a number of 
grounds. In this Article, we focus on one avenue of challenge that has 
received little scholarly attention in the context of drug pricing: void-for-
vagueness claims under the Due Process Clause. These challenges allege that 
the law’s definition of “excessive” or “unconscionable” drug prices is so 
ambiguous as to fail basic requirements of procedural due process. 
To better understand how federal and state legislation can be designed 
to survive vagueness challenges, we review and extract lessons from four 
adjacent areas of law in which a standard of “excessive” or “unconscionable” 
price has been operationalized: (1) price gouging laws relating to times of 
emergency; (2) contract law; (3) consumer lending law; and (4) public 
utilities rate regulation. We analyze the approaches taken in each field and 
their potential applicability to the prescription drug context. We conclude 
that consumer lending law offers the most promising model, particularly if 
advanced via federal legislation, and offer a series of recommendations for 
drafting legislation aimed at identifying and curbing excessive drug prices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2019, the United States Senate Committee on Finance 
summoned executives from seven large biopharmaceutical companies to 
defend their pricing practices before Congress.1 Senator Ron Wyden’s 
 
 1 Christopher Rowland, Drug Executives Grilled in Senate Over High Prices, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 
2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/drug-executives-grilled-in-senate-
over-high-prices/2019/02/25/abc89c04-393f-11e9-aaae-69364b2ed137_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6LBV-FDX8]. 
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introductory statement was laced with morally freighted language: 
medicines are “outrageously expensive”; “astronomically high” prices are 
the product of “profiteering” and “two-faced scheming”; and American 
families are driven to “morally repugnant” economic choices.2 Senator 
Chuck Grassley’s opening statement similarly spoke of Americans’ “sticker 
shock” and the importance of “holding the private sector . . . accountable 
through oversight.”3 On the presidential campaign trail, reflecting on drug 
price increases, Senator Cory Booker asserted, “[i]t’s unconscionable how 
people are profiteering off the pain of others.”4 In short, a pervasive theme 
in policy discussions about the affordability of medicines is that drug prices 
are unconscionably high, and that policy intervention is required. 
Public opinion reflects this view. In a February 2019 national poll, 79% 
of Americans said the cost of prescription drugs was “unreasonable.”5 Eighty 
percent perceived that profits made by pharmaceutical companies were a 
major factor contributing to high drug prices, and 52% believed drug 
companies’ marketing and advertising expenses were a major contributor.6 
Only 25% trusted drug companies to price their products fairly.7 A majority 
or supermajority of respondents supported each of ten proposed regulatory 
interventions, with the lone exception of allowing Medicare drug plans to 
exclude more drugs.8 
Allegations of unconscionably high drug prices focus on two 
dimensions: high prices at a drug’s initial launch and large periodic price 
 
 2 Hearing on Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Part II Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 116th Cong. 3–6 (2019) (statement of Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator). 
 3 Hearing on Drug Pricing in America: A Prescription for Change, Part II Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance, 116th Cong. 1–3 (2019) (statement of Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance). 
 4 Lev Facher, The ‘Big Pharma’ Candidate? As He Runs for President, Cory Booker Looks to Shake 
His Reputation for Drug Industry Coziness, STAT (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/ 
2019/02/12/cory-booker-presidential-run-pharmaceutical-industry-ties [https://perma.cc/SED3-J5B3]. 
 5 Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll—February 2019: Prescription Drugs, KFF 
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-february-2019-
prescription-drugs [https://perma.cc/G5LX-8EAE]. 
 6 Id. Experts concur that “the costs of marketing are part of the overall cost structure of drug 
manufacturers and thereby place upward pressure on prices.” NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., 
MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 89 (Norman R. Augustine et al. eds., 
2018). An analysis of twelve large pharmaceutical companies found that between 2003 and 2015, such 
expenditures “increased noticeably and exceeded research and development investments by up to eighty 
percent.” Id. at 90. 
 7 Kirzinger et al., supra note 5. Three percent trusted companies to price products fairly “a lot” and 
22% “somewhat.” Id. at fig.3. 
 8 Id. at fig.4. These interventions ran the gamut from including list prices in direct-to-consumer 
advertisements to facilitating generic entry, making changes to Medicare, and importing drugs from 
Canada. Id. 
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increases. A recent study of drug pricing and insurance claims data from 
2005 to 2016 concluded that rising national costs for generic and specialty 
drugs are primarily attributable to new drugs, while costs for other, brand-
name drugs are rising primarily due to increases in the price of existing 
drugs.9 Average annual price increases for orally administered, brand-name 
drugs exceeded 9% and injectables 15%—several times the overall rate of 
inflation.10 Among the sixteen new cancer treatments approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2018, ten were launched at a wholesale 
acquisition cost (WAC) exceeding $9,000 for a month’s supply.11 
Congress, the Trump Administration, and the states have responded 
with a bevy of policy proposals, many of which focus on taking action 
against instances of “price gouging.”12 Several states have successfully 
enacted legislation.13 Unsurprisingly, these efforts have drawn the ire of 
industry actors and prompted litigation. Each of the industry’s major trade 
associations—the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), the 
Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), and 
the Association for Accessible Medications (AAM)—have been plaintiffs in 
recent drug pricing related litigation.14 One such challenge resulted in the 
courts unraveling high-profile legislation in Maryland in 2018.15 
State laws are particularly vulnerable to challenge. They have faced 
challenges under the dormant Commerce Clause (responsible for the demise 
of Maryland’s price gouging law for generic drugs),16 patent law, trade secret 
 
 9 Inmaculada Hernandez et al., The Contribution of New Product Entry Versus Existing Product 
Inflation in the Rising Costs of Drugs, 38 HEALTH AFF. 76, 76, 81 (2019). 
 10 Id. at 82. 
 11 Lisa M. Jarvis, The New Drugs of 2018, 97 CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS 33, 37 (Jan. 21, 2019). The 
highest-cost drug, Loxo’s Vitrakvi, was priced at $32,800 per month, or $393,600 per year, for the oral 
formulation. Id. For further discussion of WAC, see LEVINSON, infra note 619 and accompanying text 
defining WAC as the offering price set by the manufacturer for wholesalers and direct purchasers, before 
discounts and rebates. 
 12 See generally William V. Padula, State and Federal Policy Solutions to Rising Prescription Drug 
Prices in the U.S., 22 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 15 (2019) (summarizing legislative activity). 
 13 See, e.g., the discussion of state legislation infra Section I.B. 
 14 See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Pharm. 
Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. filed Sept. 28, 2018) (still ongoing); 
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315 (D. Nev. dismissed June 28, 2018); 
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 887 F.3d 664 
(4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019). 
 15 See infra Section II.B. 
 16 See Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 667–75 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019). 
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law, the Takings Clause, the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause.17 
Many of these claims have been summarized previously in the academic 
literature.18 In this Article, we focus on one avenue of challenge that has 
received comparatively little scholarly attention in the drug-pricing context: 
void-for-vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause. These 
challenges allege that the laws’ definition of “excessive” or 
“unconscionable” drug prices is so ambiguous as to fail basic requirements 
of constitutionally protected due process rights. 
Void-for-vagueness challenges are worthy of greater attention for 
several reasons. First, efforts to regulate “excessive” drug prices appear 
especially at risk of such challenges given the subjectivity and controversy 
involved in what constitutes an excessive or unfairly high price. These legal 
disputes tap into deeper normative questions about what constitutes “fair” 
pricing and how it should be evaluated. Second, vagueness claims have 
already arisen in lawsuits against drug-pricing laws passed in Maryland and 
California. These claims therefore have practical salience to policymakers 
deliberating which legislative approaches to pursue and how to craft bills 
going forward. Finally, as both federal and state laws are vulnerable to 
vagueness challenges, the potential implications of such challenges are 
broad. 
Our purpose is to identify a workable approach to the design of federal 
and state prescription drug price gouging legislation—one that will survive 
constitutional challenges, in particular on the basis of vagueness, and 
facilitate substantial progress in improving drug affordability. To generate 
recommendations about surmounting vagueness challenges, we extract 
lessons from other areas of law in which a standard of “unconscionable” or 
“excessive” price has been operationalized. Our analysis and 
recommendations reflect several commonsense assumptions about what a 
 
 17 See sources cited supra note 14 (collecting cases); Robin Feldman et al., The Patent Act and the 
Constitutionality of State Pharmaceutical Regulation, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 40, 50–54 
(2019) (summarizing Takings and patent-preemption challenges). 
 18 See generally Isaac D. Buck, States as Activists, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 121 (2019) (discussing legal 
challenges to Maryland’s anti-price gouging law, among other issues); Katherine L. Gudiksen & Jaime 
S. King, The Burden of Federalism: Challenges to State Attempts at Controlling Prescription Drug Costs, 
39 J. LEGAL MED. 95 (2019) (surveying the legal challenges that states have faced in attempting to 
regulate drug prices); Katherine L. Gudiksen et al., California’s Drug Transparency Law: Navigating the 
Boundaries of State Authority on Drug Pricing, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1503 (2018) (discussing legal 
challenges to California’s drug price transparency law SB 17); Theodore T. Lee et al., Legal Challenges 
to State Drug Pricing Laws, 319 JAMA 865 (2018) (discussing the legal claims brought against drug 
pricing laws in Maryland and Nevada); Christopher Robertson, Will Courts Allow States to Regulate Drug 
Prices?, 379 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1000 (2018) (describing the dormant Commerce Clause challenge to 
Maryland’s HB 631). 
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workable definition of unconscionable or excessive prices must be able to 
do. First, the standard must advance the government’s purpose in adopting 
the law. As these laws are motivated by a desire to advance patients’ interests 
by making medicines more accessible, their application must reach the 
products posing the greatest financial challenges.19 Second, the standard 
must have a strong prospect of surviving legal challenges. Third, it must be 
feasible to operationalize. It must be measurable using available information 
and provide useful information about which products regulators should 
target for enforcement. Fourth, it must be fair to biopharmaceutical 
companies. As we discuss, fairness considerations are both procedural—the 
law must put companies on reasonable notice of what will and will not be 
considered an acceptable pricing decision—and substantive—it must permit 
companies a reasonable return on their overall investment in research, 
development, and manufacturing.20 Finally, it must not be unduly susceptible 
to gaming by the regulated entities. For example, approaches that focus 
solely on whether a drug’s launch price is excessive will encourage 
companies to price the product low on market entry and raise the price 
steadily over time, and approaches that focus solely on annual price increases 
can be gamed for new drugs by setting the launch price high. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, we survey recent state and 
federal legislative activity in the prescription drug price gouging, 
unconscionability, and rate-setting spaces. For simplicity, we refer to this 
legislation collectively as “excessive-price legislation.” Given space 
constraints, our review of federal and state bills is illustrative rather than 
exhaustive. In Part II, we describe vagueness challenges as part of the 
 
 19 In practice “excessive” drug prices may overlap with “unaffordable” drug prices, but it is important 
to mark these two terms as conceptually distinct. Although affordability may be a good metric for 
controlling prices, an affordable price may not be a fair price. This is a significant normative vulnerability 
that also has potentially serious practical implications for innovation incentives. Furthermore, focusing 
on affordable pricing as opposed to excessive price could conflict with our fourth criterion, fairness to 
drug manufacturers. 
 20 A related concern, voiced by pharmaceutical manufacturers in response to nearly all proposals to 
curb high drug prices, is that price regulation may dampen incentives for investment in drug innovation 
to the long-term detriment of the public. At some level of price constraint (holding other innovation 
incentives constant) this tradeoff surely must be real—the difficulty is knowing at which level. See NAT’L 
ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 17–18, 24; Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring 
Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 
2273, 2280–82 (2018); Rena M. Conti & Frank S. David, Rebalancing High Prescription Drug Prices 
with Innovation Incentives, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 1, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
do/10.1377/hblog20190626.569971/full [https://perma.cc/G4Z2-6NTR]. In evaluating potential policy 
models, this conundrum leads us to shy away from stringent approaches such as hard caps on prices. But 
given the healthy financial margins enjoyed by many drug companies, we suspect there is some room for 
price reductions on the most expensive drugs before innovation incentives are seriously jeopardized. 
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biopharmaceutical industry’s litigation strategy to resist these laws. In Part 
III, we canvass four adjacent areas of law in which legislatures, regulatory 
agencies, and the courts have been involved in regulating excessive prices: 
(1) price gouging laws relating to times of emergency; (2) consumer lending 
laws; (3) contract law; and (4) public utilities rate regulation. We analyze the 
regulatory approaches taken and their potential applicability to the 
prescription drug context. Our analysis is based on a review of legal cases, 
treatises, and scholarship in these areas. We focus on U.S. law, although it is 
noteworthy that drug regulators in Europe and elsewhere have also stepped 
up scrutiny of excessive drug prices and applied their own operational 
definitions of what is “excessive.”21 Finally, in Part IV, we provide 
recommendations concerning key decisions in the design of excessive-price 
statutes. 
I. EXCESSIVE-PRICE LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS AND THE STATES 
Legislators at both the federal and state levels have proposed a broad 
range of approaches to address expensive prescription medications.22 
Proposals run the gamut, from requiring provision of drug samples to 
facilitate development of generics,23 to prohibiting gag clause provisions that 
prevent pharmacists from informing patients that a prescription would be 
cheaper without insurance.24 A number of measures, however, specifically 
target instances of apparent “price gouging,” or “unconscionable” or 
 
 21 Fiona Carlin et al., Recent Pharmaceutical Excessive Pricing Cases in Context, GLOBAL 
COMPETITION REV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1147163/recent-
pharmaceutical-excessive-pricing-cases-in-context [https://perma.cc/65MA-3FBA]. 
 22 The executive branch is also making efforts to address prescription drug affordability under the 
White House “Blueprint” for drug costs. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AMERICAN 
PATIENTS FIRST: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION BLUEPRINT TO LOWER DRUG PRICES AND REDUCE  
OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS (2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PM8G-98XW]. However, the White House proposals, unlike the legislative proposals, 
do not directly target “excessive” drug prices for regulatory action. They are therefore beyond the ambit 
of our analysis. 
 23 Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2017, S. 974, 115th Cong. 
(2017). 
 24 Congress has passed two such laws. The Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, Pub. L. No.  
115-263, 132 Stat. 3672 (2018) (banning gag clauses in certain drug plans); The Know the Lowest Price 
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-262, 132 Stat. 3670 (2018) (banning gag clauses in Medicare Part D and Medicare 
Advantage plans); see also Gudiksen & King, supra note 18, at 101; Susan Jaffe, No More Secrets: 
Congress Bans Pharmacist ‘Gag Orders’ on Drug Prices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://khn.org/news/no-more-secrets-congress-bans-pharmacist-gag-orders-on-drug-prices 
[https://perma.cc/EZM8-J5DS] (both discussing these federal laws). 
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“excessive” pricing. In this Part, we survey an illustrative sample of recent 
legislative efforts in this space.25 
A. Federal Bills 
1. Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act 
On September 25, 2019, Senator Chuck Grassley introduced 
prescription drug legislation approved by the Senate Finance Committee.26 
The major provision that directly regulates price is a provision that 
effectively caps price increases for Medicare Part B drugs (e.g., outpatient 
infusions administered in a physician’s office) at the rate of overall inflation 
by requiring manufacturers to rebate any amounts paid by Medicare above 
that level back to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).27 That 
provision does not extend to purchases by non-Medicare plans or to Part D 
(orally administered) prescription drugs.28 
2. Lower Drug Costs Now Act 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and House Democrats introduced 
legislation on September 19, 2019 that proposes sweeping changes to how 
 
 25 Given space constraints and the plethora of bills introduced, we confine our review to legislation 
defining substantive actions to be taken in response to identified instances of excessive pricing. Though 
we will not discuss them at length, we acknowledge that an adjacent set of bills—disclosure and 
transparency laws—are germane to making such laws effective. Transparency laws require 
biopharmaceutical companies to publicly disclose when their products’ prices exceed a specified 
threshold. By making available the pertinent data, they serve as handmaidens to laws seeking to take 
direct action on excessive prices. See, e.g., Zachary Brennan, Vermont Drug Price Transparency: New 
Law Calls Out Egregious Price Spikes, REG. FOCUS (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-
focus%E2%84%A2/news-articles/2016/12/vermont-drug-price-transparency-new-law-calls-out-
egregious-price-spikes [https://perma.cc/CLA7-X6MX]. Transparency laws have been a popular 
approach in the states, and in spring 2019, these laws found expression in several federal bills. For 
example, H.R. 2113, introduced in April 2019, would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to annually determine whether an applicable drug has experienced a price increase at or above a 
specified level. Prescription Drug STAR Act, H.R. 2113, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 26 Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act of 2019, S. 2543, 116th Cong. (2019); Description of the 
Chairman’s Mark, The Prescription Drug Pricing Reduction Act (PDPRA) of 2019 (July 25, 2019) (as 
reported by S. Comm. on Finance), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINAL%20 
Description%20of%20the%20Chairman’s%20Mark%20for%20the%20Prescription%20Drug%20Pricin
g%20Reduction%20Act%20of%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LU2-QYA9]. 
 27 S. 2543 § 106. Medicare is health insurance administered by the federal government for the elderly 
and those with certain disabilities. Part B pertains to outpatient care, and Part D offers prescription drug 
coverage. Medicare Program—General Information, CMS.GOV (Nov. 13, 2019, 10:51 PM), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/index 
[https://perma.cc/AC8G-TWNX]. 
 28 S. 2543 § 106. 
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prescription drugs are paid for in Medicare Parts B and D.29 Among other 
provisions, the Lower Drug Costs Now Act would authorize the HHS 
Secretary to negotiate the price of at least twenty-five drugs that lack a 
generic or biosimilar competitor.30 The bill sets a price ceiling of 120% of 
the volume-weighted average price in six foreign countries (Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom), which would 
apply to Medicare purchases as well as purchases by any commercial insurer 
that wishes to opt in.31 Companies that overcharge Medicare or another payer 
after agreeing to a maximum price would be subject to civil penalties of ten 
times the overcharge.32 Drug manufacturers that refuse to negotiate or to 
agree to the price cap specified in the legislation would be subject to an 
excise tax of 65%–95% of annual gross sales.33 Further, annual price 
increases would be limited to the rate of inflation.34 For Medicare Part B, 
these pricing provisions would apply until a generic or biosimilar competitor 
enters the market, as a “rebatable drug” is defined as a “single source drug 
or biological.”35 For Part D, a “rebatable drug” is defined as a drug or 
biologic that is covered by Part D and does not cost more, on average, than 
$100 per year per patient (subject to future adjustments for inflation).36 
3. Combatting Unreasonable Rises and Excessively (CURE) High 
Drug Prices Act 
The Combatting Unreasonable Rises and Excessively (CURE) High 
Drug Prices Act was introduced on December 13, 2018 by Senator Richard 
Blumenthal37 and reintroduced on February 28, 2019 as S. 637.38 Although 
the Act’s title references “unreasonable” and “excessive” prices (and a press 
release calls such high prices “predatory” and “unconscionable”),39 the 
 
 29 Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (as passed by the House, 
Dec. 12, 2019), https://congress.gov/116/bills/hr3/BILLS-116hr3eh.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE3H-6VP3]. 
 30 Id. §§ 101, 1192, 1194. 
 31 Id. §§ 1191(c)(3), 1194(c)(1). 
 32 Id. § 1198(a). 
 33 Id. §§ 102(a), (c) (adding 26 U.S.C. § 4192). 
 34 Id. §§ 201, 202. 
 35 Id. § 201. 
 36 Id. § 202. 
 37 CURE High Drug Prices Act, S. 3754, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 38 CURE High Drug Prices Act, S. 637, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 39 Press Release, Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal, Harris, Merkley & Klobuchar Introduce Bill to 
End Predatory Price Gouging on Lifesaving Drugs (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-harris-merkley-and-klobuchar-introduce-bill-to-end-predatory-
price-gouging-on-lifesaving-drugs [https://perma.cc/J9T7-A3DW]. 
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statutory term of choice in S. 637 is “price gouging.”40 The bill provides a 
general definition of “price gouging” and identifies three situations in which 
there will be a default presumption that price gouging has occurred.41 The 
general definition provides that price gouging is: 
an increase in the average manufacturer price [(AMP)] of a qualifying drug 
that— 
(A) is in substantial excess of an amount that could be reasonably justified 
by an increase in cost of producing the drug or by an increase in cost due 
to appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public health; and 
(B) that because of insufficient competition in the marketplace, consumers 
cannot reasonably avoid.42 
The presumption of price gouging would be triggered if a drug’s AMP has 
increased 10% or more in the previous twelve months, 20% or more in the 
previous thirty-six months, or 30% or more in the previous sixty months.43 
Although standards triggering the presumption of price gouging are clear, 
the general definition is open to considerable interpretation. 
If the Secretary of HHS believes that a manufacturer has engaged in 
price gouging, she would be required to notify the manufacturer and request 
a “statement of justification” for the price increase.44 This statement of 
justification could include information about the drug’s production costs, 
efforts to expand access to the drug, marketplace competition, and “any other 
information that the manufacturer believes to be relevant.”45 Manufacturers 
would have forty-five days to respond.46 If the Secretary determined that 
there has been a prohibited price increase, she could choose to do nothing, 
or pursue one of three options.47 First, the Secretary could require the 
manufacturer to disgorge excessive payments to those who have overpaid.48 
Second, the Secretary could order the manufacturer to make the drug 
available to certain health plans at the pre-gouging price for up to a year.49 
Third, in situations of repeat offenders or where price gouging knowingly 
 
 40 S. 637. 
 41 Id. §§ 2(5), 3(b). The Blumenthal bill’s definition of price gouging bears a resemblance to the 
language in § 2–801(f) of Maryland’s anti-price gouging law, HB 631, discussed infra note 258. 
 42 S. 637 § 2(5). 
 43 Id. § 3(b). 
 44 Id. § 3(c). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. § 3(d). 
 47 Id. § 3(f). 
 48 Id. § 3(f)(1)(A). 
 49 Id. § 3(f)(1)(B). 
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occurs, the manufacturer could be compelled to “pay a civil penalty of up to 
three times the excessive amount the manufacturer received as a result of a 
violation of this Act.”50 
4. Stop Price Gouging Act 
In February 2019, Senator Sherrod Brown introduced the Stop Price 
Gouging Act, which would impose an excise tax51 on biopharmaceutical 
companies for sales of prescription medications experiencing a “price 
spike.”52 Entities covered by the Act would be required to submit quarterly 
cost, volume, pricing, revenue, and other information on their prescription 
drugs to the HHS Inspector General,53 who would review this information 
annually to determine whether a “price spike” has occurred.54 A price spike 
is defined in the bill as “an increase in the average manufacturer price in 
commerce of a prescription drug for which the price spike percentage is 
equal to or greater than applicable price increase allowance.”55 In other 
words, if a drug’s price increased more than an allowable amount—
determined by comparison to the Chained Consumer Price Index—a price 
spike would be deemed to have occurred.56 
Unless an exemption (listed in the Act) applied, the Inspector General 
would report their findings to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),57 which 
then would impose a calibrated tax on the offending company.58 Price spikes 
of less than 15% above the allotted allowance would be subject to a 50% tax 
on price-spike revenue,59 those 15%–20% above the allowance would be 
taxed at 75%, and those 20% or more above the allowance would be taxed 
at 100%.60 Different calculations would be performed for cumulative price-
spike taxes.61 
 
 50 Id. § 3(f)(1)(C). 
 51 Excise taxes are taxes paid on the purchase of a specific good or the conduct of a certain activity 
(e.g., highway trucking). Excise Tax, IRS (July 29, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/excise-tax [https://perma.cc/3J6S-J3DU]. 
 52 Stop Price Gouging Act, S. 378, 116th Cong. (2019). Representative Mark Pocan introduced an 
identical bill in the House. Stop Price Gouging Act, H.R. 1093, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 53 S. 378 § 2(b). 
 54 Id. § 2(c). 
 55 Id. § 2(a)(6)(A). 
 56 Id. § 2(a)(6)(C). The Chained Consumer Price Index, or C-CPI-U, is a cost of living index. See 
Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U), BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (July 
8, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/additional-resources/chained-cpi.htm [https://perma.cc/JT5L-NPZ5]. 
 57 S. 378 § 2(e). 
 58 Id. § 4192(a). 
 59 Id. § 4192(b)(2)(A). 
 60 Id. §§ 4192(b)(2)(B)–(C). 
 61 Id. § 4192(c). 
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5. Prescription Drug Price Relief Act of 2019 
In January 2019, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Ro 
Khanna introduced into the Senate and House, respectively, the Prescription 
Drug Price Relief Act of 2019.62 This Act provided that “excessively priced 
drugs” would lose their government-granted market exclusivities. 
To determine whether a brand-name drug’s domestic price is excessive, 
the HHS Secretary would be required to review all brand-name drugs at least 
annually.63 The Act sets forth two ways in which a drug may be excessively 
priced: (1) if the “domestic average manufacturing price exceeds the median 
price charged for such drug in the 5 reference countries”—Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan64—or (2) if, based on 
consideration of a number of factors, the Secretary judges the drug’s price to 
be “higher than reasonable.”65 The Act’s enumerated factors run the gamut 
from the specific (e.g., patient population size, government investment in 
research and development) to the very open-ended (“[o]ther factors the 
Secretary determines appropriate”).66 Any person could petition the 
Secretary “to make an excessive drug price determination for an applicable 
drug” under this second category, and the Secretary would be required to 
respond within ninety days.67 
 
 62 Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, S. 102, 116th Cong. (2019); Prescription Drug Price Relief 
Act, H.R. 465, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 63 S. 102 § 2(a); H.R. 465 § 2(a). 
 64 S. 102 §§ 2(b)(1)(A)–(B); H.R. 465 §§ 2(b)(1)(A)–(B). Another bill proposed by Senator Rick 
Scott, the Transparent Drug Pricing Act of 2019, would create an “International Retail List Price Index” 
which would prohibit a U.S. retail list price from exceeding the “lowest retail list price for the drug among 
Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, or Germany.” S. 977, 116th Cong. § 4(a) (2019). 
 65 S. 102 § 2(b)(2). 
 66 Id. § 2(b)(2). The full list of factors to be considered is as follows: 
(A) The size of the affected patient population.  
(B) The value of the drug to patients, including the impact of the price on access to the drug and 
the relationship of the price of the drug to its therapeutic health benefits.  
(C) The risk adjusted value of Federal Government subsidies and investments related to the drug.  
(D) The costs associated with development of the drug.  
(E) Whether the drug provided a significant improvement in health outcomes, compared to other 
therapies available at the time of its approval.  
(F) The cumulative global revenues generated by the drug.  
(G) Whether the domestic average manufacturer price of the drug increased during any annual 
quarter by a percentage that is more than the percentage increase in the consumer price index for 
all urban consumers for the respective annual quarter.  
(H) Other factors the Secretary determines appropriate.  
Id. §§ 2(b)(2)(A)–(H). 
 67 Id. § 2(c)(1). 
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For those drugs identified as excessively priced, the bill provides that 
the Secretary “shall waive or void any government-granted exclusivities” 
and “shall grant open, non-exclusive licenses” to other manufacturers.68 The 
impacted exclusivities fall under various sections of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act, but also would include 
“[a]ny other provision of law that provides for exclusivity (or extension of 
exclusivity) with respect to a drug.”69 The bill has additional provisions 
governing reasonable royalties to be paid from licensees to those who have 
lost their exclusivities,70 establishing a database of brand-name drugs and 
excessive price determinations,71 and reporting requirements for both the 
Secretary and drug manufacturers.72 
The bill’s definition of excessive price is an unusual hybrid of clear and 
opaque measures. The international reference pricing standard is relatively 
straightforward (although disputes may arise about how to calculate the price 
in foreign countries), but the “higher than reasonable” standard is not. 
Although the legislation provides specific considerations to be weighed in 
determining whether a price is “higher than reasonable,” the breadth of these 
factors and lack of direction as to how to weigh them against one another (in 
the absence of clarifying regulations) leaves considerable room for agency 
discretion. 
6. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018 
In December 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jan 
Schakowsky introduced into the Senate and House, respectively, the 
Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018.73 This bill would have created 
an Office of Drug Manufacturing within HHS that would either manufacture 
generic medications itself or contract with others when it determined that (1) 
a drug is “not readily available from existing suppliers”; (2) HHS 
manufacture would facilitate market entry of other generics; or (3) it is 
 
 68 Id. §§ 3(a)(1)–(2). Other federal bills have taken similar approaches. For example, the FLAT 
Prices Act, introduced in February 2019 in both the Senate and the House, identifies three threshold price 
increases for which a drug manufacturer loses 180 days of market exclusivities. FLAT Prices Act, S. 366, 
116th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), (b) (2019); H.R. 1188, 116th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), (b) (2019). It further provides that 
for each five percent price increase in WAC over those three identified thresholds, certain market 
exclusivities “shall be reduced for an additional 30 days.” S. 366 § 2(a)(2); H.R. 1188 § 2(a)(2). 
 69 S. 102 §§ 8(5), 8(5)(G). 
 70 Id. § 4. 
 71 Id. § 5. 
 72 Id. §§ 5(b), 6. 
 73 Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act of 2018, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Affordable Drug 
Manufacturing Act of 2018, H.R. 7348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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“necessary for the Office to carry out its duties.”74 The Act aimed to increase 
competition, reduce prices, address shortages, and “increase patient access 
to affordable drugs.”75 Rather than identify and penalize offending conduct, 
this bill sought to ameliorate the conditions which make excessive pricing 
possible—namely, limited competition.76 
The bill’s provisions pertaining to insulin are of particular interest. The 
Act would have required that within a year of enactment, HHS must begin 
to manufacture certain insulins.77 These would include insulins with no 
current market exclusivities and less than three manufacturers for the U.S. 
market that, in the previous twelve months, had a price hike above the 
Consumer Price Index for Medical Care.78 This definition of a trigger price 
for regulatory action is quite clear. 
7. Low Drug Prices Act 
Senator Jeff Merkley introduced the Low Drug Prices Act in November 
2018.79 This bill implicitly addressed the problem of excessive pricing 
through reference pricing. The Act would have required HHS to “establish 
annual reference prices”80 and mandated that the total acquisition costs of 
prescription drugs for federal health programs could not exceed those 
reference prices.81 The total acquisition cost is the amount paid by the federal 
program plus the amount paid by the patient, after discounts and rebates.82 
Reference prices would have been set using the median price of the drug sold 
in specified foreign countries (Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Canada, Australia, Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
Sweden).83 Further, the bill would have conditioned reimbursement of a drug 
 
 74 S. 3775 § 310B(a)(4)(D)(i); H.R. 7348 § 310B(a)(4)(D)(i). 
 75 S. 3775 § 310B(a)(2); H.R. 7348 § 310B(a)(2). 
 76 See Elizabeth Warren, It’s Time to Let the Government Manufacture Generic Drugs, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 17, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/elizabeth-warren-its-time-to-let-
the-government-manufacture-generic-drugs/2018/12/17/66bc0fb0-023f-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/6RMC-ZWKU]; Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren, Schakowsky 
Introduce Bicameral Legislation to Radically Reduce Drug Prices Through Public Manufacturing of 
Prescription Drugs (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-
schakowsky-introduce-bicameral-legislation-to-radically-reduce-drug-prices-through-public-
manufacturing-of-prescription-drugs [https://perma.cc/9GB6-MPTQ] (calling the bill “an ambitious 
proposal to address the skyrocketing price of prescription drugs”). 
 77 S. 3775 § 310B(d). 
 78 Id. § 310B(e)(1)(C)(ii)(I). 
 79 Low Drug Prices Act, S. 3680, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 80 Id. § 2(a). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. §§ 2(b)(1)–(2). 
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in federal health programs on drug manufacturers offering the reference price 
to all buyers, including the uninsured and patients with commercial and 
individual health plans.84 
B. State Bills and Enacted Legislation 
While Congress has recently become a locus of bills addressing 
excessively priced prescription drugs, states (and the District of Columbia) 
have been active in this space for the past several years.85 In 2019, more than  
300 bills were filed at the state level to address prescription drug costs.86 In 
2018, “forty-four states considered 227 bills to address rising drug costs, of 
which 55 became laws in thirty-two states.”87 In the following Section, we 
survey two key strategies states have pursued to directly target excessive 
pricing: price gouging laws and rate-setting laws. 
1. Price Gouging Laws 
State price gouging statutes are a common legislative fixture for 
addressing steep price increases on necessary goods during emergency 
situations.88 Recently, this approach has been applied to prescription drugs. 
During the 2018–2019 legislative session, fifteen states considered price 
gouging legislation specific to medicines.89 The 2019 National Academy for 
State Health Policy (NASHP) legislative tracker showed five states 
introduced seven prescription drug price gouging bills.90 These bills all 
prohibit unconscionable or excessive prices for prescription drugs.91 
 
 84 Id. § 2(d) (“[A]s a condition for receiving reimbursements under any of the Federal programs, a 
drug manufacturer shall offer prescription drugs at the reference price to all individuals, including 
individuals who are not insured and individuals who are covered under a group health plan or group or 
individual health insurance coverage.”). 
 85 See, e.g., Gudiksen & King, supra note 18, at 98; Nat’l Acad. For State Health Policy,  
State Prescription Drug Legislative Tracker 2019, NASHP (Jan. 3, 2020), https://nashp.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2019/12/Final-2019-Tracker-1-3-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX76-WBWD] [hereinafter 
NASHP Tracker]. 
 86 Data are current as of January 3, 2020. NASHP Tracker, supra note 85. 
 87 Katie Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary: The Year in Review, SOURCE 
BLOG (Dec. 17, 2018), http://sourceonhealthcare.org/spotlight-on-2018-state-drug-legislation-summary-
the-year-in-review [https://perma.cc/NY5G-TYZF]. 
 88 See infra Section III.A for more details. 
 89 Gudiksen & King, supra note 18, at 110; Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation 
Summary, supra note 87; State Prescription Drug Legislative Tracker 2018, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE 
HEALTH POLICY (2018), https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Rx-Legislative-Tracker-Update-
9.5.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN7D-2USE]. 
 90 NASHP Tracker, supra note 85. 
 91 See id. The seven bills are S.B. 415, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., §§ 5–6 (Ind. 2019); H.B. 
5109, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (Mi. 2019); S.B. 2630, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018); S.B. 
1590, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018); S. 977, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018); S.B. 141, 
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Where price gouging bills have become law, they have faced 
formidable constitutional challenges.92 In 2007, the Federal Circuit struck 
down the District of Columbia’s excessive-price prohibition for patented 
medications on patent preemption grounds.93 Likewise, a decade later, the 
Fourth Circuit invalidated Maryland’s price gouging law for generic drugs, 
HB 631, hailed by its advocates as a “first-in-the-nation state law,”94 on 
dormant Commerce Clause grounds.95 Even before HB 631’s defeat, the 
pending legal challenge appeared to have had a “chilling effect on 
pharmaceutical price gouging laws”96: of the fifteen price gouging bills 
considered in 2018, none were enacted.97 Ten of these bills used similar 
language to HB 631, including their definitions of “unconscionable 
increase.”98 
These setbacks are palpable, but they are not necessarily definitive. The 
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in the Maryland case, and no 
prescription price gouging legislation has yet been reviewed beyond the 
courts of appeals. As others point out, if legislation similar to Maryland’s 
were enacted by a different state and challenged in another circuit reaching 
a different result, a circuit split might encourage Supreme Court review.99 
Even if these statutes pass muster under the dormant Commerce Clause, 
however, a lingering sticking point for price gouging prohibitions will be 
defining key terms such as “excessive” or “unconscionable” in a manner that 
 
2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 1308, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 32.1-373 
(Va. 2019). NASHP Tracker, supra note 85. 
 92 See, e.g., Dana A. Elfin, Spiked Maryland Rx Pricing Law Could Kill Similar Efforts, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (Apr. 16, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/spiked-
maryland-rx-pricing-law-could-kill-similar-efforts [https://perma.cc/SV78-2Q4J] (explaining the 
successful constitutional challenge to Maryland’s price gouging law). 
 93 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The 
Federal Circuit opinion treats the District of Columbia as a state. Id. at 1371–72. 
 94 Darien Shanske & Jane Horvath, Maryland’s Generic Drug Pricing Law Is Constitutional: A 
Recent Decision Misunderstands the Structure of the Industry, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180621.752771/full [https://perma.cc/Z3UX-9BCW]; 
see also Lucas Allen, Demanding Affordable Medicines: Lessons from Maryland’s Law Against Price 
Gouging, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 18, 2017), https://truthout.org/articles/demanding-affordable-medicines-
lessons-from-maryland-s-law-against-price-gouging [https://perma.cc/38RP-ZEV6] (“Maryland’s 
passage of HB 631 is one of a few victories in state drug-pricing legislation over the past year.”). 
 95 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1168 (2019). 
 96 Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary, supra note 87. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Katie Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary: Part 4—Price Gouging 
Prohibitions, SOURCE BLOG (Sept. 11, 2018), http://sourceonhealthcare.org/spotlight-on-2018-state-
drug-legislation-part-4-price-gouging-prohibitions [https://perma.cc/DRR5-7C7J]. 
 99 Id. 
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avoids a void-for-vagueness challenge.100 That issue has not yet been fully 
litigated. 
This Section details the rise and fall of the two most notable state 
prescription drug price gouging statutes—the District of Columbia’s 
Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005 and Maryland’s Prohibition 
Against Price Gouging for Essential Off-Patent or Generic Drugs—and then 
briefly reviews price gouging bills introduced in other states, many of which 
follow Maryland’s template. The efforts of the District of Columbia and 
Maryland are interesting foils to one another. Each tackled a different 
segment of excessive pricing problems—patented medications versus 
generics—and each had a distinct approach for identifying problematic 
pricing as well as enforcement. These differences had implications for the 
kind of legal challenges that would ultimately be their downfall. 
a. D.C.’s Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005 
More than a decade before the recent spate of state legislative efforts to 
control prescription drug costs, the District of Columbia led the field with 
the Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of 2005.101 This Act was passed 
based on findings that “[t]he excessive prices of prescription drugs” were 
“threatening the health and welfare of the residents of the District.”102 The 
legislation focused specifically on patented medications, and the tool it 
utilized was a price cap.103 The Act prohibited drug manufacturers and 
licensees from selling patented medications in the District of Columbia for 
an excessive price, stating, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any drug manufacturer 
or licensee thereof, excluding a point of sale retail seller, to sell or supply for 
sale or impose minimum resale requirements for a patented prescription drug 
that results in the prescription drug being sold in the District for an excessive 
price.”104 
As with several of the federal proposals already discussed, the law 
defined an “excessive price” by referencing prices paid in high-income 
foreign countries.105 It established a prima facie case of excessive pricing if 
the wholesale price of a patented medication was more than 30% higher than 
that medicine’s price “in any high income country in which the product is 
 
 100 See Robertson, supra note 18, at 1001 (“Under any such policy, it will remain difficult and 
contentious to determine what is and is not an ‘unconscionable’ price and to set the amount of any required 
rebate.”). 
 101 D.C. CODE § 28–4551 (2005). 
 102 Id. § 28–4551(1). 
 103 Id. § 28–4554(a). 
 104 Id. § 28–4553. 
 105 Id. § 28–4552(2); see also infra Section I.A. 
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protected by patents or other exclusive marketing rights.”106 The United 
Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Australia served as reference countries.107 
Once a prima facie case was established, the law provided that a 
defending manufacturer or rights-holder would have the opportunity to rebut 
the presumption of price gouging by providing evidence of the 
demonstrated costs of invention, development and production of the 
prescription drug, global sales and profits to date, consideration of any 
government funded research that supported the development of the drug, and 
the impact of price on access to the prescription drug by residents and the 
government of the District of Columbia.108 
The Act provided that “[a]ny affected party” had standing to file a civil 
enforcement suit, and a finding of excessive pricing could yield injunctive 
relief, fines, damages (including treble damages), attorneys’ fees, litigation 
costs, or “[a]ny other relief the court deems proper.”109 
Pharmaceutical industry organizations BIO and PhRMA challenged the 
Act, claiming that it was invalid under the Commerce Clause and preempted 
by federal patent law.110 The District Court for the District of Columbia found 
that the Act violated the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to 
transactions not within the District’s borders,111 and further ruled it 
preempted by patent law.112 The patent issue was appealed, eventually 
reaching the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court and enjoined the Act’s enforcement, deeming it to be 
conflict preempted.113 The court explained that “[b]y penalizing high 
prices—and thus limiting the full exercise of the exclusionary power that 
derives from a patent,” the Act impermissibly tinkered with the balance set 
by Congress in the patent system between incentives for invention and public 
access to patented products.114 
 
 106 D.C. CODE § 28–4554(a). 
 107 Id. § 28–4552(2). 
 108 Id. § 28–4554(b). 
 109 Id. § 28–4555. 
 110 Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. D.C., 496 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Pharm. Research & 
Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 111 Pharm. Research, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 71. For a discussion of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 
see infra Section I.B.1.b. 
 112 Pharm. Research, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 
 113 496 F.3d at 1374. Conflict preemption occurs when state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 1372 (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 114 Id. at 1374. 
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Although much about this ruling invites further inquiry, if not 
skepticism,115 the issue was not appealed to the Supreme Court.116 The ruling 
appears to have had a chilling effect on states’ attempts to regulate high-
priced, on-patent medications through price caps. Importantly, however, 
although the decision appears to foreclose state efforts to regulate the prices 
at which patented medications may be sold, it does not appear to reach 
initiatives that regulate what payers will pay for patented medications. Thus, 
rate-setting proposals, discussed below, appear unaffected by the ruling as 
long as they do not raise dormant Commerce Clause or other constitutional 
concerns.117 Moreover, the decision does not reach regulation of off-patent 
or generic medications. 
b. Maryland’s Prohibition Against Price Gouging for Essential 
Off-Patent or Generic Drugs 
Given the invalidation of the District of Columbia’s earlier effort to 
regulate the prices of patented medications, it is unsurprising that subsequent 
state-level price gouging bills focused on generics. The most important of 
these was Maryland’s HB 631, which was struck down by the Fourth Circuit 
in 2018. 
On May 27, 2017, Maryland enacted HB 631, the Prohibition Against 
Price Gouging for Essential Off-Patent or Generic Drugs.118 Maryland’s 
legislation put patented medications aside and focused on off-patent or 
generic medications for which all federal exclusivities—patent or 
otherwise—had expired.119 Further, the statute only covered medications 
deemed “essential” and produced by “three or fewer manufacturers.”120 HB 
631’s anti-gouging prohibition stated that “[a] manufacturer or wholesale 
 
 115 See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, BIO v. DC and the New Need to Eliminate Federal Patent Law 
Preemption of State and Local Price and Product Regulation, 2007 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J., https:// 
patentlyo.com/lawjournal/2007/08/bio-v-dc-and-th.html [https://perma.cc/XKF2-GY4G] (criticizing the 
Federal Circuit’s preemption analysis). 
 116 The Federal Circuit also denied both rehearing and rehearing en banc. See Biotechnology Indus. 
Org. v. District of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 117 See Feldman et al., supra note 17, at 49–50. 
 118 HB 631, GEN. ASSEMBLY MD. (Nov. 28, 2017), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain. 
aspx?stab=01&pid=billpage&tab=subject3&ys=2017rs&id=HB0631 [https://perma.cc/E2G4-L8Y6]. 
 119 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(b)(1)(i) (West 2017). 
 120 Id. § 2–801(b)(1)(iii). Three seems to be minimum number of manufacturers required for a 
reasonably well-functioning generic market. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, 
at 77 (“If only a single generic producer enters the market, it does not necessarily reduce prices . . . . It 
may take several competing generic companies to enter the market [for prices] to reach their lowest 
possible level . . . .”). 
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distributor may not engage in price gouging in the sale of an essential off-
patent or generic drug.”121 
A further distinction between the District of Columbia’s law and 
Maryland’s was the metrics used to determine what constituted an excessive 
price. While the District of Columbia used foreign reference pricing plus a 
30% markup as a benchmark, Maryland’s key terms were not defined 
quantitatively.122 Instead, borrowing terminology from the common law 
doctrine of unconscionability,123 HB 631 defined “price gouging” in terms of 
an “unconscionable increase.”124 “Unconscionable increase” was in turn 
defined as 
an increase in the price of a prescription drug that: 
(1) Is excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the drug or the 
cost of appropriate expansion of access to the drug to promote public 
health; and 
(2) Results in consumers for whom the drug has been prescribed having no 
meaningful choice about whether to purchase the drug at an excessive price 
because of: 
(i) The importance of the drug to their health; and 
(ii) Insufficient competition in the market for the drug.125 
Although this definition, on its face, left considerable room for 
interpretation as to what counts as an “unconscionable increase,” it was 
rendered more concrete when read in conjunction with HB 631’s notification 
provisions. HB 631 endowed the state Attorney General with enforcement 
 
 121 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–802(a). 
 122 This was done “to avoid legislation that might be significantly under-inclusive or that might seem 
to validate an otherwise-unjustified price increase based solely on the fact that it remained below a 
particular quantitative threshold, the General Assembly selected a qualitative standard, rather than a 
qualitative [sic] one.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 32, Ass’n for 
Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017) (No. 17-cv-01860), 2017 WL 
9438490 [hereinafter Frosh Motion to Dismiss]. 
 123 See, e.g., id. at 31 (“[T]he Act draws directly from the well-established common law doctrine of 
unconscionability, expressly invoking both the ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ components of that 
doctrine. The doctrine has been applied by courts in literally hundreds of cases over the course of 
centuries, without threat to anyone’s constitutional rights.”); id. at 3 (“HB 631 closely tracks the common 
law doctrine of unconscionability, which predates the Constitution itself.”). 
 124 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(c). The legislation presumed that any generic drug 
already has a price, so Maryland could target price increases without worry that it would incentivize 
excessively high launch prices. 
 125 Id. § 2–801(f); see also Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *8–10, rev’d, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019) (describing the statute’s unconscionability provisions and analyzing 
dormant Commerce Clause and Due Process vagueness challenges in the context of a motion to dismiss). 
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powers (another departure from the District of Columbia’s statute).126 
Enforcement could begin127 with notification of a price increase to 
Maryland’s Attorney General by the Maryland Medical Assistance 
Program.128 The Maryland Medical Assistance Program could only notify the 
Attorney General, however, of certain price increases.129 Among those 
increases were those where the increase “by itself or in combination” 
resulted in a 50% or greater increase in the WAC within the past year, or 
related to drugs with a WAC over $80 for defined periods of time, dosing, 
or course of treatment.130 Although the notification provisions specified 
which price was to be examined (the WAC, which approximates the list price 
of the drug), the more general definition of excessive price gave no such 
specification. 
Once notification of a price increase was received, the Attorney General 
had discretion to choose a path forward, if at all.131 One option was turning 
to Maryland’s courts for relief.132 Available remedies included an injunction, 
restoration of money acquired through prohibited pricing to consumers and 
payers, restrictions on future pricing available to state health programs, and 
civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation.133 
Dismayed with the passage of this legislation, the trade association 
representing generic manufacturers, the Association for Accessible 
Medicines (AAM), sued. It advanced two main claims: that HB 631 violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause, and that it was unconstitutionally vague, in 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.134 AAM 
argued that HB 631 violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it 
reached transactions occurring wholly outside the State of Maryland. With 
respect to vagueness, AAM argued that several of the legislation’s key terms 
 
 126 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–803. 
 127 We say “can begin” because it is unclear if enforcement must begin with notification. 
Furthermore, the district court observed: “Although HB 631’s reporting provision could serve as a 
benchmark, it does not appear to be binding on the Attorney General.” Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *10 
(citing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–803(a)). 
 128 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–803(a). 
 129 Id. §§ 2-803(a)(1)–(2). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. §§ 2-803(b)–(d). 
 132 Id. § 2-803(d). 
 133 Id. §§ 2-803(d)(1)–(5). 
 134 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 23–27, Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 
2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. July 6, 2017) (No. 17-cv-01860), 2017 WL 2884401 [hereinafter Ass’n for 
Accessible Meds. Complaint]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
880 
including “unconscionable increase” and “excessive” were impermissibly 
unclear as to proscribed conduct.135 Maryland filed a motion to dismiss.136 
On September 29, 2017, the district court granted Maryland’s motion 
in part and denied it in part.137 The court dismissed the dormant Commerce 
Clause claim but preserved the vagueness claim.138 AAM appealed, and the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the dormant Commerce Clause claim 
and invalidated the statute on that basis.139 
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, a corollary of the Commerce 
Clause, holds that states cannot interfere with or burden interstate 
commerce.140 Its purpose is to guard against economic protectionism and 
state legislation that privileges in-state parties at the expense of similarly 
situated out-of-state competitors.141 
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides several different 
routes for evaluating whether state legislation runs afoul of its prohibitions.142 
Though a historically small corner of this analysis,143 the extraterritoriality 
principle played a central role in the Fourth Circuit’s decision. The Fourth 
Circuit articulated two ways state legislation could violate this principle: “if 
it either expressly applies to out-of-state commerce, or has that ‘practical 
effect,’ regardless of the legislature’s intent.”144 Whereas the district court 
 
 135 Id. at 22, 27–28. 
 136 Frosh Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122. 
 137 Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *15. It further denied AAM’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *3–4 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 
887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019) (laying out a “two-tiered” analysis of 
per se violations and a balancing test under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., plus a third “emerging” strand of 
cases formulating an extraterritoriality principle) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970)). The Pike balancing test, however, has become disfavored, though not yet invalidated by the 
Supreme Court. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) (“[E]ven on the assumption 
that a Pike examination might generally be in order in this type of case, the current record and scholarly 
material convince us that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of 
the kind that would be necessary . . . to satisfy [the] Pike burden . . . .”); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348–49 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) 
(“I am unable to join Part II–D of the principal opinion, in which the plurality performs so-called ‘Pike 
balancing.’ Generally speaking, the balancing of various values is left to Congress—which is precisely 
what the Commerce Clause (the real Commerce Clause) envisions.”). 
 143 Frosh, 887 F.3d at 681 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (stating that the extraterritoriality principle “has 
been characterized by our sister circuits as the [sic] ‘the most dormant’ of the Supreme Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause”). 
 144 Id. at 668 (citations omitted). 
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had rejected an interpretation of the extraterritoriality principle as 
“stand[ing] for the much broader proposition that a regulation that has effects 
outside the state is per se invalid,”145 that appears to be precisely the 
interpretation embraced by the Fourth Circuit. Given that HB 631’s 
prohibition against unconscionable increases applied to sales by 
manufacturers and wholesalers, the statute would reach transactions 
occurring outside of Maryland.146 The Fourth Circuit concluded: 
The Act instructs prescription drug manufacturers that they are prohibited from 
charging an “unconscionable” price in the initial sale of a drug, which occurs 
outside Maryland’s borders. Maryland cannot, even in an effort to protect its 
consumers from skyrocketing prescription drug costs, impose its preferences in 
this manner. The “practical effect” of the Act . . . is to specify the price at which 
goods may be sold beyond Maryland’s borders.147 
The Court found the argument that the statute only reached upstream 
transactions for drugs made for sale in Maryland unavailing.148 Despite the 
states’ and even AAM’s understanding of the statute as only implicating 
drugs made for eventual sale in Maryland, the Court found that HB 631 could 
reach transactions that had no nexus to drug sales in the state.149 Maryland’s 
petition for a rehearing en banc was denied,150 as was its petition for certiorari 
to the Supreme Court.151 Thus, Maryland’s price gouging law remains void 
until it is reworked to be consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. Because 
the vagueness argument was not fully litigated, it remains a viable basis for 
legal challenges to future statutes like HB 631. 
c. Other State Price Gouging Laws 
The efforts of the District of Columbia and Maryland are the most 
notable state-level experiments with excessive price and price gouging 
legislation. Maryland’s legislation, in particular, has been remarkably 
influential. As noted above, of the fifteen prescription drug price gouging 
proposals introduced during the 2018 legislative session, ten included 
 
 145 Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *6 (“[I]f any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of 
state is per se unconstitutional, wouldn’t we have to strike down state health and safety regulations that 
require out-of-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels?” (quoting Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. 
v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2015))). 
 146 Frosh, 887 F.3d at 672–73. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 672. 
 149 Id. at 671; Id. at 678–79 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 150 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 742 F. App’x 720 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 151 Frosh v. Ass’n for Accessible Meds., 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019). 
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language drawn from or identical to HB 631.152 Further, the majority of the 
price gouging bills tracked by NASHP for the 2018–2019 legislative 
session153—Indiana’s SB 415;154 Michigan’s HB 5109;155 New Jersey’s SB 
2630156 and SB 1590;157 and Virginia’s SB 1308158—are identical to or share 
significant similarities with HB 631’s key language and requirements.159 
Although most state price gouging legislation is modeled after 
Maryland’s, there are some departures. Rhode Island’s H 7022, for instance, 
hewed closely to traditional price gouging statutes for times of emergency.160 
Contemplating situations of drug shortage, it only applied during a “market 
emergency” declared by the governor or President, and then only for six 
months.161 Price gouging would be measured by comparing average prices 
(prior to rebates and discounts being applied) of drugs sold before and during 
the emergency to determine whether a “gross disparity” existed.162 Another 
example is New York’s S 5262,163 which would have amended New York’s 
business law to prohibit price gouging of prescription medications subject to 
shortages. Specifically, S 5262 provided that “[n]o party within the chain of 
distribution of any drug subject to a shortage shall sell or offer to sell any 
such drug subject to a shortage for an amount which represents an 
unconscionably excessive price.”164 The bill provided that a determination of 
“unconscionably excessive is a question of law for the court,”165 but provided 
 
 152 For a state-by-state summary of laws introduced in 2018, see Gudiksen, supra note 98 (noting 
similar laws were introduced in Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 153 NASHP Tracker, supra note 85. 
 154 S.B. 415, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., §§ 5–6 (Ind. 2019). 
 155 H.B. 5109, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mi. 2019). 
 156 S.B. 2630, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018). 
 157 S.B. 1590, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018). 
 158 S.B. 1308, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 32.1-373 (Va. 2019). 
 159 In contrast to HB 631, New Jersey’s S 977 targets any FDA-approved medication or health 
technology that received government funding; it also focuses on prices paid in other countries. S. 977, 
218th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.J. 2018). S 977 took inspiration from a federal bill proposed by Senator 
Sanders. Rebecca Wolitz, The Pay Twice Critique, Government Funding, and Reasonable Pricing 
Clauses, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 190 (2019). New York’s SB 141 is also not limited to generic 
medications. It further provides that a determination of an “unconscionably excessive price” is a question 
of law and outlines evidence for proving a violation of the law, including “a gross disparity between the 
market price of the pharmaceutical . . . and the price of the same . . . over the six months prior . . . .” S.B. 
141, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2019). 
 160 H. 7022, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018). 
 161 Id. § 6-13.4-4. 
 162 Id. § 6-13.4-3(6). 
 163 S. 5262, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 164 Id. § 396-rrr(2). 
 165 Id. § 396-rrr(3). 
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some guideposts: courts should consider disparities between the price after 
and before the shortage began, or between prices charged by the same seller 
to different purchasers.166 The legislation did not specify which price should 
be assessed. 
In summary, price gouging laws have been a fairly popular approach 
for states, with Maryland in particular inspiring a number of imitators. Given 
the discouraging litigation outcomes concerning these early laws, however, 
continued policymaking momentum in this area will require finding ways 
around patent preemption and dormant Commerce Clause challenges. This 
might entail, for example, imposing price gouging prohibitions on patented 
drugs via federal rather than state legislation, and focusing on within-state 
transactions for state laws that prohibit excessive prices for off-patent drugs. 
And such laws may continue to be confronted with vagueness challenges, as 
we describe further in Part II, necessitating careful drafting of statutory 
definitions of excessive price. 
2. Rate-Setting Laws 
There is growing interest among states in using rate setting by “drug 
affordability boards” (DABs) to address unconscionable pricing.167 This 
approach does not restrict drug prices per se, but rather sets an upper limit 
on the amount that specified drug purchasers in the state will pay.168 In 2018, 
seven states considered bills along these lines;169 in 2019, the NASHP 
legislative tracker listed fifteen bills introduced in nine states.170 In the 
highest-profile legislative victories to date, Maryland enacted rate-setting 
 
 166 Id. §§ 396-rrr(3)(b)(i)–(ii). 
 167 Ed Silverman, If the States Don’t Treat Pharma as a Utility, It May Be ‘Lights Out’ for Too Many 
Patients, STAT (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/25/states-pharma-utility-price-caps-
patients [https://perma.cc/A57N-836V]; see also Jane C. Horvath & Gerard F. Anderson, The States as 
Important Laboratories for Federal Prescription Drug Cost-Containment Efforts, 321 JAMA 1561, 1561 
(2019) (describing initiatives in Maryland and other states to establish “all-payor upper payment limits” 
for select high-cost drugs). 
 168 Horvath & Anderson, supra note 165, at 1561. 
 169 Gudiksen, Spotlight on 2018 State Drug Legislation Summary, supra note 87. 
 170 See S.B. 27, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2019); S.B. 370, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2019); H.B. 
3493, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019); L.D. 1499, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); H.B. 768, 2019 Gen. 
Assemb. (Md. 2019); H. 1133, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); S. 706, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); 
H. 4000, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); H. 4134, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); H.F. 1668, 91st Sess. 
(Minn. 2019); S.B. 310, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2019); S.B. 977, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); 
H.B. 2692, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); see also NASHP Tracker, supra note 85; Comparison of 
States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, NASHP (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://nashp.org/comparison-of-bills-creating-state-prescription-drug-affordability-review-boards 
[https://perma.cc/R4NQ-KT64]. Of note, New Jersey’s proposal caps prices, rather than sets payment or 
reimbursement rates. Id. 
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legislation known as HB 768 in May 2019,171 and Maine enacted similar 
legislation, LD 1499, the following month.172 In September 2019, 
Massachusetts also enacted HB 4000, a general appropriations bill, which 
included provisions enabling an affordability review process for negotiating 
supplemental rebate agreements with manufacturers for drugs covered by 
MassHealth.173 
Early permutations of rate setting in the prescription drug space, 
proposed by ballot initiatives in California and Ohio, would have imposed a 
price ceiling for state government payers, such as state employee health 
insurance plans.174 That price ceiling was keyed to the prices paid by the 
United States Department of Veterans Affairs, which receives a statutory 
discount of 24% “off of the nonfederal AMP”175 plus additional, negotiated 
rebates.176 The Ohio Drug Price Relief Act and its California cousin both 
failed at the polls.177 
The general mechanism in rate-setting proposals is the creation of a 
board that is empowered to review drug prices and set upper payment limits. 
These bills also often incorporate transparency provisions requiring drug 
manufacturers to submit information pertaining to price increases and launch 
prices.178 Some proposals frame rate setting as triggered by drugs that present 
an “affordability challenge,”179 but many are explicitly concerned with 
regulating “excessive” prices—including the influential model legislation 
 
 171 Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, H.B. 768, ch. 692, 2019 Md. Laws 692; Lev Facher, 
Pharma Lobbyists Flooded Maryland to Block a Drug-Pricing Bill. Opponents Pushed Back—and Won, 
STAT (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/11/pharma-lobbyists-flooded-maryland-to-
block-a-drug-pricing-bill-opponents-pushed-back-and-won [https://perma.cc/9HK7-HYHG]. 
 172 Maine Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 471, 2019 Me. Laws 471 (2019). 
 173 H. 4000, 191st Gen. Court (Mass. 2019); see also NASHP Tracker, supra note 85. 
 174 California Proposition 61, Drug Price Standards, BALLOTPEDIA (2016) https://ballotpedia.org/ 
California_Proposition_61,_Drug_Price_Standards_(2016) [https://perma.cc/8KQ4-VW2X]; Ohio Issue 
2, Drug Price Standards Initiative, BALLOTPEDIA (2017) https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Issue_2,_Drug_ 
Price_Standards_Initiative_(2017) [https://perma.cc/B8T8-ZXHW]. 
 175 Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2338 (2018) (citing 
38 U.S.C. § 8126(a)(2) (2012)); California Proposition 61, supra note 174; Ohio Issue 2, supra note 174. 
 176 Catherine Candisky & Megan Henry, Ohioans Nix Controversial Drug-Price Issue, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Nov. 8, 2017, 5:54 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20171107/ohioans-nix-
controversial-drug-price-issue [https://perma.cc/8SSN-FX6Z]. 
 177 Id. For further thoughts about why such initiatives may not work well, see Sachs, supra note 175, 
at 2328–29. 
 178 See, e.g., Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, NASHP, https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/08/Rate-Setting-Model-Act-Explanation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV6M-THZD] (discussing 
NAHSP’s Model Act and stating “[t]he reporting requirements in this section parallel the NASHP 
Transparency Model Act, which requires reporting for drugs priced at or above specific thresholds”). 
 179 See, e.g., Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 692, 2019 Md. Laws 692, §§ 21–2C–
08(B)(2), (C)(4). 
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proposed by NASHP.180 The model legislation seeks to “protect State 
residents, state and local governments (including their contractors and 
vendors), commercial health plans, providers, state-licensed pharmacies, and 
other health care system stakeholders from excessive costs of certain 
prescription drugs.”181 
Many state legislators have proposed legislation following this 
approach.182 Provisions commonly include setting out criteria for a board or 
commission’s makeup, identifying triggering requirements for which drugs 
will be subject to potential cost review, identifying information required 
from manufacturers, establishing policies for public disclosure, determining 
which drugs based on submitted information will be subject to a maximum 
payment allowance, establishing criteria for setting payments, and 
specifying enforcement provisions.183 For instance, a rate-setting bill 
proposed in Oregon, HB 2696, is specifically structured to set rates for drugs 
imposing excess costs. The bill provides: “If the Drug Cost Review 
Commission finds, based on a drug cost review, that the cost of a prescription 
drug will result in excess costs for payers in this state, the commission shall 
establish the maximum payment rate that may be claimed for the 
drug . . . .”184 HB 2696 further defines “excess costs” as either exceeding “the 
cost of alternative treatment options with equivalent therapeutic benefits” or 
imposing costs that are “not financially sustainable for public and private 
health care systems over a period of 10 years.”185 
With the exception of New Jersey’s A 583 and Minnesota’s insulin-
specific HF 284, every state bill proposed in 2019 covers patented and 
 
 180 An Act to Establish Rate Setting of Prescription Drugs in [State], NASHP, https://nashp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/NASHP-RX-Rate-Setting-Model-Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLC5-Z6TV] 
[hereinafter NASHP Model Rate Setting Law]. Some discuss both affordability and excessive costs. See, 
e.g., H. 1133, 191st Gen. Court, § 10A (Mass. 2019). Regarding influence, compare NASHP Model Rate 
Setting Law, supra, with Comparison of Bills Creating State Prescription Drug Affordability Review 
Boards, supra note 170 (compiling actual legislation and revealing the Model Law’s structural and 
substantive influence). 
 181 NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180. The Model Law further defines “excess costs” 
in section 4. Id. § 4. 
 182 See, e.g., H. 1133 (pulling NASHP quoted language nearly verbatim in § 2(a)); H.B. 2696, 80th 
Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ore. 2019) (pulling NASHP quoted language nearly verbatim in § 8). 
 183 See generally NASHP Tracker, supra note 85 (compiling actual legislation and describing the 
rate-setting provisions). See also supra note 170 (listing rate-setting bills). 
 184 H.B. 2696, § 13. 
 185 Id. § 7(4). Note this two-part definition is a slight variation on NASHP’s model legislation. 
Although the second prong is essentially the same, the first prong is different. NASHP’s first prong is 
more of a cost-effectiveness test. NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180, § 4(2)(a) (“Costs of 
appropriate utilization of a prescription drug product that exceed the therapeutic benefit relative to other 
therapeutic options/alternative treatments . . . .”). 
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generic medications, and price increases as well as launch prices for new 
products.186 Moreover, bills proposed in Illinois (HB 3493) and 
Massachusetts (H 1133), and Maryland’s new law (HB 768), have largely 
identical triggering criteria for reporting requirements.187 They authorize 
boards to consider reviewing the costs for drugs and biologics with a WAC 
at launch of $30,000 or more, or a WAC increase of $3,000 or more over 
twelve months; biosimilars with a launch WAC that is not at least 15% lower 
than its branded counterpart; generic drugs with a WAC of $100 or more per 
month; and generic drugs with a WAC increase of 200% or more over twelve 
months.188 The Maryland law and Illinois bill also include a catchall 
provision for drugs creating affordability challenges for the state health care 
system and patients.189 Maine’s new law, by contrast, does not identify 
triggering criteria. Rather, Maine’s board will “determine annual spending 
targets for prescription drugs purchased by public payors based upon a ten-
year rolling average of the medical care services component of the . . . 
Consumer Price Index,” taking into account inflation and pharmacy 
savings.190 Maine’s board will further have the ability to identify spending 
targets for specific drugs creating affordability issues for those enrolled in 
public plans.191 
An important feature of the NASHP model legislation is that the 
determination of whether a drug’s cost is excessive is not made primarily by 
reference to the manufacturer—for instance, by reference to its research and 
development and marketing costs or its gross and net revenues.192 That 
information is considered secondarily if primary considerations for 
determining excess cost fail to yield a determination.193 The primary criterion 
 
 186 Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, supra note 
170. 
 187 See id.; 2019 Prescription Drug Affordability Initiative, HEALTH CARE FOR ALL (2019), 
http://healthcareforall.com/2019/01/2019-prescription-drug-affordability-initiative 
[https://perma.cc/SU7C-GLQ9] (confirming that triggering criteria remained the same in the final version 
of the bill). 
 188 H. 1133 § 10A(j); H.B. 768, 2019 Gen. Assemb. § 21–2C–08(C) (Md. 2019); H.B. 3493, 101st 
Gen. Assemb. § 30(d) (Ill. 2019); see also Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review 
Board Legislation, supra note 170. 
 189 H.B. 768 § 21–2C–08(C)(4); H.B. 3493 § 30(d)(4). 
 190 Maine Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 471, 2019 Me. Laws 471 § 2042; Newly-
Enacted Laws, NASHP, https://nashp.org/new-laws [https://perma.cc/UAM8-RAC7]. 
 191 2019 Me. Laws 471 § 2042(1)(B). 
 192 See Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, supra note 178, § 4; see, e.g., H.B. 2696, 80th Leg. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 12 (Or. 2019) (listing ten factors to be considered prior to consideration of 
manufacturer costs). 
 193 See Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, supra note 178, § 4. 
114:859 (2020) Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs 
887 
in determining whether a drug imposes excess costs or an affordability 
challenge instead pertains to “commercial payor, provider, and consumer 
costs.”194 Maryland’s law, for instance, requires its Board to consider factors 
including the drug’s WAC in the state and other relevant drug cost indexes; 
average discounts and rebates to state health plans and pharmacy benefit 
managers (PBMs); discounts given to patients through patient assistance 
programs; the WAC, discounts, and rebates for competitor therapies; total 
costs to health plans; the impact on patient access that results from the drug’s 
price in conjunction with the amount of patient cost-sharing that insurance 
plans require; how paying for the drug will financially impact overall health 
and social-services costs compared to therapeutic alternatives; and “any 
other factors as determined by the Board in regulations adopted by the 
Board.”195 
Legislative proposals for drug affordability review boards and rate 
setting are relatively new but hold promise for addressing costly 
medications. As NASHP details, its model legislation has taken some cues 
from the Canadian Patented Medicines Review Board,196 which has played a 
role in keeping drug costs in Canada lower than in the United States.197 
As with all state efforts to address excessive pricing, rate-setting 
proposals raise concerns, among others, about whether industry opposition 
will lead to legal challenges.198 One legal claim the industry may raise is that 
rate setting, insofar as it applies to patented medications, is preempted—
though some experts find this claim to be unavailing.199 Vagueness claims 
are also a possibility. 
 
 194 Id. 
 195 H.B. 768, ch. 692, 2019 Gen. Assemb., § 21–2C–09(B) (Md. 2019). 
 196 Drug Rate Setting Model Act Overview, supra note 178, § 4. There are some differences between 
the NASHP and Canadian approaches, however. Most notably, Canada’s Board reviews drugs for 
excessive price while the NASHP state Commission would consider whether drugs generate excessive 
costs for the state. Id. 
 197 See, e.g., So-Yeon Kang et al., Using External Reference Pricing in Medicare Part D to Reduce 
Drug Price Differentials with Other Countries, 38 HEALTH AFF. 804, 810 (2019) (“Compared to other 
countries, the U.S. pays substantially higher prices for single-sourced brand-name drugs that have been 
on the market for longer than three years”). 
 198 Jane Horvath, Maryland Rate-Setting Legislation Question and Answer, NASHP (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://nashp.org/maryland-rate-setting-legislation-question-and-answer/#q8 [https://perma.cc/UJH5-
DEW5]; see also Silverman, supra note 167 (quoting PhRMA as having “serious concerns” about the 
constitutionality of Maryland’s rate-setting legislation). 
 199 See e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 17, at 49–50. 
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II. VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS CHALLENGES TO EXCESSIVE-PRICE LAWS 
As discussed above, courts have already grappled with a number of 
different constitutional challenges to state laws regulating excessive drug 
prices. Although we and others have reviewed the contours of some types of 
challenges,200 void-for-vagueness claims remain largely unexplored in the 
scholarly literature on drug pricing and have not yet been fully adjudicated 
by the courts. As parsing “excessive” pricing can be a fraught task and 
vagueness challenges have the potential to undermine legislative efforts, we 
provide an overview of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and then turn to the 
specific application of this claim to the drug-pricing context. 
A. Void-for-Vagueness Under the Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution provide that no person may be deprived of 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”201 The void-for-
vagueness doctrine is an integral part of these due-process protections.202 It 
invalidates “laws that are impermissibly vague”203 and requires that 
enactments be “clearly defined.”204 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine serves two important purposes.205 
First, it “guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a 
statute proscribes.”206 Second, “the doctrine guards against arbitrary or 
discriminatory law enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards 
to govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges.”207 
 
 200 See generally Buck, supra note 18 (discussing the legal claims brought against Maryland and 
Massachusetts laws); Gudiksen & King, supra note 18 (broadly analyzing the pharmaceutical industry’s 
challenges to state legislation); Gudiksen et al., California’s Drug Transparency Law, supra note 18 
(describing legal challenges to California’s SB-17); Lee et al., supra note 18 (discussing the legal claims 
brought against Maryland and Nevada laws); Robertson, supra note 18 (describing dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to Maryland’s HB 631). 
 201 U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV § 1. 
 202 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“This requirement of clarity in 
regulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 205 See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (noting two protections of ensuring 
fair notice and non-arbitrary enforcement); Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 253–54 (“[T]he void for 
vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns . . . .”). 
 206 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1212; see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one 
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All 
are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” (footnote omitted)); Connally v. 
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
 207 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1212; see also Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 253; Grayned, 408 U.S. 
at 108–09. 
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Thus, a statute can be invalidated as vague if it either (1) “fails to 
provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
understand what conduct it prohibits,” or (2) “authorizes or even encourages 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”208 In interpreting the notice 
aspect of the doctrine, courts look for “reasonably clear lines” between the 
kinds of conduct that are permitted and those that are not.209 This standard 
will be met where the statute’s meaning can be ascertained from review of 
judicial interpretations, dictionaries, treatises, or commonly understood 
meanings of words.210 With respect to the enforcement aspect, the doctrine 
requires “that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.”211 
The standard applied to determine whether a law is impermissibly 
vague varies depending on the nature of the law.212 Because less is presumed 
to be at stake, provisions involving civil penalties are afforded more 
flexibility than those imposing criminal penalties.213 Further, the Court has 
applied relatively lax review to economic regulation “because its subject 
matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic 
demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant 
legislation in advance of action.”214 Compared to individuals, businesses are 
thought to have greater “access to the law and political capitol [sic]”215 and 
greater capability to stay abreast of regulatory developments.216 The Court 
has recognized that in the noncommercial context, “the most meaningful” 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not the notice aspect—suggesting that 
notice may be the most meaningful aspect in the commercial context.217 The 
less strict standard of review for economic regulation will not, however, be 
applied if the regulation potentially infringes an individual’s or entity’s 
constitutionally protected rights. Under such circumstances, the Court has 
 
 208 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). 
 209 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974). 
 210 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 972 (2019). 
 211 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574. 
 212 Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1212–13. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Village of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 215 Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127, 
1138. 
 216 Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 498–99; Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574 (“We recognize that in a 
noncommercial context behavior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory 
language.”). 
 217 Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574. 
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stated that “a more stringent vagueness test should apply.”218 In particular, 
greater precision and clarity are required of a law that threatens rights to 
freedom of speech.219 
The Court’s comments on economic regulation and civil penalties have 
particular salience for our analysis of potential vagueness challenges to laws 
regulating prescription drug prices. Although the fact patterns in many of the 
Supreme Court’s modern vagueness doctrine cases are somewhat removed 
from the drug-pricing context,220 several older cases dealing directly with the 
regulation of “excessive” and “unreasonable” prices bear striking 
similarities.221 
On one February day in 1921, the Supreme Court issued rulings in five 
related cases pertaining to the Lever Act,222 which among other things 
criminalized exacting “any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling 
or dealing in or with any necessaries” and “excessive prices for any 
necessaries.”223 In the main case outlining the Court’s reasoning, the Cohen 
Grocery Company was charged with “willfully and feloniously making an 
unjust and unreasonable rate and charge in handling and dealing in a certain 
necessary,” which was sugar.224 Other cases dealt with unreasonable prices 
for milk and clothing.225 
 
 218 Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 499; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1, 19 (2010) (“We have said that when a statute ‘interferes with the right of free speech or of association, 
a more stringent vagueness test should apply.’” (quoting Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 499)). 
 219 Village of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 499. Vague statutes “abut[ting] upon sensitive areas of basic 
First Amendment freedoms” are especially concerning because they can “inhibit the exercise of those 
freedoms” and “lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 
239, 253–54 (2012) (“When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to 
ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.”). However, “perfect clarity and precise guidance 
have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.” Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U.S. at 19 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citation omitted)). 
 220 See, e.g., Goguen, 415 U.S. at 583 (small flag placed on seat of pants); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 122 
(picketing outside of a school). 
 221 See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 29–30 (1963); United States v. L. 
Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 86 (1921); C.A. Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255 U.S. 104, 105 (1921); 
Tedrow v. A.T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co., 255 U.S. 98, 99 (1921); Weeds, Inc., v. United States, 
255 U.S. 109, 110 (1921); Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Co., 255 U.S. 102, 103 (1921); see also Johnson 
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2570 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing a 1914 case finding 
the phrase “real value” unconstitutionally vague). 
 222 See supra cases accompanying note 219. 
 223 L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 86 (quoting the Smith-Lever Act, ch. 80 § 2, 41 Stat. 297 
(1919)). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Kinnane, 255 U.S. at 103 (milk pricing); Lockwood, 255 U.S. at 105 (clothing pricing). 
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These cases challenged the pertinent provisions of the Lever Act as 
unconstitutionally vague, and the Court agreed,226 finding that “the section 
forbids no specific or definite act. . . . It leaves open, therefore, the widest 
conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of 
which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.”227 Remarking 
that the arbitrariness of a standard used for enforcement of the section was 
“not a mere abstraction,” the Court included a lengthy footnote detailing 
differences in interpretation of the term “unreasonable prices” among lower 
courts.228 
A more recent case in 1963, United States v. National Dairy Products 
Corp., considered a provision of the Robinson–Patman Act that criminalized 
the sale of goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying 
competition or eliminating a competitor.”229 Charged with selling products 
for below cost with the intent to drive competitors out of business, National 
Dairy alleged that the phrase “unreasonably low prices” was 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Focusing on the notice issue, the Court upheld the statute. It 
distinguished the facts of this case from those of L. Cohen Grocery Co., 
because here the statute made clear which kinds of business practices it 
targeted.230 A seemingly important factor was the statute’s intent element.231 
National Dairy was not just selling its products below cost, but doing so with 
the intent to undermine competition.232 The Court further reiterated that a 
vagueness analysis varies depending on whether constitutional rights 
(particularly under the First Amendment) are implicated, and here, they were 
not.233 
Lower federal courts and state courts considering claims that the term 
“unconscionable” is unconstitutionally vague have issued decisions in both 
directions. A Massachusetts federal district court, for instance, upheld a 
 
 226 Lockwood, 255 U.S. at 105–06; L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89. 
 227 L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89. 
 228 Id. at 89, 90 n.1. 
 229 372 U.S. at 29 (1963) (quoting the Robinson–Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1936)). 
 230 Id. at 35–36. 
 231 Id. at 37; see also Andrew E. Goldsmith, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 301 (2003) (discussing scienter element as a controversial 
mechanism courts sometimes use to mitigate vagueness). 
 232 Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 37 (“[S]ales made below cost without legitimate 
commercial objective and with specific intent to destroy competition would clearly fall within the 
prohibitions . . . .”). 
 233 Id. at 36 (“No such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to 
destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable.”). 
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mortgage lending statute providing that a mortgage lender could not offer 
rates or other terms which “‘significantly deviate from industry-wide 
standards or which are otherwise unconscionable.’”234 Noting the relatively 
weak standard of review applied to economic regulations, the court found 
that the law gave the defendant sufficient guidance as to what constituted 
proscribed behavior.235 That guidance included the industry-wide standard 
for subprime mortgage origination fees (where charging twice as much 
would be viewed as a likely deviation) and Massachusetts’s 
unconscionability doctrine.236 
On the other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court deemed the term 
“unconscionable” unconstitutionally vague in a statute providing that a used 
car dealer’s license could be revoked if the dealer “indulged in an 
unconscionable practice relating to said business.”237 At issue in the case was 
a dealership accused of resetting odometers to understate a car’s true 
mileage.238 The court invalidated the statute’s “catchall” phrase, reasoning 
that “[w]here criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions are to be imposed, we 
think the threat of arbitrary enforcement of the law requires more specificity 
than is contained” in the statute.239 The court rejected the state’s argument 
that it was impossible to catalog all of the unsavory practices against which 
the public required protection, quipping that cars are “not a new mercantile 
invention” and regulators “have years of experience to guide them in 
formulating their regulations.”240 As evidence, the court pointed to other 
parts of the statute where specific acts were enumerated.241 
To sum up, the void-for-vagueness doctrine encompasses several key 
elements. The concept of fair warning and the avoidance of arbitrary and 
standardless enforcement are pillars of the doctrine. In addition, regulations 
impacting constitutional rights or involving criminal penalties demand a 
 
 234 United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 205 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing 
940 C.M.R. § 8.06(6)). 
 235 Id. at 205. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Trail Ridge Ford, Inc. v. Colo. Dealer Licensing Bd., 543 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Colo. 1975). 
 238 Id. Although the court found this particular instance of the term “unconscionable” to be 
impermissibly vague, it cautioned that “[w]e should not be understood to say that a reference to 
‘unconscionable practices’ will always be unconstitutionally vague. There may be numerous areas of the 
law where a stronger argument for the validity of such a reference can be made, particularly in the civil 
field.” Id. at 1247. 
 239 Id. at 1246; cf. State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ark. 1999) 
(permitting the inclusion of unconscionable practice in a catchall provision “because the General 
Assembly could not be expected to envision every conceivable violation”). 
 240 Trail Ridge Ford, Inc., 543 P.2d at 1247. 
 241 Id. 
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higher level of scrutiny than economic regulation and statutes involving civil 
penalties. Further, courts that have considered the term “unconscionable” 
prices—or adjacent terms such as “unreasonable” prices—on vagueness 
grounds have ruled both that in some cases such terms do not violate the 
doctrine, but in other cases they do.242 
Although these guideposts are clearly laid out, many commentators 
have argued that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is itself vague and the 
Court’s application of it lacks predictability.243 For instance, it is not clear 
how the Court balances the two key factors—notice and nonarbitrary 
enforcement—against one another; “it has at times seemed to weigh notice 
without giving fair enforcement concerns adequate attention, and vice 
versa.”244 Another aspect of the doctrine that lacks clarity is what must be 
shown to bring a facial challenge. As we describe below, in the case against 
Maryland’s HB 631, the district court noted that the Supreme Court has put 
forward different standards.245 The complainant’s burden of proof has 
obvious ramifications for how challenging it will be to invalidate a statute as 
unconstitutionally vague. 
B. Vagueness Challenges to Drug Price Legislation in  
California and Maryland 
Industry trade associations have brought void-for-vagueness challenges 
against a California drug price transparency law, SB 17, and Maryland’s 
anti-price gouging law, HB 631. In the ongoing California litigation, PhRMA 
v. David, PhRMA’s vagueness claim focuses on the notice aspect of the 
 
 242 Compare United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 29 (1963) (finding 
“unreasonably low” language constitutional), with United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 
89 (1921) (finding “unreasonable rate[s]” language unconstitutionally vague). 
 243 Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright and the Vagueness Doctrine, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 359–
60 (2012) (“Given the state of the Court’s jurisprudence, one could even argue that the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine is itself standardless, vague, and susceptible to arbitrary or selective application by the courts.”); 
see also Koh, supra note 215, at 1137 (“Moreover, as a number of scholars have observed, the doctrine 
itself seems to lack consistency or predictability.”). 
 244 Koh, supra note 215, at 1137. 
 245 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 
887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019) (“The precedents do not provide a clear 
statement of the proper standard to apply in facial vagueness challenges. Under one formulation of the 
test, ‘the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’ . . . 
However, in a recent decision involving a criminal statute, the Supreme Court rejected the view that ‘a 
statute is void for vagueness only if it is vague in all its applications.’” (quoting Village of Hoffman Ests. 
v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 
2561 (2015))). This Court also noted the apparent lack of clarity about how to interpret “plainly legitimate 
sweep” of a statute in a civil case that does not involve First Amendment rights. Id. at *9 (quoting Martin 
v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 136–37 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
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doctrine246 and challenges a purported ambiguity that allegedly impinges 
upon drug manufacturers’ freedom of speech.247 By contrast, in the Maryland 
case, Association of Accessible Medications v. Frosh, the void-for-vagueness 
claim challenged the core definitions and aims of the statute. It raised key 
questions about just what kinds of pricing activities constitute a prohibited 
“unconscionable increase.” 
Because California’s transparency law is outside the ambit of our focus 
on price gouging laws, we do not delve into its intricacies here, but its key 
component is a requirement that drug manufacturers provide sixty-day 
advance notice of price increases that amount to 16% or greater over two 
years for drugs with a WAC of more than $40.248 In David, PhRMA argues 
that this notification requirement “offends due process because the Act is 
silent on which WAC increases determine whether a manufacturer has 
breached the statutory threshold.”249 The statute became effective on January 
1, 2018, but PhRMA claims it is unclear whether the notice provision 
calculation includes retroactive price increases occurring between January 1, 
2016 and January 1, 2018.250 PhRMA alleges that “multiple direct requests 
to clarify this ambiguity” with the administering agency have been 
unsuccessful.251 
This timing issue affects whether and to what extent a drug 
manufacturer may impose current or future increases if it wishes to avoid 
triggering notification.252 According to PhRMA, the vagueness is not just a 
matter of not knowing how statutory price increases are calculated. PhRMA 
argues that the notification requirement violates its members’ First 
Amendment free-speech rights by compelling a disclosure: “It is 
 
 246 See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 28–30, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. 
of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018). 
 247 Id. at 30. 
 248 S.B. 17 §§ 127677(a), (b). 
 249 See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 32, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. 
of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinafter PhRMA Amended 
Complaint]. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. But note that “California law prohibits an administrative agency from providing any pre-
regulatory guidance regarding the application of a law . . . and OSHPD’s regulations when published may 
not provide that guidance. Final responsibility for construing SB 17’s retroactive application rests with 
courts . . . .” Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss First 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6) at 27 n.8, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 
2018) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11340.5(a) (West 2019)). 
 252 PhRMA alleges that “[m]any of these manufacturers will not increase the WAC of products at 
the same time and in the same manner that they otherwise would without the risk of past increases 
triggering SB 17’s 60-day notice provision.” PhRMA Amended Complaint, supra note 249, at 33. 
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inappropriate to implement a de facto nationwide ban on WAC increases and 
to compel self-accusatory statements by manufacturers based on price 
increases before adoption of SB 17. . . . Each day, affected members must 
refrain from legitimate price increases to preserve their constitutionally 
protected silence.”253 
Although much is unclear about the application of the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that a higher 
standard applies when First Amendment rights are implicated.254 The success 
of PhRMA’s vagueness claim thus may hinge on the resolution of its 
underlying First Amendment claim. As of this writing, the Court has denied 
California’s motion to dismiss in David, and the case is still pending.255 
In AAM’s lawsuit challenging Maryland’s HB 631, the Fourth Circuit 
ruled the statute unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and 
declined to reach the vagueness claim.256 Although the void-for-vagueness 
challenge was never fully litigated, the District Court’s discussion of this 
claim offers some insights. 
As detailed above, HB 631 prohibited price gouging for generics, which 
it defined as an “unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription 
drug.”257 “Unconscionable increase” was defined using general criteria 
relating to whether price increases were “excessive and not justified” by 
increases in production costs of “appropriate expansion of access to the 
drug,” and whether the increases relate to drugs that consumers have “no 
meaningful choice” but to purchase.258 Further, other provisions of the statute 
stipulated what sort of price increases could trigger Maryland’s Medicaid 
program to notify the Attorney General that action may be appropriate under 
the statute. 
 
 253 Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 29, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. 
v. David, No. 2:17-cv-02573 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018). 
 254 See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) 
(“If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent 
vagueness test should apply.”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1972) (“Where First 
Amendment interests are affected, a precise statute ‘evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific 
conduct be . . . proscribed,’ assures us that the legislature has focused on the First Amendment interests 
and determined that other governmental policies compel regulation.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 255 As of this writing, the docket was last updated on January 13, 2020. 
 256 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 1168 (2019) (“Because we hold that the statute is unconstitutional pursuant to the dormant commerce 
clause, we need not address whether it is also void for vagueness.”). 
 257 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(c) (West 2017); see also Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. 
Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019). 
 258 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–801(f). For specifics, see also supra Section I.B.1.b. 
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AAM alleged that the terms “excessive,” “justified,” “appropriate,” and 
no “meaningful” choice were unconstitutionally vague.259 It argued that the 
bill “provides no guidance . . . on how to interpret or apply any of these 
provisions,” leaving the plaintiffs unable to determine whether contemplated 
price increases “would be considered ‘unconscionable.’”260 In response, 
Maryland argued that HB 631 explicitly drew upon the “centuries-old” 
common law doctrine of unconscionability,261 which provides “droves of 
precedents to which manufacturers and wholesale distributors can look to 
find guideposts.”262 
In denying Maryland’s motion to dismiss on the claim for vagueness, 
the district court rejected Maryland’s assertions about the common law 
doctrine of unconscionability.263 Because the statute provided its own 
definition of “unconscionable,” the court found, it was unclear whether 
common law understandings were “directly applicable.”264 The court went 
on to find that the terms “excessive,” “justified,” and “appropriate” raised at 
least the possibility of vagueness.265 The phrase “no meaningful choice,” by 
contrast, was sufficiently defined, as neither of its two qualifying 
subdivisions were vague.266 Thus, the court “recognize[d] that there are 
reasonable—though not necessarily prevailing—contentions [of 
unconstitutional vagueness] asserted by the Plaintiff.”267 
The Maryland case illustrates that vagueness challenges are a 
cognizable challenge to price gouging laws—one that seems likely to crop 
up again as other states and Congress take a bite at the price gouging apple. 
To better understand how future laws could be designed to withstand 
allegations of constitutional invalidity for vagueness, we turn now to lessons 
from legal prohibitions on excessive prices in other domains. 
 
 259 Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *10–11. 
 260 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. Complaint, supra note 134, at 28. 
 261 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Ass’n for Accessible 
Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 2017) (No. 17-cv-01860); see also Frosh Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 122, at 16, 31 (“The doctrine has been applied by courts in literally hundreds of cases 
over the course of centuries, without threat to anyone’s constitutional rights.”). 
 262 Frosh Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at 16. 
 263 Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818, at *10. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at *10–11. 
 266 Id. at *11. 
 267 Id. 
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III. DEFINING EXCESSIVE PRICE: LESSONS FROM OTHER AREAS OF LAW 
A. Price Gouging Laws for Times of Emergency 
The clearest analogue to excessive-price laws for prescription drugs are 
price gouging laws adopted by states to keep essential products affordable 
during times of emergency. These laws address the practice of escalating the 
price of a good or service above the regular selling price when a market 
disruption268 caused by an acute event, typically a natural disaster or 
manmade emergency,269 interrupts supply or causes demand to spike. They 
are typically adopted after states have experienced a natural disaster that led 
to price spikes for necessities such as gasoline or portable generators.270 The 
broadest of the laws permits the invocations of its price gouging provisions 
before a market disruption occurs, if “there is a substantial likelihood that an 
abnormal market disruption is imminent.”271 The statutes’ prohibitions on 
price hikes are time limited—for example, they may last thirty days after a 
formal declaration of emergency, or for the duration of the emergency.272 
Emergency price gouging laws impose civil penalties for violations, 
which may be substantial because they are pegged to each violation (i.e., 
each sale).273 Some allow for injunctive relief, criminal charges, or a private 
right of action for consumers.274 In some states, the statutes operate by 
defining excessive price hikes as a violation of the state’s general consumer 
protection statute prohibiting unfair and deceptive business practices; in 
others, price gouging laws are freestanding.275 
 
 268 An exception is a Michigan statute, which prohibits “[c]harging the consumer a price that is 
grossly in excess of the price at which similar property or services are sold” without any requirement of 
an emergency or market disruption. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.903(1)(z) (2019). 
 269 Acts of terrorism and civil unrest are illustrative of the situations commonly contemplated as 
manmade emergencies. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r(2) (Consol. 2019) (listing as potential 
causes of market disruption “failure or shortage of electric power or other source of energy, strike, civil 
disorder, war, military action”). 
 270 Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects 
of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J. 535, 542–43 (2006) (listing various anti-gouging laws that 
were enacted after particular disasters). 
 271 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.10, § 1105(2) (2014); see also Justin Schuster, America’s Drug Problem, 
POLITIC (Feb. 11, 2013), http://thepolitic.org/price-gouging-and-the-prescription-drug-gray-market 
[https://perma.cc/SJK3-Z7KY] (indicating that Maine has the most expansive anti-price gouging statute 
in the nation). 
 272 Rapp, supra note 270, at 543–45. 
 273 Price Gouging Laws by State, FINDLAW, https://consumer.findlaw.com/consumer-
transactions/price-gouging-laws-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/897Y-WE9Q] (listing enforcement 
mechanisms of each law). 
 274 Id. 
 275 See Rapp, supra note 270, at 541–42. 
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Most states—thirty-four, at last count, plus the District of Columbia as 
of a 2012 survey—have adopted some type of emergency price gouging 
law.276 They vary in the scope of products and services covered. Some are 
narrowly crafted, with specific products listed,277 while others are broader, 
giving discretion to officials to determine which goods constitute necessities 
in the wake of an emergency. Broader statutes typically specify that the 
goods and services be essential to the public’s health, safety, or welfare.278 
Prior to the recent wave of adoption of statutes specifically aimed at 
prescription drugs, very few state price gouging laws specifically mentioned 
pharmaceuticals.279 
1. Approaches to Defining Excessive Price 
In describing prohibited conduct, emergency price gouging laws take 
three approaches.280 What we will call “Type 1” laws specify a maximum 
percentage price increase that may occur after the market disruption occurs. 
 
 276 Id. (summarizing some of the thirty-four states’ laws); Michael Giberson, Thirty-four States and 
the District of Columbia Have Anti-Price Gouging Laws, KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM (Nov. 17, 2012), 
https://knowledgeproblem.com/2012/11/03/list-of-price-gouging-laws [https://perma.cc/8AUU-TSHZ] 
(listing state laws as of November 17, 2012); see also Gudiksen, supra note 96 (identifying Giberson’s 
as the most recent available list of laws as of September 2018). 
 277 Fuel is the most common product mentioned, but statutes also mention water, food, rental 
facilities, medical supplies, building materials, transportation services, storage services, housing, and 
emergency supplies such as batteries and flashlights. For further details, see the statutes compiled at Price 
Gouging Laws by State, supra note 273. See also Joshua Gregg, The Implications, Negative Health 
Effects, Legal Issues, and Potential Solutions Associated with the Shortage of Essential Drugs in the U.S. 
Medical Care Market, 25.2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 431–32 (2015) (summarizing states’ approaches 
to price gouging legislation). 
 278 See Price Gouging Laws by State, supra note 273. 
 279 But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(19) (2014) (listing “pharmaceuticals”); IOWA ADMIN. CODE 
r. 61–31.1(714) (2019) (“medicines”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.372(8) (2018) (defining “medical 
supplies” to include “prescription and nonprescription medications”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.10, 
§ 1105(1)(C) (2014) (listing “pharmaceutical products, including prescription medications” among the 
“necessities” covered); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5102(9) (West 2019) (“prescription and 
nonprescription medications”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(27) (2019) (“medicine”); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 59.1–526 (2019) (“medical supplies and services”); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6J-2(i) (2019) 
(“prescription and nonprescription medications”). A few other states’ laws refer to “chemicals,” but that 
term is placed among a list of building supplies and may be intended to mean non-pharmaceutical 
chemicals. See, e.g., 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-21(b)(3) (2019). 
 280 This typology was offered by Rapp, supra note 270, at 543–50, and cited in Caitlin E. Ball, Note, 
Sticker Shock at the Pump: An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Petroleum Price-Gouging Regulation, 
44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2011) and Emily Bae, Note, Are Anti-Price Gouging Legislations 
Effective Against Sellers During Disasters?, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 79, 83 (2009) (listing state 
laws falling into each of these three groups). Close review of the statutes reveals that some are a  
hybrid of the three approaches. For instance, Kentucky’s law sets forth a general standard, “grossly  
in excess of the price prior to the declaration and unrelated to any increased cost to the seller,” but creates 
safe harbors for price increases below a specified numeric threshold (10%). KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 367.374(1)(b)–(c). 
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“Type 2” laws prohibit any price increase beyond the amount necessitated 
by increased operational costs on the part of the seller. “Type 3” laws impose 
a general prohibition on the sale of covered goods during emergencies at an 
excessive or unconscionable price.281 For example, Idaho’s statute prohibits 
selling covered goods or offering them for sale at an “exorbitant or excessive 
price.”282 
Type 1 laws commonly limit price increases to 10%–25% above pre-
emergency levels.283 Some laws allow sellers to argue, in defense to a price 
gouging allegation, that increased operational costs arising due to the market 
disruption (for example, because supply chains were interrupted) justify the 
increase in the product’s price.284 Others do not, presuming that the allowable 
price increase specified in the statute adequately accounts for the fact that 
sellers’ costs may increase during emergencies.285 
In defining what constitutes an excessive or unconscionable price, Type 
3 laws (like Type 1 laws) typically refer to the difference between the pre- 
and post-emergency price of the product. A common approach is to call for 
an assessment of whether there is a “gross disparity” between the prices 
charged before and after the market disruption in the affected market area.286 
Some Type 3 laws also permit benchmarking to the current price of similar 
 
 281 Depending on how courts interpret the unconscionability standard, Types 2 and 3 laws may be 
functionally similar. For example, a New York court, interpreting the state’s Type 3 statute, held that no 
price increase above that necessary to account for increased operational costs would survive review. See 
People ex rel. Abrams v. Two Wheel Corp., 525 N.E.2d 692, 696 (N.Y. 1988). 
 282 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(19). 
 283 Ball, supra note 280, at 913; see also Bae, supra note 280, at 83. 
 284 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 396(b) (2019) (“However, a greater price increase is not unlawful 
if that person can prove that the increase in price was directly attributable to additional costs imposed on 
it by the supplier of the goods, or directly attributable to additional costs for labor or materials used to 
provide the services, during the state of emergency or local emergency . . . .”); Ball, supra note 280, at 
913. 
 285 Bae, supra note 280, at 84. 
 286 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.160(1)(b) (2019) (stating that it is prima facie evidence that a price is 
unconscionable if either (1) “a gross disparity” exists between the price and the price at which that good 
was sold during the thirty days before the emergency declaration, unless the increase is due to increased 
costs on the part of the seller, or regional, national or international market trends; or (2) the price “grossly 
exceeds” the average price at which the same or similar commodity was readily obtainable in the trade 
area in the thirty days prior (unless due to increased costs or market trends)). Some courts have 
characterized the gross disparity showing as procedural rather than substantive in nature because its legal 
effect is to establish a presumption of price gouging. See, e.g., Two Wheel Corp., 525 N.E.2d at 695 
(“[G]ross disparity” provision in New York’s price gouging statute “is procedural rather than definitional; 
it simply establishes a means of providing presumptive evidence” of price gouging.). 
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goods outside the emergency zone or by other sellers within the zone.287 
Further, some require a showing that the disparity is not attributable to 
increased operational costs.288 In addition to examining the magnitude of 
price increases, New York’s law has a procedural element: it permits courts 
to find that a price is “unconscionably excessive” if there is a gross price 
disparity, “an exercise of unfair leverage or unconscionable means” in the 
transaction, or both.289 
2. Legal Challenges 
Legal challenges to the validity of states’ emergency price gouging laws 
are rare. Our review of the thirty-five laws identified no challenges to Type 
1 laws, one challenge to a Type 2 law, and three challenges to Type 3 laws. 
The Type 2 challenge was to Mississippi’s statute, which imposes 
penalties for raising prices above their level in the “same market area” “at or 
immediately before” the market disruption, unless necessitated by increased 
costs.290 The state attorney general brought an enforcement action against a 
chain of gas stations that hiked the price of gasoline after Hurricane 
Katrina.291 In its challenge to the statute, the company claimed that the 
phrases “in the same market area” and “at or immediately before” were 
impermissibly vague.292 The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed. Applying 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s standard of review for vagueness challenges,293 it 
found that the statute’s terms “would be clear to any businessman who wants 
to charge competitive prices and attract customers.”294 
Type 3 laws in Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New York have been 
challenged on vagueness grounds, but not successfully. In Marathon 
Petroleum Co. LLC v. Stumbo, a Kentucky trial court found a gasoline 
company’s vagueness claim regarding that state’s price gouging law too 
 
 287 People ex rel. Vacco v. Beach Boys Equip. Co., 273 A.D.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) 
(examining prices charged for generators by other retailers in the trade area, in applying New York’s 
law); Bae, supra note 280, at 85–86. 
 288 See, e.g., 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 3.18 (2019) (defining an “unconscionably high” price for 
gasoline as one with a “gross disparity” that “is not substantially attributable to increased prices charged 
by the petroleum-related business suppliers or increased costs due to an abnormal market disruption”). 
 289 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r(3)(a) (Consol. 2019). 
 290 State ex rel. Hood v. Louisville Tire Ctr., Inc., 55 So. 3d 1068, 1070 (Miss. 2011) (citing MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 75–24–25(2) (Rev. 2009)). 
 291 Id. at 1070–71. 
 292 Id. at 1071. 
 293 See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925) (“[A] statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .”). 
 294 Louisville Tire Ctr., 55 So. 3d at 1073. 
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poorly and cursorily argued to be sustained.295 New York’s law, which uses 
an “unconscionably excessive” price standard, has been challenged by sellers 
of portable generators and home heating oil. In People ex rel. Abrams v. Two 
Wheel Corp., the state’s highest court rejected the vagueness argument 
because it found that sufficient guidance as to the meaning of 
“unconscionably excessive” was provided by (1) the statute’s enumeration 
of factors to be considered in arriving at a determination of 
unconscionability, in conjunction with (2) common law decisions on the 
unconscionability defense in contract disputes, and (3) the definition of 
unconscionable contracts provided in Section 2-302 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.296 Applying those indicators, the court held that a price 
may be unconscionable under New York’s statute either because there is an 
extreme price disparity or because “procedurally, the excess was obtained 
through unconscionable means,” such as the bargaining advantage gained by 
a natural disaster,297 and that merchants had been given sufficient notice. 
Similarly, in People ex rel. Vacco v. Chazy Hardware, Inc.,298 a New York 
trial court concluded, without elaboration, that the statute did not impose 
“such an amorphous standard that a merchant would be unable to conduct 
itself in accordance with the terms.”299 And in State v. Strong Oil Co., Inc., 
which involved home heating oil, the court had no difficulty concluding that 
the statute set forth sufficiently clear criteria in directing the factfinder to 
compare the seller’s price after the market disruption to its pre-disruption 
price or to prices charged to other consumers in the same trade area.300 
The final challenge involving Massachusetts’s law was narrower. In 
White v. R.M. Packer Co., Inc., the First Circuit was asked to determine 
whether gasoline retailers had engaged in price gouging after Hurricane 
Katrina.301 That required determining whether the state had shown a “gross 
disparity” between the pre- and post-disaster prices. The district court, 
looking at the plain language of the applicable regulations, rejected the 
 
 295 528 F. Supp. 2d 639, 651 (E.D. Ky. 2007). 
 296 525 N.E.2d 692, 694–96 (N.Y. 1988). 
 297 Id. at 695. 
 298 176 Misc. 2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). 
 299 Id. at 965. The conduct at issue in Chazy Hardware presented a fairly easy case for the court: the 
defendant had purchased fifty-four portable generators during an ice storm and sold them two days later 
at double the price. Id. at 961–62. 
 300 105 Misc. 2d 803, 818–19, 824–25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
 301 635 F.3d 571, 574–75 (1st Cir. 2011). The case involved increases in the price of gasoline on the 
Massachusetts island of Martha’s Vineyard following two hurricanes. The price gouging claims were 
brought under Massachusetts’s gasoline price gouging statute. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 2(a), 
(c) (2019); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 3.18 (2019). The gas retailers did not challenge the law on 
vagueness grounds, but merely disputed whether their prices violated it. 635 F.3d at 575. 
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notion that the state could make out a claim merely by showing high profit 
margins or large price increases.302 To the contrary, the regulation also 
evinced concern about increases in sellers’ operational costs, so it was 
necessary to examine changes in price relative to changes in costs over the 
same period.303 The court concluded that no price gouging was shown under 
the facts of the case. 
The takeaways from this review of litigation are that the validity of 
emergency price gouging statutes is rarely challenged; and when challenges 
are brought, courts have little difficulty interpreting and applying even the 
relatively nonspecific, Type 3 statutes. A possible reason for the paucity of 
litigation may be that the laws are infrequently invoked—fortunately, the 
disasters that would trigger them are rare, and consumers and attorneys 
general may deem some price hikes as involving consumer harms too trivial 
to justify the time and expense involved in bringing an enforcement action.304 
A second reason is that Type 1 statutes, which account for nine of the thirty-
five laws, by our count,305 are really quite clear. When a percentage price 
increase is specified, there is little to quibble about beyond the applicable 
time period and market area for measuring the percentage change. Type 2 
statutes are somewhat more open to argument because their prohibition on 
price increases is typically accompanied by exceptions where the seller’s 
increased operational costs justify an increase. Nevertheless, no challenges 
have been brought thus far on the basis of increased cost. Finally, although 
Type 3 laws may seem quite vulnerable to vagueness challenges, many 
specify criteria for assessing whether an excessive increase has occurred.306 
Even where they do not, the limited case law available suggests that courts 
will seek and find useful standards for operationalizing the concept in the 
contract law doctrine of unconscionability. For these reasons, emergency 
price gouging laws appear to provide a legally unproblematic model for 
prohibiting excessive prices. 
 
 302 White, 635 F.3d. at 588. 
 303 Id. at 588 (“Dramatic changes in gross margin might illustrate that a price increase is a ‘gross 
disparity’ in price because it reflects price increases unexplained by cost increases. But nothing in the 
regulation suggests that increases in gross margin alone, in the absence of any price increase and 
simultaneous with declining retail prices, can support a price-gouging claim.”). 
 304 Gary E. Lehman, Price Gouging: Application of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices 
Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, 17 NOVA L. REV., 1029, 1049–50 (1993). 
 305 Type 1 states include Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin, based on our review of state statutes. 
 306 See., e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(19) (2019) (directing courts to take into consideration how 
the seller’s cost of acquiring the item compares to the pre-emergency price for the item, any additional 
costs of doing business that the seller experienced during the emergency, and the duration of the 
emergency). 
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3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices 
As noted above, most emergency price gouging statutes as currently 
written do not explicitly cover medicines—hence the new bills proposing to 
amend or extend them. The interesting question is not whether they presently 
apply to drugs, but whether this type of approach is a useful one to take for 
drugs. 
The approach is appealing because of its simplicity and its apparent 
durability before the courts. It asks adjudicators simply to compare prices 
before and after a triggering event. In the case of Type 1 statutes, it supplies 
a concrete, mathematical calculation to perform. Types 2 and 3 statutes 
involve more discretion for the factfinder, but often provide one or more 
specific criteria by which to evaluate price hikes. 
Yet several shortcomings to this approach for drug prices should be 
noted. First and foremost, it has no application to a drug’s launch price. It 
may be useful for addressing price increases for generics and (at the federal 
level) branded medications, but its focus is solely on the magnitude of price 
increases over time, not the reasonableness of the product’s initial price. In 
the context of the products and services subject to price gouging during 
emergencies, this makes sense: for batteries, generators, building supplies, 
diapers, and the like—there is often no public concern about the 
reasonableness of their market price. That is because, in ordinary times, the 
market functions well as a pricing mechanism. There is robust competition, 
consumers have adequate knowledge of and ability to choose among 
competing products, and desperate need does not drive purchasing decisions. 
For many new prescription drugs, in contrast, such market conditions are not 
present, permitting launch prices to be set at very high (often monopoly) 
levels. These baseline prices are a substantial public concern, and the 
emergency price gouging law approach is unable to address them. 
A second question is how to adapt an approach based on acute, time-
limited emergencies to the drug-affordability problem, which is longstanding 
and likely to endure indefinitely. It is not unprecedented to characterize a 
chronic public health problem that has recently increased in seriousness as 
an emergency. Several states and President Trump, for example, have 
declared a public health emergency in response to the opioid epidemic.307 At 
least one state price gouging bill proposed for prescription drugs hewed to 
the emergency framework, confining its protections to times when a market 
 
 307 See Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., What Is a Public Health “Emergency”?, 371 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 
986, 986–87 (2014); Alexander Walsdorf, Note, I Get By With a Little Help from My 750-Dollar-Per-
Tablet Friends: A Model Act for States to Prevent Dramatic Pharmaceutical Price Increases, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 2497, 2522 n.132 (2018). 
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shortage triggers the governor to declare a market emergency.308 But most 
state bills, as well as the federal drug price gouging bills, do not make 
reference to an emergency or market disruption.309 Instead, they require 
companies to regularly report price increases and authorize enforcement 
action whenever those increases exceed a specified standard. That seems the 
most straightforward response to the question of how to adapt price gouging 
laws to the drug context. 
A third issue is what benchmark price could be used to gauge the 
excessiveness of drug price increases.310 The approach of emergency price 
gouging laws is nearly always to compare the prices charged by a given seller 
in the same market area before and after an emergency declaration. 
Occasionally, prices are evaluated by reference to what other sellers in the 
same market area charge, or by what is charged in another market area. The 
last two approaches are not feasible for drugs because prices do not vary 
geographically within the United States in the same way the prices for 
gasoline or generators do, and because many drugs have only one seller.311 
Often, there will be no set of comparable products in the market from which 
one could infer whether a drug’s current price departs from the usual price 
for similar goods. Further, the usual, pre/post approach is not easily applied 
if there is no discrete declaration of an emergency. In that case, some dates 
must be chosen as setting the price against which future increases will be 
benchmarked. Again, the difficulty is that any such price, because of the 
monopoly or near-monopoly position of the seller, may be considerably 
above what policymakers would consider reasonable or what a more 
competitive market would produce. 
No way around this problem is apparent. Policy approaches inspired by 
emergency price gouging laws must be content with arresting the trend of 
escalating drug prices; they will not be able to reverse it. Selecting a Type 3 
approach rather than Type 1 at least permits the state to vary what constitutes 
an acceptable price increase according to the baseline cost against which the 
increase is being assessed. While Type 1 statutes impose a one-size-fits-all 
 
 308 H. 7022, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2018). 
 309 For details see supra Part I. 
 310 This issue has been raised by Professor Isaac Buck, who has noted the lack of an “organic price 
equilibrium” for prescription drugs. Zack Buck, Assistant Professor, Presentation at the Health Law 
Professors Conference: States of Emergency (June 8, 2018) (on file with authors). 
 311 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL 
IMPERATIVE, at xviii (Norman R. Augustine et al. eds., 2018) (“Historically, the greatest pricing concerns 
have focused on on-patent drugs; however, major price increases for generic drugs have become 
increasingly common as more than half of existing generics are now produced by a single supplier.”). 
Furthermore, the use of foreign benchmarks would appear to be outside the approach embraced by these 
emergency laws as the U.S. does not have a comparable foreign market. 
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standard in specifying a percentage cap on price increases, Type 3 statutes 
permit the state to calibrate its actions to the impact of a particular price 
increase on consumers. For inexpensive drugs, states may prefer not to 
expend resources going after a company’s decision to increase a drug’s price 
substantially in percentage terms. In contrast, a drug that starts out costing 
several thousand dollars per year might reasonably be targeted for 
enforcement for any price increase in excess of general inflation. Such 
discretion under a Type 3 statute would create greater uncertainty for 
biopharmaceutical companies about what will be deemed acceptable, and 
therefore open the statute up to vagueness challenges. 
Solutions, however, are available. The statute could provide specific 
criteria for evaluating the unreasonableness of a particular percentage price 
increase or specify brackets of acceptable increases for drugs with different 
baseline costs. But, of course, as with any proposal benchmarking against an 
upper limit, this will incentivize regulated entities to price or impose price 
increases just below that threshold. 
A final issue is whether and how to import the practice of taking 
companies’ increased operational costs into consideration from emergency 
price gouging laws. Many such statutes provide a defense to price gouging 
actions if the company can show that its own costs greatly increased during 
the emergency, or provide that operational costs are to be considered when 
deciding whether price gouging has occurred.312 The rationale for this 
approach in the context of emergencies is obvious: the same market 
disruptions that increase demand for the product, making it possible to price 
gouge, may also increase the costs of producing or obtaining it. The supply 
of product components or ingredients may have been interrupted or it may 
be more costly to locate and transport those components under emergency 
conditions. Those considerations apply to a much lesser extent in the day-to-
day operation of the prescription drug market. Acute problems such as 
problems at manufacturing facilities do occur and have led to drug shortages 
on many occasions.313 Manufacturers have rarely cited such problems as 
justifications for drug price increases, but in some cases reasonably may do 
so. Thus, there is an argument for taking them into account. 
 
 312 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 396(b) (2019); FAQs on Price Gouging, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/consumers/pricegougingduringdisasters#8C [https://perma.cc/PXB9-CTZW] 
(noting “[i]f the seller can prove that the increased price is directly attributable to increases in the cost of 
labor or materials needed to provide the good or service, the seller may not be liable under the statute”). 
 313 See Frequently Asked Questions About Drug Shortages, FDA (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-shortages/frequently-asked-questions-about-drug-shortages#q4 
[https://perma.cc/3XGN-F3R7]. 
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Permitting such a defense poses risks, however. It may create perverse 
incentives in allowing companies to pass on inefficiencies in their operations 
to consumers. That problem is why regulators of the price of public utilities 
moved away from focusing on companies’ rate of return (which implicitly 
accounts for operational costs) in favor of imposing flat price caps.314 
Another challenge in the drug context is that biopharmaceutical companies 
number among their operational costs the vast amounts they spend on 
marketing and promotion activities.315 More than half of Americans recently 
polled think that too much is spent on such activities,316 so allowing 
companies to use such expenses as a basis for increasing prices is 
undesirable. Thus, if statutes do permit companies to argue that their drug 
price increases are justified by higher operational costs, the allowable costs 
should be limited to expenses incurred because of an acute disruption in the 
market or their supply chain. 
B. Contract Law 
Although the term “unconscionable” is used in many places in the law, 
it has deep doctrinal roots in contract law. There, the doctrine of 
unconscionability permits a court to refuse to enforce a contract or 
contractual provision because to do so would yield results that “shock the 
conscience.”317 It permits courts to modify or reject a contractual agreement 
or provision on grounds of unfairness.318 A motivating premise of the 
doctrine is that courts ought not to participate in enforcing a contract that is 
technically valid but works a deep injustice against one of the parties.319 
Furthermore, the doctrine of unconscionability allows courts to “police 
bargains overtly,” as opposed to covertly.320 
 
 314 See infra Section III.D. 
 315 One study, for instance, found that in 2016 pharmaceutical companies spent $6 billion on direct-
to-consumer advertising. Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Medical Marketing in the United States, 
1997–2016, 321 JAMA 80, 82 (2019). 
 316 See Kirzinger et al., supra note 5, at figs.2 & 4. 
 317 156 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 343 § 1 (2019). 
 318 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 298 (4th ed. 2004); see also U.C.C. § 2-302 cmts. 1–3 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 319 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 60 (Ariz. 1995) (“[C]ourts will not lend 
their hand to the enforcement of oppressive contracts . . . .”). 
 320 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 298; see also U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (“This section is intended 
to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find to 
be unconscionable. In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, 
by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to 
public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow the court to 
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The doctrine of unconscionability is now widely recognized as having 
two distinct dimensions, one procedural and one substantive.321 Courts will 
examine the fairness of the process by which the contract came into existence 
as well as the contract’s actual provisions.322 It is well established that the 
unconscionability doctrine can be applied to a contract’s price terms,323 
although such cases are relatively unusual.324 Reported cases have involved 
door-to-door sales, rent-to-own contracts, loans and interest charges, 
royalties, rents, commodities, and water.325 A typical fact pattern involves an 
unsophisticated buyer purchasing goods from an aggressive seller for far 
more than their fair market value.326 The doctrine of unconscionability is 
traditionally not a freestanding cause of action, though it is occasionally 
treated as such.327 Rather, unconscionability is conventionally asserted as a 
defense by a party alleged to be in breach of a contract.328 Courts are not in 
consensus about whether judges may raise the issue of unconscionability sua 
sponte,329 but it is clear that unconscionability is an issue for the judge, not 
the jury.330 Although facts about context are very important for the analysis, 
 
pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a conclusion 
of law as to its unconscionability.”). 
 321 Arthur Leff is generally recognized as the originator of these terms. See Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). 
 322 Id.; Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1820 (1994). 
 323 See Charles L. Knapp, Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First-Century 
Survey, in COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 312 (Larry A. DiMatteo et al. 
eds., 2013) (“Although not seen originally as being applicable to a contract’s price term, § 2-302 was in 
time also applied in cases where courts found the contract price for goods or services to be unconscionably 
high.”). 
 324 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 306–07 (noting that “[c]ourts have been more reluctant to 
pass judgment on the fairness of the price term” because it is rarely a surprise to the parties and judging 
its fairness is “no simple matter”). 
 325 Darr, supra note 322, at 1821–22. 
 326 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447–49 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 
Darr, supra note 322, at 1820–22. 
 327 See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 323, at 335–37 (discussing court’s treatment of claims of procedural 
and substantive unconscionability as a cause of action in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 
694 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). 
 328 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 299. 
 329 For a discussion, see Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1028–29 (2015) (“Courts typically regard unconscionability purely as an 
affirmative defense, which places the burden on the defendant to plead and prove it. On the other hand, 
whether a contract is void as against public policy may be raised sua sponte by the court.” (internal 
footnote omitted)). 
 330 Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 56 (Ariz. 1995) (“Maxwell contends that the 
determination of whether a contract is unconscionable is for the trier of fact. We find no support for this 
position given that Arizona law, which is consistent with the law in every other jurisdiction that has ruled 
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they do not “convert the determination on unconscionability from one that is 
a matter of law as applied to those facts to one that is in whole a matter of 
fact.”331 
1. Approach to Defining Excessive Price 
Principles of equity underlying the doctrine of unconscionability trace 
back to at least the Roman era, but the doctrine got its modern start in the 
United States in the mid-twentieth century.332 Drafters of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), which offers model state legislation for 
commercial transactions, codified the doctrine in § 2-302 pertaining to the 
sales of goods333: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract 
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect 
to aid the court in making the determination.334 
Similar provisions can be found in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 208, as well as uniform laws dealing with consumer credit, 
consumer sales, land transactions, and residential leases.335 Although UCC 
§ 2-302 pertains to contracts involving goods, “it has wisely been applied, 
either by analogy or as an expression of a general doctrine, to many other 
kinds of contracts.”336 In addition to wielding authority under state statutes, 
many of which are based on the UCC, courts have “asserted the power to 
employ the notion of unconscionability as a matter of general common 
law.”337 
 
on this issue, clearly provides that the determination of unconscionability is to be made by the court as a 
matter of law.”). 
 331 Id. 
 332 Knapp, supra note 323, at 310. 
 333 Id.; 156 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 343 § 1 (2016, rev. Sept. 2019). 
 334 U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 335 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 299. 
 336 Id. at 298; see also Knapp, supra note 323, at 311 (discussing factors that led to the broader 
application by analogy of U.C.C. § 2-302 beyond the sale of goods). 
 337 Knapp, supra note 323, at 311; see also Beh, supra note 329, at 1016 n.26 (citing Kathleen S. 
Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1903, 1928–49 (2013) (identifying several state statutes)). 
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Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. is an important and widely 
cited case articulating the common law authority of courts to use 
unconscionability as a justification for refusing to enforce a contract.338 Ora 
Lee Williams had a middle school education and supported seven children 
on public assistance of $218 per month.339 As was fairly common in low-
income neighborhoods at the time, Walker-Thomas Furniture deployed 
door-to-door salesmen to sell merchandise on credit, to be paid in 
installments.340 Williams purchased a number of household items from 
Walker-Thomas Furniture between 1957 and 1962341 and signed more than 
a dozen purchase contracts, “nearly all in response to a salesman’s home 
visit.”342 The contracts included egregious cross-collateralization provisions 
effectively forcing her to carry a balance on each item until all her purchases 
were paid in full.343 They further permitted Walker-Thomas Furniture to 
repossess all items purchased from its store in the event of default on any 
single item.344 
In 1962, Williams defaulted after buying a stereo, and the store “sought 
to replevy all the items purchased since December[] 1957.”345 The lower 
courts reviewing Williams’s case rejected her contention that these contracts 
were unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. However, the Court of 
Appeals disagreed about the power of the courts to find contracts 
unconscionable and remanded the case to the trial court for rehearing.346 
Although the existence of the unconscionability doctrine is well 
established in contract law, a precise definition of “unconscionable” is 
elusive. One commentator has observed the fact that “the term is incapable 
of precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness.”347 It imparts 
flexibility but also confusion. Others have been deeply critical of the 
doctrine, particularly UCC § 2-302, writing: “If reading this section makes 
 
 338 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Knapp, supra note 323, at 311 (calling the case “[p]robably the 
most important” to the case law surrounding § 2-302). The paternity of the unconscionability doctrine 
can be traced back to pre-UCC equity cases. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83–84 
(3d Cir. 1948); FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 300 (calling Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 
“an early but still notable application of the Code’s unconscionability doctrine”). 
 339 Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 
1383, 1392 & n.41 (2014). 
 340 Id. at 1392. 
 341 Williams, 350 F.2d at 447. 
 342 Fleming, supra note 339, at 1392–93 (2014). 
 343 Williams, 350 F.2d at 447. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Id. at 450. 
 347 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 299–300. 
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anything clear it is that reading this section alone makes nothing clear about 
the meaning of ‘unconscionable’ except perhaps that it is pejorative.”348 The 
comments to § 2-302 shed only a dim light on the term’s meaning. They state 
that “[t]he basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the 
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”349 A bit 
more helpfully, they explain that the doctrine aims to prevent “oppression 
and unfair surprise,” and is not concerned with the “disturbance of allocation 
of risks because of superior bargaining power.”350 
The concept of unconscionability—as with many standards used in 
contract and commercial law and beyond—thus involves some 
imprecision.351 Although the unconscionability doctrine has been criticized 
for its vagueness,352 courts have developed fairly standardized and workable 
doctrinal analyses for determining if a contract or contractual provision is 
unconscionable.353 Moreover, as discussed below, this doctrine has been 
applied to contractual price terms relating to hospital charges. 
2. Legal Challenges 
Williams has been credited with providing “[t]he most durable answer” 
to the meaning of unconscionability.354 According to the court, 
“[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of 
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract 
 
 348 Leff, supra note 321, at 487. 
 349 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 350 Id. 
 351 See, e.g., Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 214–15 (Cal. 2013) (defending 
unconscionability analysis against charge of being “hopelessly vague” by noting that imprecision is 
“hardly anomalous” in the law). 
 352 Darr, supra note 322, at 1830–32. One of the earliest and most prominent critics of the 
unconscionability doctrine is Arthur Leff, who characterized substantive unconscionability as grounded 
in little more than “the emotional state of the trier” and argued that “what may permissibly make the 
judges’ pulses race or their cheeks redden, so as to justify the destruction of a particular provision, is, one 
would suppose, what the judge ought to have been told by the statute.” Leff, supra note 321, at 516; see 
also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 267 (1st ed. 1988) (calling the doctrine 
“troubling because there is no precise definition of when a contract is unconscionable”). 
 353 See Alpha One v. NYNEX Info. Res. Co., No. 930129C, 1994 WL 879488, at *3 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. May 23, 1994) (noting criticism of doctrine’s vagueness, but explaining standards used by the courts); 
Abel Holding Co. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 350 A.2d 292, 303–04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), aff’d, 
371 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (noting that “[u]nconscionability is not defined, and the 
definition most commonly used is vague and unsatisfactory,” but then proceeding to explain how courts 
have fleshed out the doctrine). 
 354 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301. 
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terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”355 These two 
aspects are often referred to, respectively, as “procedural unconscionability” 
and “substantive unconscionability.”356 
Procedural unconscionability pertains to the bargaining process itself.357 
In general, following the lead of the comment to UCC § 2-302, procedural 
unconscionability has been thought to consist of two principal aspects: 
oppression and surprise.358 Oppression refers to the “inability to bargain 
about a particular term”—for example, because of extreme inequality of 
bargaining power, lack of meaningful choice, or lack of alternative suppliers 
in the market.359 Surprise can arise from “fine print” contracts or other 
circumstances that submerge a provision that disadvantages one party.360 
Typical fact patterns of procedural unconscionability involve sharp or 
deceptive bargaining practices; fine print, boilerplate or convoluted 
contracts; exploitation of language barriers or uneducated, illiterate, 
mentally infirm, or otherwise unsophisticated parties; or unequal bargaining 
power.361 Inequality in bargaining power alone is rarely sufficient but may 
clear the bar in combination with other elements of either procedural or 
substantive unconscionability.362 Although courts commonly turn to these 
factors to make a determination of procedural unconscionability, they “have 
not clearly articulated the requisite proof of these factors or specified a recipe 
for their successful combination.”363 
 
 355 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301. 
 356 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leff, supra 
note 321, at 487; Knapp, supra note 323, at 312–13 (discussing the influence of Leff’s article and how it 
closely tracked elements in the Williams case). 
 357 Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to 
Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 9 (2012). 
 358  U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); Jonathan A. Eddy, On the 
“Essential” Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 
28, 42 (1977).  
 359 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Eddy, supra note 
358, at 42. 
 360 Eddy, supra note 358, at 43. 
 361 Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 
549 P.2d 903, 906–07 (Kan. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d; 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 301; M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky, Unconscionability and the 
Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 211, 222. 
 362 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 302; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 
cmt. d (summarizing factors courts have said weigh in favor of a finding of unconscionability). 
 363 Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: The Case 
for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard, 
31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 752–53 (1994). 
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Whereas procedural unconscionability is concerned with the process of 
contract formation, substantive unconscionability is concerned with the 
fairness of a contract’s terms.364 Defining standards for substantive 
unconscionability appears a more difficult task than defining them for 
procedural unconscionability. Scholars “often describe the concept by listing 
the types of clauses most commonly deemed substantively 
unconscionable.”365 That said, central themes pertain to the one-sided 
allocation of risks and terms that are “commercially unreasonable.”366 A 
substantively unconscionable bargain is one “such as no man in his senses 
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and 
fair man would accept on the other.”367 
In undertaking a substantive unconscionability analysis, courts have 
searched for evidence of a significant disparity between the price and cost or 
value of the good, for penalty clauses, and for provisions denying rights and 
remedies to the consumer.368 An illustrative price term case concerned a 
transaction in which the price of goods was two and a half times the 
“reasonable market price” and several other conditions also pointed to an 
unfair bargain.369 Courts also examine “the basis and justification for the 
price,” including prices paid by other, similar consumers in similar 
transactions.370 The California Supreme Court, for example, declined to hold 
a high bank fee for processing checks unconscionable on its face; further 
inquiry into the context for the price and transaction was required.371 
Courts applying the doctrine of unconscionability have “reviewed 
evidence of procedural and substantive unconscionability separately, 
requiring a minimum threshold or quantum of each type of unconscionability 
to justify intervention in the contract.”372 Many courts have used a “sliding-
 
 364 Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 10–11. 
 365 Id. 
 366 Id. 
 367 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (quoting Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 411 
(1889)); see also Philpot v. Tenn. Health Mgmt., 279 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting 
similar language). 
 368 Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906–07 (Kan. 1976); Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 
135, 139 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 11. 
 369 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (citing Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 
653–54 (N.J. 1971) (finding unconscionability where, in addition to the high price, the goods were of 
extremely little use to buyers, sellers made many misrepresentations and deceptions, and buyers were 
poor, uneducated, and inexperienced)). 
 370 Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985) (citing Bennett v. Behring Corp. 
466 F. Supp. 689, 697 (S.D. Fla. 1979)). 
 371 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 513–14. 
 372 Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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scale” approach,373 in which more of one type of unconscionability can 
“offset” less of the other.374 The Arizona Supreme Court, for instance, has 
observed that although some courts have questioned whether both kinds of 
unconscionability must be present, the majority of courts “have held that 
there must be some quantum of both . . . and take a balancing approach in 
applying them.”375 
Historically, courts “have been more reluctant” to apply the doctrine of 
unconscionability to price terms than to other contractual provisions.376 
Judicial hesitation stems from the facts that price rarely comes as a surprise 
in a contract, can sometimes be negotiable, and, most importantly, can be 
extraordinarily complex to evaluate on fairness grounds.377 Given the 
centrality of price terms in the overall contract, furthermore, it is difficult for 
a court to invalidate price provisions while enforcing the remainder of the 
contract.378 Although some commentators have dismissed the doctrine of 
unconscionability as essentially inapplicable to price terms, analysis of 
recent cases suggests such a conclusion is mistaken.379 
Courts’ concerns about applying the unconscionability doctrine to price 
may, however, help to explain why when they have chosen to do so they 
often cite deficiencies in both substantive and procedural aspects of the price 
bargain.380 A 1994 study of forty-four price unconscionability cases found 
that among those with an outcome of unconscionable terms, all “involved a 
determination that the price was outrageous and in nearly three-fourths of 
the cases, the contracting process was procedurally flawed.”381 Only two 
cases held that “a high price alone, without process problems, resulted in an 
unconscionable contract.”382 A more recent analysis identified several 
decisions handed down in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that signaled 
 
 373 Id. at 12–19; Knapp, supra note 323, at 322–23. 
 374  FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 302 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 
6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)); Lonegrass, supra note 357, at 12. 
 375 Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical 
Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1073–74 (2006) (discussing Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995)). 
 376 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 306. 
 377 Id. at 306–07. 
 378 Id. at 307. 
 379 See Jacob Hale Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
965, 967, app. (concluding that “in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom, the doctrine has quietly 
flourished in courts in recent years,” undermining the “widely held belief . . . that ‘price alone is 
insufficient to establish unconscionability’”). 
 380 See id. at app. 
 381 Darr, supra note 322, at 1842–43. 
 382 Id. at 1843. 
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courts’ willingness to hold the price term of consumer credit contracts 
unconscionable purely because the price was high,383 but such cases appear 
exceptional. 
A 2018 California Supreme Court case represents the sliding-scale 
approach and demonstrates the continuing importance of finding at least 
some degree of both procedural and substantive unconscionability in a price-
term case. At issue in De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. was whether courts had 
the authority to deem a high interest rate on consumer loans of $2,500 or 
more unconscionable.384 The facts involved high-risk borrowers taking out 
unsecured loans of $2,600 with a 96% or 135% interest rate.385 By statute, 
interest rates were capped only on consumer loans less than $2,500.386 The 
issue was not the unconscionability of these interest rates, but whether courts 
had authority to rule on the unconscionability of interest rates for loans not 
capped by statute.387 Nevertheless, its analysis is instructive. 
The court began by acknowledging that it was “long established under 
California law” that “the doctrine of unconscionability reaches contract 
terms relating to the price of goods or services exchanged,” including interest 
rates.388 Whether a price term is “unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh” is a 
holistic analysis that “depends on more than just a single printed number,” 
so courts examine “other provisions and circumstances affecting a 
transaction’s benefits and burdens” along with the price itself.389 The court 
further observed that procedural elements are an integral part of the analysis 
of the unconscionability of price terms.390 Although aspects of the doctrinal 
analysis lack clarity, the court stated it was clear that “unconscionability 
requires . . . procedural unconscionability—along with the overly harsh or 
one-sided results that epitomize substantive unconscionability.”391 
The court noted that substantive unconscionability is not sufficiently 
established by examining whether the “price exceeds cost or fair value.”392 
Rather, an inquiry must also be made into “the basis and justification for the 
 
 383 Russell, supra note 379, at app. (collecting cases, many of which also involve a deficiency of 
procedural unconscionability with respect to the price term of the contract). 
 384 422 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Cal. 2018). 
 385 Id. at 1008. 
 386 Id. 
 387 See id. at 1007. The Court did not rule on whether the terms at issue were unconscionable because 
they were not asked to do so by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1021. 
 388 Id. at 1009. 
 389 Id. 
 390 Id. at 1009; see also id. at 1014 (describing the sliding-scale approach). 
 391 Id. at 1014. 
 392 Id. (citations omitted). 
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price”393 and “whether there are market imperfections that make it less likely 
that the price was set by a ‘freely competitive market.’”394 The court 
summarized its approach by emphasizing the flexibility of the 
unconscionability doctrine (particularly as compared to a statutory price cap) 
and the importance of considering a host of contextual features, both 
procedural and substantive.395 Unconscionability is a finding that “under the 
circumstances of the case, taking into account the bargaining process and 
prevailing market conditions—a particular rate was ‘overly harsh,’ ‘unduly 
oppressive,’ or ‘so one-sided as to shock the conscience.’”396 
The 1995 Arizona Supreme Court case Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial 
Services, Inc. offers an example of the minority approach that an 
unconscionability finding can be based on substantive unfairness alone.397 At 
issue in Maxwell was a loan for a water heater costing $6,512 “payable at 
19.5 percent interest, for a total time-payment price of $14,860.43.”398 The 
contract included provisions that in the event of default, Fidelity would not 
only be able to repossess the water heater, but could also foreclose on 
Maxwell’s house, valued at approximately $40,000.399 The court held that 
the best reading of Arizona’s unconscionability statute was that procedural 
unfairness was not strictly required, “especially in cases involving either 
price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies.”400 It further found that the 
interest rate and amount of total payments in Maxwell’s loan raised “a 
question of grossly-excessive price, constituting substantive 
unconscionability,” and that the oppressive default provisions “not only may 
constitute substantive unconscionability but also may provide evidence of 
procedural unconscionability.”401 
In unconscionable-price cases, courts tend to intervene where market 
conditions appear to be such that the usual supply-and-demand mechanism 
 
 393 Id. at 1015 (citations omitted). 
 394 Id. at 1014–15 (citations omitted). 
 395 Id. at 1015. 
 396 Id. 
 397 Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (characterizing the sliding-scale 
approach as the approach of “[m]any courts, perhaps a majority,” and cases involving a procedural finding 
alone as “exceptional”). 
 398 Id. at 59. 
 399 Id. at 53, 60. 
 400 Id. at 59. This reading was based on, among other evidence, an interpretation of the UCC in the 
same manner. Id. 
 401 Id. at 59–60. 
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does not adequately constrain prices.402 Even some commentators who are 
skeptical of the unconscionability doctrine, because they believe that 
economic exigency should not incur a coercive fix, acknowledge a role for 
it under conditions of market failure.403 
But how to determine whether prices reveal a problem with the market? 
Professor Steven Bender has identified four different metrics suggested by 
the case law for determining substantive price unconscionability.404 These 
are: (1) the difference between the sales price of the good and the seller’s 
cost for the good; (2) net profit, i.e., the sales price compared to the seller’s 
total cost of operation, including the cost of the good; (3) the sales price 
compared to that of other sellers; and (4) the sales price compared to that of 
other “similarly situated” sellers.405 Courts applying the retail-price 
comparison approach (measures 3 and 4) have generally found 
unconscionability where the retail price exceeds the comparator by a ratio of 
two to one.406 Notably, most state statutes (as opposed to court decisions) 
employing an unconscionability standard use the retail-price approach rather 
than examining the seller’s profits.407 In terms of which approach is best, 
Professor Bender criticizes option (1) for disregarding the seller’s 
operational costs, and (3) and (4) for being unhelpful in cases of a 
monopoly.408 Thus, Professor Bender argues, option (2) is best.409 
Before turning to applications of these principles to prescription drugs, 
we note that there is precedent for applying the unconscionability doctrine 
to medical bills.410 Medical-bill cases generally concern hospital charges, 
particularly for emergency department visits.411 In gauging substantive 
unconscionability in such cases, courts have compared the hospital’s usual 
 
 402 Darr, supra note 322, at 1823 (stating that where there is a “lack of market mechanisms to assure 
that the gouger is policed,” “the courts may serve as a market surrogate and police prices in conformity 
with existing notions of price fairness”). 
 403 Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 354–55, 373 
(2002). 
 404 Bender, supra note 363, at 754. 
 405 Id. It is also worth noting that others have observed a different kind of reference pricing that 
benchmarks prices against other recent transactions between the same parties. See, e.g., Darr, supra note 
322, at 1837–38 (quoting Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlement 
in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729–30 (1986)). 
 406 Bender, supra note 363, at 756. 
 407 Id. at 764. 
 408 Id. at 754–55. 
 409 Id. at 755. 
 410 For a discussion of cases, see George A. Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of 
Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 124–28 (2005). 
 411 Id. 
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charge for the service with what other hospitals charge or what is typically 
actually paid after charges are discounted to insurers’ negotiated rates.412 On 
the procedural front, several courts have held that hospital admission and 
payment agreements may be held unconscionable merely because under 
exigent circumstances a reasonable person may not pay much attention or 
have much choice but to sign.413 
A recent example of a medical-bill case concerned an uninsured 
California patient’s challenge to charges of more than $10,000 for three 
emergency department visits.414 The plaintiff claimed that the charges were 
unconscionable because they were “not tethered to [the providers’] actual 
costs,” but were “four to six times” those costs “and far beyond any 
reasonable profit margin.”415 The court held that his claim under the state’s 
unlawful competition statute prohibiting “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” 
business practices could proceed over the defendants’ demurrer.416 The fact 
that all emergency patients had to sign the admission contract before being 
treated could support a finding of procedural unconscionability,417 and that 
although mere demonstration that the “price exceeds cost or fair value” was 
insufficient to prove substantive unconscionability,418 the plaintiff’s 
allegations did adequately state a cause of action.419 The court went on to 
note that in assessing substantive unconscionability, it looks to factors such 
as the justification for a price, certain costs incurred by the seller, and the 
price paid by “similarly situated consumers in a similar transaction.”420 
In arguing for the application of unconscionability to hospital-
admission agreements for uninsured patients, Professor George Nation has 
argued that the usual concern that courts are bad at deciding what a fair price 
is does not apply, because hospitals have, in effect, already set a reasonable 
price: what they charge Medicare and other payers.421 Nation argues for 
application of the unconscionability doctrine to hospital agreements, because 
(1) there is price discrimination among buyers, which often serves as a basis 
for a finding of unconscionability in other cases; (2) the buyer has no 
 
 412 Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New 
Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 686 (2008). 
 413 See Nation, supra note 410, at 126–28. 
 414 Moran v. Prime Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 415 Id. at 315. 
 416 Id. at 309, 319. 
 417 Id. at 315. 
 418 Id. at 316 (quoting Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985)). 
 419 Id. 
 420 Id. (quoting Perdue, 702 P.2d at 512). 
 421 See Nation, supra note 410, at 131–36. The same could be said about prescription drugs. 
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meaningful choice; (3) the buyer may not realize he will pay more than other 
patients; and (4) the magnitude of the markup over hospitals’ costs is 
shocking.422 
Three key takeaways emerge from the foregoing review. First, despite 
unconscionability’s long-held reputation as a hopelessly indeterminate 
doctrine, courts have identified a method for consistently applying it to the 
price term of contracts. The doctrine has form and force as a mechanism for 
policing unfair prices. Second, in a majority of jurisdictions, the method 
requires a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. 
Under the sliding-scale approach, the procedural unfairness can be relatively 
minor if the substantive unfairness of the price term is severe, but it must still 
be present to some degree. Finally, courts have articulated three basic metrics 
for proving substantive unconscionability: the seller’s markup on the good, 
the seller’s profit, and (merging options (3) and (4) identified by Professor 
Bender,423 which are similar) the seller’s price compared to prices offered by 
competitors. 
3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices 
At first glance, the unconscionability doctrine in contract law seems to 
provide an attractive model for tackling high pharmaceutical prices in several 
respects. First, it offers powerful rhetoric drawing on a sense of moral 
unfairness. This strongly resonates with current debates about high drug 
prices. The unconscionability doctrine arose in the common law out of a felt 
need to come to the aid of consumers who were victims of market failures 
(e.g., lack of choice due to a paucity of alternative sellers) or were being 
exploited because of their vulnerable position.424 Many people have similar 
feelings about consumers who depend on high-cost drugs, especially single-
source drugs.425 
Second, unlike alternative models such as emergency price gouging 
laws, the unconscionability doctrine in contract law has potential utility for 
policing the base price of prescription drugs, not just price hikes. It therefore 
 
 422 Id. at 136. 
 423 See supra text accompanying note 405. 
 424 See, e.g., De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1010 (Cal. 2018) (observing that courts 
recognize “the justification for unconscionability was to protect social welfare” and that excessively high 
prices can indicate market failures); Knapp, supra note 323, at 312 (describing various vulnerabilities to 
which courts are sensitive in applying the unconscionability doctrine). 
 425 See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, When Is the Price of a Drug Unjust? The Average Lifetime Earnings 
Standard, 38 HEALTH AFF. 604, 604–05 (2019) (“Excessively high prices for basic necessities such as 
drugs . . . take advantage of a person’s compromised circumstances . . . . A particularly high-price drug, 
especially one that offers to save a life or substantially improve the quality of life, exploits a person’s ill 
health for a company’s profit.”) 
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offers the prospect of creating a regulatory regime in which gaming 
(adjusting one aspect of prices to avoid regulatory constraints on another) is 
comparatively more difficult. A legislature could simply decree that any drug 
price that reaches an unconscionable level—whether through price hikes or 
high initial prices—is unlawful. 
Third, such a standard is (obviously) very flexible. It allows judges 
latitude to apply a more general standard to specific transactions. This is 
useful in policing contracts that are against public policy because it is 
impossible for legislators and agencies to anticipate every possible provision 
that contracting actors might dream up to take advantage of an 
unsophisticated party.426 In the prescription drug space, such flexibility 
would be advantageous because of the different contexts surrounding prices 
for different drugs. Some drugs cost more than others to bring to market; 
some are blockbusters while others target small markets; some are lifesaving 
and essential while others are merely quality-of-life-enhancing; some are 
sold in markets with many therapeutic alternatives and substantial consumer 
choice, and others are alone in their class. Each of those factors arguably 
bears on whether the price of the drug is substantively and procedurally 
unfair, and the contract law conception of unconscionability allows for a 
case-by-case weighing. In contrast, a legislative pronouncement that a WAC 
over a certain dollar amount per year is unlawful does not. 
Thus, unconscionability doctrine in the common law is flexible not only 
as to which price terms are unconscionable, but also how that proof is made. 
Under the sliding-scale approach, litigants can advance arguments under a 
variety of indicia of procedural unfairness (e.g., unequal bargaining power, 
lack of opportunity to bargain, lack of choice, surprise, lack of education or 
sophistication) and substantive unfairness (e.g., comparison to the seller’s 
acquisition cost, seller’s total costs, or prices charged by others). This 
flexibility maximizes opportunities to use the doctrine to go after a wide 
range of problematic situations. 
Despite these positive features, the contract law approach to defining 
excessive price would encounter significant problems if marshaled to combat 
high prescription drug prices. A threshold issue is that the model is hard to 
scale. Common law contract doctrine evolved to resolve disputes between 
the parties to one specific contract. The model is one of private 
enforcement—court actions are initiated by one of the parties to the contract, 
while state attorneys general and other public enforcers are not involved. 
Some of the indicia included in courts’ traditional analysis of procedural and 
 
 426 See, e.g., State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ark. 1999) (permitting 
the inclusion of unconscionable practice in a catchall provision “because the General Assembly could not 
be expected to envision every conceivable violation”). 
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substantive unconscionability only make sense in the context of evaluating a 
particular buyer and a particular seller under particular circumstances. For 
example, courts often examine the buyer’s likely understanding of the 
bargain she was entering into by looking at her level of educational 
attainment, language proficiency, and naïveté.427 All of these considerations 
make the contract law model a poor fit if policymakers wish to impose 
across-the-board regulation of the ways in which particular goods can be 
bought and sold. 
It is also unclear how a contract law model would work in light of the 
complexity of the prescription drug supply chain. Medicines are not 
purchased by the consumer from the supplier. The patient sits at the distal 
end of a long supply chain; the actors that directly contract with drug 
manufacturers are wholesalers and mail-order pharmacies (many of which 
share corporate ownership with a pharmacy benefit manager, or PBM).428 If 
those initial contracts produce unfair effects for the ultimate third-party 
beneficiaries, it is unclear how they would be redressable under the 
unconscionability doctrine. 
The remedies available in contract law are another sticking point. 
Traditional remedies for unconscionable contracts—refunding the buyer’s 
money, eliminating the obligation to pay, or voiding the contract 
altogether429—are not particularly helpful for patients who still need the drug 
and have no alternative supplier. These remedies may also be too weak to 
incentivize biopharmaceutical companies to change their pricing behavior. 
The upshot of this discussion is that although there may be utility in 
borrowing something from the common law standard of unconscionability, 
there is no allure to leaving the process of policing excessive drug prices as 
a matter of contract law (i.e., to police them through litigation relating to 
particular contracts). 
Second, although the flexible nature of the unconscionability doctrine 
is alluring, the flipside of flexibility is unpredictability. Unconscionability is 
a judge-made, judge-administered doctrine. Adopting the common law 
understanding of the doctrine as the basis for a statutory definition of 
 
 427 See e.g., Knapp, supra note 323, at 312. 
 428 For a discussion of the complexity of the system, see NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., 
supra note 6, at 19, 41–49. 
 429 FARNSWORTH, supra note 318, at 305–06; see also Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 
380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting that UCC § 2-302 “makes no provision for damages, 
and none may be recovered thereunder”). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 
cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Perhaps the simplest application of the policy against unconscionable 
agreements is the denial of specific performance where the contract as a whole was unconscionable when 
made. . . . Where a term rather than the entire contract is unconscionable, the appropriate remedy is 
ordinarily to deny effect to the unconscionable term.”). 
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unconscionability (either expressly or by omitting any explicit definition of 
that term in the statute, which will cause courts to default to the common law 
understanding) means that it will fall to judges to decide which drug prices 
are unconscionable. This may be undesirable because different judges may 
reach different conclusions when applying the indicia of unconscionable 
prices. They may have different ideological perspectives on the extent to 
which market failures must be present before intervention in markets is 
justified. Some may hew more closely than others to judges’ historical view 
that unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy, not to be applied casually 
to bargains that arise in markets that basically function well. These potential 
variations in how judges may apply the doctrine to drug prices raise the 
question of whether biopharmaceutical manufacturers will have reasonable 
notice as to what the legal standard requires of them. 
Third, although there are some exceptional cases,430 most courts have 
made clear that a showing of at least some degree of procedural unfairness 
is required in order to find a contractual provision unconscionable.431 Yet 
such a showing may be quite tricky in the prescription drug context. It shifts 
the focus from an analysis of the price to an analysis of the buyer, the seller, 
and their relationship to one another. In practice, the characteristics of the 
buyer weigh heavily. If used, this approach to defining excessive price would 
push regulators to focus on particular kinds of drugs that are most likely to 
raise procedural-unfairness issues (i.e., drugs that patients must take in order 
to avoid serious health effects, drugs for which there is no therapeutic 
alternative in the marketplace) and possibly on particular classes of 
consumers who are especially vulnerable (e.g., patients with conditions that 
predominantly affect low-income populations). Procedural 
unconscionability could be hard to establish for other drugs. Even for these 
drugs, to the extent that courts consider the relevant buyer for examining 
procedural unconscionability to be the wholesaler or mail-order pharmacy 
rather than the patient, arguing vulnerability or lack of sophistication would 
be difficult. 
It is questionable whether courts would find the medical necessity of 
even essential drugs sufficient to constitute lack of choice in satisfaction of 
the procedural unconscionability requirement. As commentators have noted 
about unconscionability cases pertaining to hospital bills for emergency care, 
“if need alone vitiated promises to pay, few medical contracts could be 
 
 430 See supra note 383 and accompanying text. 
 431 See supra notes 372–375 and accompanying text. 
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enforced.”432 Courts have also been unmoved by the fact that hospital fees 
are not disclosed in advance.433 These precedents strongly suggest that it is 
undesirable to use a definition of unconscionability that requires a 
procedural-unfairness showing for prescription drugs. 
A final concern is that metrics used at common law for measuring 
substantive unconscionability do not straightforwardly apply to prescription 
drug prices. Cases examining the difference between the sales price of a good 
and the seller’s cost have involved situations where a retailer is marking up 
a product made by someone else.434 Quantifying this difference is more 
difficult for prescription drugs, where the seller is also the manufacturer. 
Examining its profit requires determining its cost to produce the drug, 
including research and development costs. As we discuss in greater depth 
when we turn to public utilities regulation,435 this is extremely difficult to do 
for drug companies in general and at the level of individual drugs in 
particular. For one thing, it requires allocating the manufacturer’s total costs 
over its portfolio of multiple drugs. Additionally, this “cost plus” or “rate-
of-return” approach simply does not reflect how prescription drugs are priced 
even in well-functioning, competitive markets.436 For the same reason, the 
alternative measure of the seller’s profit is fraught for prescription drugs. 
Instead, one might compare a seller’s price against prices offered by other 
sellers of similar goods. Yet, while rulings of price unconscionability often 
involve prices being roughly at least twice that of an item’s market value,437 
that rule of thumb appears too blunt an assessment for evaluating drug prices 
in light of innovation policy concerns. Further, although market comparisons 
are possible for drugs that have competition from generics or from on-patent 
drugs with similar efficacy and safety profiles,438 many drugs do not fit that 
 
 432 Hall & Schneider, supra note 412, at 675 (emphasis omitted). 
 433 Id. at 675–76 (citing Cox v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006)). 
 434 See Bender, supra note 363, at 754 n.166 (citing as an example Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 
N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), reversed on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967), in which 
the court deemed it unconscionable to price a freezer that cost the seller $348 at $900 for cash sales or 
$1,145 for sales on credit). 
 435 See infra Section III.D. 
 436 See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices Doesn’t Add 
Up, ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-
cost-research-and-development/585253 [https://perma.cc/VF9K-MJ5Q]. 
 437 Bender, supra note 363, at 756. 
 438 Even in such cases, the seller is likely to argue that its product offers unique advantages. For 
example, the Auvi-Q epinephrine auto-injector entered the market at a price seven times higher than its 
biggest competitor, the EpiPen. Although the auto-injectors administered the same drug at the same dose 
using the same method of administration, Auvi-Q was touted as superior because its dose was delivered 
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description. Thus, if the common law notion of unconscionability has a role 
to play in addressing high drug prices, it is better suited to serving as a basis 
for interventions in drug markets that, despite competition, have seen prices 
remain high. Though courts are unlikely to rule a price set by a competitive 
market unconscionable, prices set through oligopolies are not “immune from 
scrutiny.”439 
Because of these problems, contract law precedent is useful primarily 
for establishing a default definition of unconscionability that legislators can 
work from and adjust when drafting statutes specific to prescription drugs. 
As we discuss further in Part IV, quite substantial adjustments to this 
baseline would be desirable. 
C. Consumer Lending Laws 
Although the common law contracts doctrine of unconscionability 
provides consumers some protection against the consequences of borrowing 
money via high-interest loans, most states have also adopted provisions that 
explicitly regulate the interest rates that may be charged in consumer loans. 
States’ efforts to regulate consumer lending practices have taken a bifurcated 
approach: (1) freestanding usury laws,440 which establish a legally 
permissible ceiling on interest rates for a specified range of consumer loans; 
and (2) more general consumer protection laws, covering lending as well as 
sales of goods and services, which prohibit unfair and deceptive business 
practices. Statutes in the latter group, instead of specifying maximum interest 
rates, typically use terms such as “unfair” or “unconscionable” to describe 
the prohibited conduct. Thus, they are analogous to Type 3 emergency price 
gouging laws, whereas usury laws look more like Type 1 laws. We discuss 
the history, strengths, and weaknesses of these two approaches to protecting 
consumers against excessively priced loans, and then discuss their potential 
applications to prescription drug prices. 
 
in five seconds instead of ten and it provided audio rather than written instructions. See Mello, supra note 
20, at 2275–76. 
 439 Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512 (Cal. 1985) (“While it is unlikely that a court 
would find a price set by a freely competitive market to be unconscionable, the market price set by an 
oligopoly should not be immune from scrutiny. Thus courts consider not only the market price, but also 
the cost of the goods or services to the seller, the inconvenience imposed on the seller, and the true value 
of the product or service.” (citations omitted)). 
 440 Usury protections have been almost universally adopted in the states via statute, but some states 
have usury provisions in their state constitutions. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Usury Provisions in State Constitutions, 73 A.L.R. 6th 571, § 2 (2012). 
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1. Approaches to Defining Excessive Price 
a. Usury Laws 
Usury is defined as the exaction of a greater sum for the use of money 
than the highest interest rate allowed by law.441 Borrowers can assert usury 
as a defense to the enforcement of a loan contract, and states may also create 
civil or criminal penalties for usurious practices. 
Regulation of usury has ancient roots and has been part of American 
law since colonial times,442 but has changed in the last four decades. Until 
the 1970s, most states had usury laws of broad scope.443 With the advent of 
hyperinflation, however, lenders who were subject to these statutory caps on 
interest rates felt their margins tightly squeezed and pressured legislatures 
for relief.444 Many states responded by easing, or in a few cases abandoning, 
interest rate ceilings in the late 1970s and early 1980s.445 Congress also 
responded by preempting the application of state usury laws to major 
categories of lenders and loans in a series of new federal statutes;446 as a 
result, much modern consumer lending takes place outside the reach of state 
law. Further, in 1978 the Supreme Court held that when a consumer borrows 
money from a national bank in another state, the laws of the bank’s state, 
rather than the consumer’s, apply.447 That holding opened the door for states 
to compete to attract national banks by permitting higher interest rates.448 
This, in turn, spurred state banks (and then nonbank lenders) competing with 
national banks to demand equal footing in terms of the rates they could 
charge.449 
Today a “legislative patchwork”450 exists in which most states have 
replaced broad caps covering all consumer loans with usury laws covering a 
narrower range of products, and a few have abandoned their usury laws 
 
 441 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 2 (2019). 
 442 Bender, supra note 363, at 726. 
 443 Adriel D. Orozco, Note, The Judicial Expansion of an Old Tool to Combat Predatory Lending in 
New Mexico, 46 N.M. L. REV. 191, 199–200 (2016). 
 444 Id. at 200. 
 445 Bender, supra note 363, at 732–34. 
 446 For example, the National Bank Act limits the interest rate charged by national banks to that 
allowed by the law of the bank’s home state and preempts conflicting state usury laws. 12 U.S.C. § 85 
(2018); 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 103 § 13 (2019). The Federal Deposit Insurance Act preempts 
state law claims against state-chartered, federally insured banks. See Wooster, supra note 440, § 3. 
 447 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 313 (1978). 
 448 Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case for a Federal Usury Cap, 
34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259, 264 (2014). 
 449 Id. at 264–65. 
 450 Id. at 266. 
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altogether. Nevertheless, as we discuss below, courts applying usury statutes 
have done so in a manner that robustly protects consumers, rebuffs 
vagueness challenges, and construes them to cover a range of situations not 
expressly covered in the statutes. 
Usury statutes vary considerably in the permissible interest rate, types 
of loans covered, and remedies and penalties.451 Several states adopted the 
1968 Uniform Consumer Credit Code (or a subsequent 1974 version),452 
which sought to create greater consistency across states in prohibited 
practices and set a maximum interest rate of 18% for consumer loans.453 In 
other states, maximum interest rates range from around 8% to as high as 
45%; rates in the 15%–18% range are common.454 Rather than specifying a 
numerical interest rate, some usury statutes peg the maximum to a 
benchmark indicator, such as the U.S. prime rate.455 But even these statutes 
set forth the basis for calculating the allowable rate with great specificity.456 
For penalties, some statutes provide that the entire contract is void, while 
others allow collection of the principal and the legally permitted amount of 
interest. Some states, but not all, provide for additional civil or criminal 
penalties (fines).457 
Despite these differences, usury laws have some broad commonalities. 
Most critically, they have taken a consistent approach to defining excessive 
price: specifying, in clear terms, a maximum annual percentage interest 
 
 451 9 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 20:2 (4th ed. 2019). 
 452 Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Regulation of Consumer Loans Under Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code, 73 A.L.R. 6th 425, §§ 1–2 (2012). 
 453 UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.401(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1974); UNIF. CONSUMER 
CREDIT CODE § 3.201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1968). 
 454 BANKING LAW—CONSUMER PROTECTION: INTEREST RATES & USURY, LEXISNEXIS 50-STATE 
SURVEYS: STATUTES & REGULATIONS (2018). 
 455 Anne Sraders, What Is the Prime Rate? Definition, History and Rate in 2019, THE STREET  
(July 31, 2019, 3:15 PM) https://www.thestreet.com/markets/what-is-the-prime-rate-14742514 
[https://perma.cc/F8XL-EZ4S] (defining the prime rate as “the lowest interest rate available for non-
banks to borrow money”) 
 456 For example, Rhode Island’s statute sets the maximum at 21% per annum or an “alternate rate” 
that is “equal to nine percentage points (9%) plus an index that is the domestic prime rate as published in 
the Money Rates section of The Wall Street Journal on the last business day of each month preceding the 
later of the date of the debtor’s agreement or the date on which the interest rate is redetermined in 
accordance with the terms of the debtor’s agreement.” 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2 (2019). Some states set 
as their benchmark the federal discount rate, which was abolished by the Federal Reserve Board in 2003; 
however, courts have readily substituted an analogous benchmark from the obsolete one where necessary 
to sustain the statute against a vagueness challenge. See, e.g., Pakay v. Davis, 241 S.W.3d 257, 260–62 
(Ark. 2006) (substituting the primary credit rate). 
 457 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, §§ 34–36, 45. 
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rate.458 Additionally, they permit consumers to bring a usury claim to get out 
of paying some or all of a usurious loan or to recover illegal interest already 
paid, as well as to raise usury as a defense in an action to collect on the 
debt.459 They generally require a showing of four elements to make out a 
usury claim: (1) the transaction at issue is properly characterized as a loan or 
forbearance; (2) what is loaned is money or something circulating as money; 
(3) the loan is repayable absolutely; and (4) something was exacted for the 
use of the money in excess of the interest allowed by law. Some jurisdictions 
also require a fifth element: that the lender intended the transaction to exact 
interest in excess of the allowable rate.460 
b. General Consumer Protection Laws 
States have also sought to curtail abusive consumer lending practices 
using general consumer protection acts (CPAs), which cover sales as well as 
lending in most states.461 CPAs blossomed during the pro-consumer 
movement of the 1960s, when consensus emerged that the efforts of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to combat unfair and deceptive practices, 
even in conjunction with remedies available in tort and contract, were 
insufficient to protect consumers.462 Several rounds of drafting of uniform 
laws gave states the template they needed to adopt additional protections, 
and by the mid-1970s nearly every state had adopted a CPA, with most of 
those providing consumers with a private right of action.463 Today, all fifty 
states have such laws, and consumer advocates describe them as “the main 
lines of defense protecting consumers from predatory, deceptive, and 
unscrupulous business practices.”464 The laws allow both individual 
consumers and state attorneys general to bring civil actions in response to 
 
 458 Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience 
Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1117 (2008). Interestingly, some 
states have established an administrative process for reviewing and updating the interest rate ceiling 
which resembles in some respects the way rates are set for public utilities. Virginia, for instance, tasks 
the Commissioner of Financial Institutions with setting “fair and reasonable” rates for small consumer 
loans. For a discussion, see Bender, supra note 363, at 800 & n.384. 
 459 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, §§ 34, 38. 
 460 WILLISTON, supra note 451, § 20:4. 
 461 Five states carve lenders out of their general CPAs altogether, and another fifteen have CPAs that 
cover some but not all lenders or loans. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER 
PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 
STATUTES 2 (2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5JA-
M7HN]. 
 462 D. Matthew Allen et al., The Federal Character of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1083, 1085–86 (2011). 
 463 Id. at 1086. 
 464 Carter, supra note 461, at 3. 
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violations of the statute. In addition to civil penalties, some states permit 
criminal sanctions for extreme violations. 
Some CPAs are tied to a companion usury statute, serving to expand 
the range of remedies available for violating the usury law. For example, “a 
violation of the Massachusetts usury statute constitutes a per se violation” of 
Massachusetts’s CPA.465 More commonly, CPAs are freestanding and 
prohibit acts that violate a general standard of “unfair” or “unconscionable” 
business practices.466 Florida’s CPA, for instance, prohibits “[u]nfair 
methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce”;467 
Arkansas’s prohibits “any other unconscionable . . . practice in business, 
commerce, or trade.”468 
CPAs using the term “unfair” often incorporate by reference the FTC’s 
understanding of that term.469 “Unconscionable” acts are not synonymous 
with “unfair” ones, however, and in defining “unconscionable” legislatures 
and courts have incorporated common law understandings of that term from 
contracts cases and UCC § 2-302.470 As discussed above,471 such 
understandings pin unconscionability to findings of procedural and 
substantive unfairness. New Mexico’s CPA, for example, defines 
“unconscionable trade practice[s]” to include procedural and substantive 
standards lifted directly from the UCC.472 Thus, our earlier analysis of the 
requirements for a finding of unconscionability in contract law also describes 
the typical analysis in a CPA case applying an unconscionability standard. 
When fleshing out procedural unconscionability, for instance, CPAs 
commonly name as key indicia lack of sophistication on the part of the 
 
 465 In re Pena, 397 B.R. 566, 577 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008). 
 466 They also prohibit deceptive practices, but we confine our discussion to their unfair or 
unconscionable practices component. 
 467 FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2019). 
 468 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107(a)(10) (2019). 
 469 For a summary of the FTC’s evolving definition of unfair practices, see United Cos. Lending 
Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200–01 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 470 See Russell, supra note 379, at 984. These understandings were enshrined in the 1971 Uniform 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, which does not apply to lending. See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
ACT § 4(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1971) (listing six factors that should be considered in determining 
whether an act is unconscionable). 
 471 See supra Section III.B. 
 472 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(E) (2019); see also Orozco, supra note 443, at 202 (noting that New 
Mexico’s statute therefore retains the UCC’s inherent ambiguity as to what sorts of practices and prices 
violate these standards, making it vulnerable to vagueness challenges, but also permitting flexibility in 
dealing with unjust business practices). 
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borrower, financial necessity, sharp practices by the lender, and lack of 
choice.473 
The two approaches states have taken to defining excessive price in the 
consumer lending context—maximum interest rates and prohibitions on 
unconscionable lending practices—can and do peacefully coexist as 
complementary efforts to protect consumers against predatory lending.474 
Where usury statutes’ protections do not apply, or offer inadequate remedies, 
CPAs can fill gaps. The CashCall case discussed earlier illustrates the point: 
the court held that the fact that California’s usury law applies only to loans 
under $2,500 had no bearing on the plaintiffs’ ability to bring an action under 
the state’s general CPA alleging an unconscionably high interest rate on a 
loan greater than $2,500 because the legislature had adopted a separate 
provision applying the unconscionability doctrine to all consumer loans.475 
Usury statutes, the court went on, simply provide a “bright-line rule” about 
excessive price that supplements the more flexible, context-dependent 
unconscionability standard.476 
The two approaches have complementary strengths and weaknesses. 
One advantage that usury laws offer over CPAs’ unconscionability standard 
is that the characteristics of the borrower do not matter. If the loan’s interest 
rate is over the limit, usury has been committed. This means that usury laws’ 
protection, as a practical matter, extends to a broader swath of consumers. It 
is also more straightforward to establish in litigation. Although courts have 
allowed petitioners in CPA cases to establish procedural unconscionability 
based on a showing that the lender’s customers as a class had indicia of 
procedural unfairness such as low educational attainment and low income 
without establishing that every individual borrower was disadvantaged,477 
even this requirement may constrain the types of loans that can be 
 
 473 Bender, supra note 363, at 772. 
 474 For an extended discussion of this idea, see id. Professor Bender points out that disputes do 
occasionally arise when both regimes are brought to bear—for example, can a court review an interest 
rate under the unconscionability standard when it does not violate the state’s usury law or when state 
usury law is preempted for that loan by federal law? But these are relatively narrow issues. See id. at 737. 
 475 De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004 (Cal. 2018). 
 476 Id. at 1010. 
 477 See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658 (N.M. 2014) (holding that a 
general practice on the part of the lender of targeting vulnerable borrowers could be deduced from the 
lender’s targeted marketing to low-income, low-educated groups that research showed could not 
understand key concepts such as annual percentage rate); see also Orozco, supra note 443 (summarizing 
the case). 
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successfully challenged. In contrast, usury laws can be used to combat high 
prices even in the absence of apparent procedural unfairness.478 
A related advantage is that the usury standard is much clearer than the 
unconscionability standard.479 As noted above,480 even laws that peg the 
maximum interest rate to some shifting benchmark in the U.S. economy are 
exquisitely specific about what that benchmark is and how the interest rate 
ceiling is to be calculated. 
On the other hand, relative to the usury approach, the unconscionability 
standard arguably offers the contracting parties greater freedom to determine 
the terms of their agreement.481 Additionally, usury laws have proven 
vulnerable to gaming on the part of regulated entities. As states narrowed the 
range of covered transactions over time, lenders have found ways to evade 
these laws by restructuring transactions so that they are not covered.482 For 
example, rent-to-own businesses can achieve lower interest rates while still 
exacting the same, high overall price from consumers by simply inflating the 
cash price of the item.483 In contrast, CPAs ordinarily apply the 
unconscionability standard to consumer sales and loans generally, without 
regard for the specific type of transaction. 
In summary, usury laws and CPAs take quite different approaches to 
defining impermissible consumer loans, mirroring the approaches taken in 
Type 1 and Type 3 emergency price gouging laws. Each approach has 
important limitations, which may explain why states have tended to pursue 
them in tandem. The implications for prescription drug pricing laws are 
discussed shortly. Before reaching that discussion, we comment on how 
these laws have fared in the face of vagueness challenges. 
2. Legal Challenges 
Some facial challenges to state laws regulating interest rates have 
questioned whether these laws are permissible exercises of the state’s police 
 
 478 For an example of this problem outside the lending context, see People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht 
Servs., Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1378, 1386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (rejecting, in a suit against a plumbing, heating, 
and air conditioning business, the contention that unconscionably high prices alone are sufficient to find 
a contract in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act). 
 479 Cf. Bender, supra note 363, at 744 (noting criticisms that the unconscionability standard 
engenders too much uncertainty as applied to loan pricing). 
 480 See supra note 456 and accompanying text. 
 481 Bender, supra note 363, at 744–55. 
 482 Id. at 739–40; Orozco, supra note 443, at 203. 
 483 Bender, supra note 363, at 740. Although market forces might ordinarily be expected to correct 
this price inflation, limited competition in the rent-to-own market and their low-income customers’ 
inability to pay full price up front may undercut this corrective force. 
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power.484 The courts’ answer has been a resounding yes: they are 
constitutionally acceptable forms of economic regulation that do not violate 
substantive due process by interfering with freedom of contract.485 States 
have wide latitude to regulate interest rates, as long as the classifications 
adopted in the statute satisfy basic equal protection requirements.486 In 
particular, courts have allowed legislatures wide discretion in selecting a 
maximum interest rate.487 
Usury statutes have been challenged on vagueness grounds. Because 
these laws so clearly state the maximum interest rate, vagueness challenges 
have centered on issues other than what constitutes an excessive price. Some 
vagueness claims have questioned whether particular charges in the 
transaction at issue count toward the statutorily-defined “interest” on the 
loan, but most concern whether the transaction fits within the scope of the 
usury law.488 For example, is the transaction a “loan” or some other type of 
transaction?489 Does the defendant’s conduct constitute a “scheme or 
business” of making usurious loans?490 
In analyzing such claims in challenges to civil usury statutes, courts 
apply the comparatively lenient vagueness standard applicable to economic 
regulation.491 Criminal usury statutes typically invite application of the 
tougher standard for criminal laws, but that has not served as a bar to 
upholding these statutes.492 Courts have upheld usury statutes against 
 
 484 See, e.g., Ardsley Constr. Co. v. Port of New York Auth., 417 N.Y.S.2d 649 (App. Div. 1979) 
(challenging interest rate cap on claims against public corporations). 
 485 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, § 7 (collecting cases). 
 486 Id. at §§ 7, 8; see also Glenn v. State, 644 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 2007) (finding that Georgia’s criminal 
payday lending statute did not violate equal protection by confining its scope to loans by Georgia 
residents); Aros v. Beneficial Arizona, Inc., 977 P.2d 784, 789 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (finding a rational 
basis for treating consumer and commercial borrowers differently). 
 487 Wooster, supra note 440, § 14 (summarizing cases). 
 488 See generally id. (collecting and summarizing cases relating to usury provisions in state 
constitutions). 
 489 See, e.g., 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 169 (2019) (citing Glenn, 644 S.E.2d 826, and SAL 
Leasing, Inc. v. State ex rel. Napolitano, 10 P.3d 1221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Fogie v. THORN 
Ams., Inc., 95 F.3d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying the “more tolerant” vagueness standard to hold 
that Minnesota’s law was sufficiently clear in its definition of “consumer credit sales” as encompassing 
rent-to-own transactions). 
 490 See, e.g., People v. Lombardo, 460 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that “scheme” and 
“business” are not vague because their legal meaning is the same as their dictionary definitions, and 
clearly applied to the defendant’s conduct); People v. Di Raffaele, 420 N.Y.S.2d 109, 110–11 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1979) (same). 
 491 Fogie, 95 F.3d at 650; United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 204 (D. Mass. 
1998). 
 492 See, e.g., Di Raffaele, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 110–11 (upholding criminal loansharking law). 
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vagueness challenges even where their holding required lenders to have a 
rather detailed knowledge of the state’s case law concerning what factors 
militate in favor of calling a transaction a loan rather than a sale.493 Cases in 
which vagueness challenges have been sustained appear to be rare and 
connected to rather exotic issues.494 
Case law also speaks to the clarity of CPAs’ “unconscionable” standard 
and the interrelationship between usury laws and general state CPAs. The 
Arkansas Supreme Court, rejecting a vagueness challenge brought by a title-
pawn business, held that one permissible vehicle for enforcing the state’s 
usury prohibition (contained in the state constitution) was for the attorney 
general to bring an action under the state’s general CPA, which prohibited 
“unconscionable, false, or deceptive” business practices.495 The contract at 
issue was unquestionably usurious; the issue was whether it could also be 
prosecuted as “unconscionable.” The court found that the “unconscionable” 
standard was not unconstitutionally vague because interpretations were 
available in the common law of contracts.496 Further, it found that it was 
consistent with the legislature’s purpose of protecting consumers against 
usury to permit the attorney general to bring enforcement actions relating to 
usurious loans under the state’s CPA.497 
Other courts have similarly upheld CPAs’ using the “unconscionable” 
standard against vagueness challenges. Courts have rebuffed claims of 
vagueness by pointing to the extensive fleshing out of its meaning in 
contracts cases, as well as provisions in some statutes and regulations that 
specify particular dimensions of unconscionability.498 For example, 
 
 493 See SAL Leasing, Inc., 10 P.3d at 1229 (holding that state consumer lending law applied to a title-
pawn business because “[u]sury case law—including [two particular decisions]—gave appellees fair 
warning that their conduct was proscribed and made arbitrary prosecution impossible”); see also Glenn, 
644 S.E.2d at 828 (rejecting claim that criminal payday lending law was unconstitutionally vague because 
it did not specifically name the particular lending schemes defendants used). 
 494 See Bisno v. Kahan, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 709, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (concerning application of 
the usury state’s interest rate cap to forbearance fees, which are a separate element of a loan contract); 
State v. Roderick, 704 So. 2d 49, 54–55 (Miss. 1997) (finding no vagueness problem with the usury 
statute itself but holding that its deployment as a predicate violation for prosecution under the state’s 
RICO statute raised vagueness problems); Harvey v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. C-12016-04, 2005 WL 
1252341, at *5–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2005) (sustaining an as-applied vagueness challenge to a state 
CPA where the attorney general sought to enforce the statute against a carmaker, which had not informed 
past buyers of the availability of a new anti-theft device). 
 495 State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Inv. Co., 985 S.W.2d 299, 301–02 (Ark. 1999). 
 496 Id. at 302. 
 497 Id. at 302–03. 
 498 See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 204–05 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(stating that in order to “[t]o establish that the Regulation is unconstitutionally vague, United ‘must 
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Massachusetts issued regulations under its CPA prohibiting mortgage loans 
that “significantly deviate from industry-wide standards”499—a phrase 
calling to mind the reference to “reasonable market price” in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts’ definition of substantive unconscionability.500 The 
district court examining those regulations also noted a policy concern 
favoring a tolerant posture toward the unconscionability standard: “In 
speaking of unfair or deceptive practices, Congress and the [FTC] have taken 
the position that a specific definition of such practices is not appropriate as 
it would necessarily be underinclusive, creating a shield for subsequent 
unfair or deceptive practices as the markets for goods and services evolve.”501 
To summarize, vagueness challenges present little threat to either usury 
statutes or application of CPAs to high-interest consumer loans. 
3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices 
Sharp lending practices share some notable features with high-priced 
prescription drugs, making them an intuitive analogue in many respects. 
Most notably, the consumers availing themselves of these hard bargains are 
often in a desperate situation: for example, in the case of predatory lending, 
because their credit history and assets are too poor for them to find credit in 
the mainstream market, and in the case of medications, because of serious 
health conditions. Although some may find consumers and patients 
differently situated morally—consumers may have poor credit due to 
irresponsible spending, while sick patients may be less blameworthy—the 
notion that the law should protect desperate people from predatory 
companies has moral force for both groups. Further, both situations often 
involve little choice of alternative products—for borrowers, because they are 
excluded from the mainstream market, and for drugs, because of a lack of 
therapeutic alternatives. In both cases, opacity in the transaction makes it 
hard for consumers to understand the full cost of what they are buying. 
Finally, both circumstances can involve a cycle of dependence. Just as 
patients are reliant on medications for chronic conditions, high-interest loan 
customers often find they cannot repay their debt and must take out new debt 
to ease their obligations under the existing loan. Although it is arguably 
unfair to paint drug manufacturers with the same moral brush as predatory 
lenders, from the consumer’s perspective the situations may feel similar. 
 
demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications’” (quoting Whiting v. Town of 
Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1991))). 
 499 Id. (citation omitted). 
 500 See supra note 369 and accompanying text. 
 501 United Cos. Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 205. 
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Usury laws’ approach of setting a maximum interest rate has clear 
applicability to drug price increases: legislation could specify a maximum 
allowable price increase over a specified time period. (Usury statutes do not 
address changes in interest rates over time, only absolute rates, but the 
approach of stating a maximum percentage is exportable to drug price 
increases.) As discussed earlier,502 recently introduced price gouging 
legislation for medications has taken exactly that approach. Such bright-line 
rules create clear targets for enforcement action—any manufacturer who 
steps over the statutory line—and puts companies unambiguously on notice 
of how much is too much in terms of a price hike. Moreover, in reviewing 
usury statutes, courts have clearly signaled that legislatures have wide 
latitude in their choice of a ceiling rate.503 They can essentially select 
whatever rate they like; courts will not require them to provide a justification 
beyond the argument that it is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 
The usury approach is also potentially applicable to drugs’ launch 
prices: Congress (but not the states, given patent preemption issues) could 
establish a statutory maximum launch price. However, there is broad concern 
among experts that such crude price controls are undesirable from a 
standpoint of preserving incentives for innovation.504 Particularly given the 
widely varying investments in research and development and anticipated 
market sizes for different drugs, imposing a single statutory cap is ill-
advised. 
One advantage of the usury approach is its imperviousness to 
procedural-unfairness issues. It is a “consumer-blind” standard, in the sense 
that the characteristics of the particular consumers or group of consumers 
who are the target market do not matter in determining whether a violation 
has occurred. Not having to worry about showing procedural unfairness 
might allow attorneys general more discretion about which drugs to target 
for enforcement actions—they would not need to worry about making out a 
claim that the drug is essential, for example, or that patients lack choice due 
to absence of competition in the market. Further, although usury statutes 
currently apply only to individual borrowers, the general approach could be 
deployed more broadly. Whereas the procedural-unfairness requirement 
makes it hard to persuade a factfinder that a sophisticated, corporate entity 
has been subjected to unconscionable practices, no comparable barrier 
 
 502 See supra Section III.B. 
 503 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, § 7 (“It is within the discretion of state legislatures 
to set the rate of interest for various types and classes of claims.”). 
 504 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 18 (noting this concern among members 
of an expert committee that did not include direct price controls in a suite of recommended measures for 
making prescription drugs more affordable). 
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precludes application of a usury approach to prices charged to drug 
wholesalers and mail-order pharmacies. 
The usury approach has a slight advantage over CPAs using an 
unconscionability standard in terms of clarity, but neither has proved 
particularly vulnerable to vagueness challenges. Courts have felt 
comfortable relying on contract law doctrine to interpret the standard. But 
importantly, CPAs or their implementing regulations may flesh out the term 
“unconscionable” to reduce ambiguity about the legislature’s intent. CPAs 
thus illustrate the potential for careful drafting to improve upon common law 
understandings of unconscionability.505 States and Congress can write 
legislation with as specific a definition as desired to reduce the risk of 
vagueness challenges and send the clearest possible signals about what is 
expected of biopharmaceutical companies. In this sense, CPAs offer a highly 
appealing model for proscribing excessive drug prices. 
State CPAs have already been used by two state attorneys general as 
well as private plaintiffs as a basis for suing drug companies over their 
pricing practices, illustrating the possibilities for a consumer protection law 
approach to excessive prices. To date, such litigation has primarily 
emphasized a deception theory rather than an argument that prices are simply 
too high. In all of these cases, the plaintiffs allege that the three largest insulin 
manufacturers used a deceptive pricing scheme by “artificially inflating 
benchmark [list] prices to offer large rebates to the PBMs.”506 That is, they 
claim manufacturers raised and publicly disseminated their drug’s WAC so 
that they could give PBMs larger rebates, though they knew wholesalers and 
other organizations would use the WAC to set prices for some groups of 
consumers, such as the uninsured. Despite the emphasis on deception, one 
recent case filed by the State of Kentucky also characterizes the 
manufacturers’ conduct as an “unconscionable pricing scheme” involving 
“unconscionably and unreasonably inflated list prices,” an apparent 
reference to the “unfair” prong of Kentucky’s CPA.507 
 
 505 This observation is inspired by the discussion in Bender, supra note 363, at 746–803, of ways in 
which states can sharpen the language in their CPAs to clearly define unconscionability, thereby choosing 
how tightly to tether the statute’s definition of that term to the default interpretation that courts will give 
it, which is based on U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 506 Complaint at 153, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-699(BRM)(LHG) (D.N.J. Dec. 26, 2017) 
(consolidating multiple suits initiated in federal court of other states); accord Complaint at 2, Minnesota 
ex rel. Swanson v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, No. 3:18-cv-14999 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2018). 
 507 Complaint at 4, 20, Kentucky ex rel. Beshear v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., No. 19-CI-00473  
(Ky. Cir. Ct. May 13, 2019), https://ag.ky.gov/pdf_news/20190513_Insulin-Pricing-Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5B3R-KKM5]. 
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Notwithstanding these strengths of the consumer lending law model, 
three sticking points are worth bearing in mind when considering its potential 
applicability to prescription drugs. First, usury laws and CPAs have 
traditionally pegged enforcement to actual transactions. They do not prohibit 
merely offering a loan product at a usurious price; a transaction with a 
consumer must take place.508 If this approach were preserved, taking action 
against high-priced prescription drugs would require waiting for a sale to 
take place. This may be a relatively minor concern because although some 
patients may be unable to afford the medications, others with better insurance 
coverage will purchase them. Yet, for newly approved drugs with lifesaving 
potential, the delay in access for some patients could be consequential. 
Second, part of the simplicity of usury statutes is that they announce a 
single price ceiling for all covered loans, regardless of who the borrower is.509 
Drugs, of course, are not sold at a single price, nor are they typically sold at 
the list price. Price discrimination among payers is the norm, implemented 
through a series of rebates and discounts off the list price.510 How, then, to 
apply the usury model? Which price should it target? Imposing limitations 
that merely apply to the WAC is an obvious answer, but this would not keep 
a manufacturer from imposing de facto price increases on particular payers 
by reducing the magnitude of the discounts and rebates it is willing to give. 
The strong bargaining position of PBMs and large wholesalers may mitigate 
concerns about such behaviors, but the law would not address it directly. 
This brings up a third, related concern: gaming. Usury statutes have 
inspired strategic behavior by lenders seeking to step out of the laws’ 
scope.511 It would be much more difficult for drug manufacturers to argue 
that their products are not covered by the statute, unless the statute applied 
only to a narrow class of products. But they could inflate a new drug’s launch 
price so that they could painlessly remain within statutory ceilings on price 
increases, or they could manipulate discounts and rebates to maintain or 
increase a drug’s average net price. This is a significant concern that even 
careful drafting may be unable to eliminate. 
 
 508 See 75 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, supra note 446, § 1 (“Usury has been judicially defined by 
the various states as the receiving, securing, or taking of a greater sum or value for the loan or forbearance 
of money, goods, or things in action than is allowed by law.”). 
 509 See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 22303 (West 2019) (providing that for consumer loans, “[e]very 
licensee who lends any sum of money [under $2,500] may contract for and receive charges at a rate not 
exceeding” the amount set forth in the statute). 
 510 For a primer on this topic, see Richard G. Frank, Prescription Drug Prices: Why Do Some Pay 
More Than Others Do?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 115 (2001). 
 511 See supra note 412 and accompanying text. 
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In conclusion, although existing CPAs are not an optimal vehicle for 
redressing unconscionable drug pricing, the general approach they employ 
has considerable appeal. The usury model is also attractive, though its 
limitations suggest it should be thought of as a companion to a more general, 
CPA-like statute—as states have done for consumer lending. There is 
significant potential to use such statutes to tailor a definition of 
unconscionability that makes sense for prescription drugs and avoids some 
of the baggage of the common law unconscionability standard. Specifically, 
legislators can make clear that plaintiffs and attorneys general need not show 
any procedural unfairness.512 We expand on this possibility in Part IV. 
D. Public Utilities Rate Regulation 
Public utilities have long been subjected to extensive regulation in the 
United States.513 In addition to price regulation via formal rate-setting 
processes, regulated aspects of public utilities include market entry and exit, 
the addition or abandonment of service offerings, service standards, financial 
structure, and accounting methods.514 
State regulation of public utilities dates to the turn of the twentieth 
century, when widening economic inequality led to concern about 
Americans’ ability to access essential products and services such as rail and 
other transit, telecommunications, electricity and gas, and finance.515 The 
impetus for intervening into the markets for these goods and services arose 
not only from their status as necessities, but also from realization that many 
of these industries tended toward natural monopolies516—and further, that 
 
 512 Cf. Bender, supra note 363, at 796–97 (advocating this approach for CPAs relating to consumer 
lending). 
 513 Public utilities are generally defined by reference to several characteristics: “(1) economies of 
scale, (2) the provision of an ‘essential’ service, (3) heavy capital requirements, (4) production of services 
or nonstorable goods, (5) demand and cost fluctuation, (6) exclusive franchises, and (7) the obligation to 
supply services to anyone willing to pay the price.” William S. Brewbaker III, Health Care Price Controls 
and the Takings Clause, 21 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 669, 705 n.149 (1994) (citing JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET 
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 8–10 (1988)). 
 514 Id. (citing BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 513, at 6). 
 515 William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation in 
America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 755 (2018); K. Sabeel Rahman, Essay, Constructing Citizenship: 
Exclusion and Inclusion Through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2460–
63 (2018). 
 516 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 3, 7 
(2011), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-lazar-electricityregulationintheus-
guide-2011-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4NR-ATB7]; Adam Plaiss, From Natural Monopoly to Public 
Utility: Technological Determinism and the Political Economy of Infrastructure in Progressive-Era 
America, 57 TECH. & CULT. 806, 814 (2016). A natural monopoly occurs when it is most efficient for an 
industry to consist of only one firm—for example, because the industry involves very high fixed costs. 
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well-regulated monopolies could actually be superior to competitive markets 
from a consumer welfare perspective.517 Public utility services tend toward 
natural monopoly because providing them is capital intensive, creating a 
barrier to market entry, and because the marginal price of production 
continues to decrease as output increases, solidifying the position of large 
companies.518 Further, the need for extensive physical facilities (for example, 
electrical wires) to distribute the utility to customers makes it more efficient 
for a geographic area to be served by a single provider. Thus, rather than 
resisting monopoly, the main regulatory move has been to protect retail 
customers against the consumer harms associated with monopolies, 
including supracompetitive prices and poor service.519 
Regulation is executed by public utility commissions (PUCs) at the 
federal and state levels. In exercising their powers, PUCs seek to balance 
consumers’ interest in affordable prices against the need to set rates at a level 
sufficient to motivate production and allow utilities to attract investment.520 
They also aim to set rates in a manner that gives utilities incentives to operate 
efficiently.521 Scholars have conceived of rate setting as reflecting a sort of 
“regulatory contract” between utilities and their customers, in which the 
utility commits to provide reliable, accessible service at minimum cost in 
exchange for the exclusive right to sell in a particular market, and customers 
(through the PUC) agree to compensate the utility for the costs it prudently 
incurs in meeting that commitment.522 
 
Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1227, 1229 
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 1st ed. 2007). 
 517 W.M. WARWICK, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION, 
AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 5.2–5.8 (rev. 2002),  
https://www.pnnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-13906.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DE85-JXC9] (“[B]oth utilities and the public recognized that regulation of service 
territories and rates at the state level was preferable to continued customer competition, duplication of 
service, and different regulations in myriad municipalities.”). 
 518 Lino Mendiola, The Erosion of Traditional Ratemaking Through the Use of Special Rates, Riders, 
and Other Mechanisms, 10 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 173, 174–75 (2008) (citing ELI CLEMENS, 
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 25 (Appleton-Century-Crofts 1950)). 
 519 Timothy J. Brennan, Entry and Welfare Loss in Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION AND THE 
REGULATION OF UTILITIES 141, 141 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1991). 
 520 Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 12 (1986). 
 521 See BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 513, at 92–95. For some utilities, particularly energy, 
establishing rate levels and structures that encourage consumers not to overconsume is also a regulatory 
goal. See id. at 93–94. 
 522 See Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 8–9. 
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Public utilities rate regulation spans many industries,523 with some 
significant inter-industry differences in approach. We focus on retail 
electricity services as an illustrative example. Electricity is a useful case 
study524 because methods of rate setting in that industry have been 
extensively reviewed by the courts and have evolved over time.525 Although 
the industry has undergone considerable deregulation since the 1980s, its 
history, and the rate-setting methods still applied in states that have not 
deregulated, provide insight into how rate setting might be carried out in the 
prescription drug industry. We conclude, however, that the approach through 
which electricity prices have been set, known as rate-of-return regulation, 
despite its merits, is pragmatically unsatisfactory for prescription drugs. By 
contrast, a distinct but related approach—setting rates that payers will pay 
when a drug’s market price exceeds some “affordability” threshold—has 
pragmatic appeal for controlling costs, albeit not insignificant normative 
vulnerabilities. 
1. Approaches to Defining Excessive Price 
About two-thirds of the U.S. population is served by investor-owned 
(private) utility companies, with the remainder served by publicly-owned 
utilities, cooperatives, and other entities.526 Electricity rates and terms of 
service for investor-owned utilities are set by state PUCs.527 With regard to 
rate setting, state PUCs have two main functions: determining the utility’s 
revenue requirements and then, based on that requirement, setting retail 
electricity rates for each class of customers. 
 
 523 Aside from electricity and telecommunications, these include natural gas, water, oil pipelines, rail 
transportation, surface freight, and (until deregulation in the 1980s) air transportation. See William M. 
Capron, Introduction to THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED 
INDUSTRIES 1, 1–12 (William M. Capron ed., 1971). Among the earliest targets of rate regulation in the 
United States were grain elevators, warehouses, and canals, for which nineteenth-century courts held that 
rate regulation was justified because they were “monopoly” providers of services “affected with a public 
interest.” Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 150–51 (1876). 
 524 Although a useful analogue to prescription drugs in many ways, retail electricity regulation does 
not face the same preemption challenges as drug regulation because it is specifically reserved to the states 
in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 796(15) (2018). 
 525 See infra Section III.D.2. 
 526 Jessica Shipley, Traditional Economic Regulation of Electric Utilities, REGULATORY 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ 
rap_shipley_pucs_regulation_overview_2018_dec_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP32-93Q4]. 
 527 In most states, public utilities are not subject to regulation; co-ops are subject to some form of 
regulation in about twenty states. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 24. Wholesale 
rates (i.e., prices that electricity retailers pay to generators) are regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission. Id. at 13. 
114:859 (2020) Reining In “Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs 
939 
Although a few states require periodic review of electricity rates, in 
most states, rate review is initiated upon the request of the utility or an 
intervenor, such as a consumer organization.528 Typically in these 
proceedings, known as “rate cases,” the utility submits a proposed rate 
change and the PUC conducts a review and approves or disallows the 
change. The basis for the PUC’s decision is established by state statute; 
generally, statutes require that rates be set at “just, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” levels,529 considering the utility’s costs to provide service. 
Statutes sometimes provide more specific guidance—for instance, 
specifying which operating or investment costs may be taken into 
consideration.530 
Two main approaches have dominated rate setting for utilities. 
Agencies may use a combination of these approaches (as well as others).531 
The first, and dominant, method is rate-of-return regulation. Reflecting the 
regulatory-contract idea, rate-of-return regulation seeks to quantify what it 
costs the utility to provide service and set rates at a level that permits the 
utility to recover its investment as well as a return on investment that is 
sufficient to attract investors. The PUC examines what the utility spends on 
operating expenses and investments and sets a valuation on its productive 
assets, taxes, and depreciation. It may disallow expenses and investments it 
deems imprudent.532 
The second approach is to impose a price cap. The PUC sets a baseline 
price ceiling that is intended to reflect prevailing costs in the industry. It then 
adjusts it upward annually for economy-wide inflation and certain changes 
that are outside the utility’s control (for example, unusual events that make 
the inputs to its services more expensive), and downward to the extent that 
productivity in the industry is expected to improve faster, and/or input costs 
are expected to increase less, than in the economy as a whole.533 A firm that 
increases its productivity over expected industry norms, or decreases its 
 
 528 See WARWICK, supra note 517, at 5.8–5.9. 
 529 Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 4 (citations omitted). 
 530 See id. at 4–5. 
 531 See William M. Capron & Roger G. Noll, Summary and Conclusion, in TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, supra note 523, at 197, 197–226 (“While rate-of-return control is 
commonly the principal device used in regulating prices and profits of electric utilities, transportation, 
and communications firms, the federal agencies responsible for regulating these sectors also regulate 
some prices directly.”). 
 532 Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 1, 5–6, 12. 
 533 See James Ming Chen, Price-Level Regulation and Its Reform, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 931, 943–44 
(2016); David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, The Price Cap Regulation Paradox in the 
Electricity Sector, 29 ELECTRICITY J. 1, 3–4 (2016). Some states also factor in other adjustments—for 
instance, a major new investment that is necessary to serve customers’ needs. Id. at 3–4. 
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input costs below them, may keep the difference.534 Whereas rate-of-return 
regulation involves regulatory scrutiny of the utility’s spending decisions, 
under price-cap regulation, the utility can “conduct its business as it sees fit, 
provided that its prices do not rise above a certain level.”535 
Although the telecommunications industry was subject to price-cap 
regulation in the late 1980s and early 1990s,536 electricity regulators 
historically have hewed closely to the rate-of-return approach.537 In applying 
that approach in rate cases, PUCs begin by determining the company’s 
revenue requirement—the amount of revenue it should be permitted  
to receive. The basic regulatory formula for the revenue requirement is:  
rate base × rate of return + operating expenses.538 The rate base is the total 
of all investments made to serve customers (for example, buildings, wires, 
and computer software), net of depreciation.539 The revenue requirement thus 
requires determining the amount of investment allowed in the rate base, a 
fair rate of return on that investment, and reasonable operating expenses—
all based on some test year, which could be historical or a future year for 
 
 534 See Sappington & Weisman, supra note 533, at 3–4. 
 535 Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1617, 1668–69 (2004) (reviewing JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: 
MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION 217–43 (2003)). 
 536 JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 4–5, 86 
(2000); Alexander Larson, Predatory Pricing Safeguards and Telecommunications Regulation, in 
COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF UTILITIES, supra note 519, at 51, 51–69. The Federal 
Communications Commission switched from rate-of-return regulation to price caps for common carriers 
in 1989. State PUCs regulating local exchange telephone companies used rate-of-return regulation until 
the 1980s, when they began introducing reforms: some loosened their control over states, others moved 
to price caps, and others pursued different approaches. By the mid-1990s about half the states were using 
price caps. THOMAS W. BONNETT, TELEWARS IN THE STATES: TELECOMMUNICATIONS ISSUES IN A NEW 
ERA OF COMPETITION 59–63 (1996). 
 537 Sappington & Weisman, supra note 533, at 1–2 (noting that by 2003, forty states had adopted 
price cap regulation for telecommunications, whereas by 2015 only fourteen states employed multiyear 
rate plans in their electricity sectors). These authors posit that both institutional differences and 
implementation-related factors for price cap regulation account for the disparity. Id. at 2–5. Notably, 
California’s experiment with price cap regulation was (wrongly) blamed for the “meltdown of 
unprecedented proportion” in the state’s electricity sector in 2000. Id. at 3. 
 538 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 38 fig.9-1; see also BONNETT, supra note 
536, at 62. This description of rate-of-return also relies on Mendiola, supra note 518, at 176–77, and 
Megan J. Hertzler & Mara N. Koeller, Who Pays for Carbon Costs? Uncertainty and Risk in Response to 
the Current Patchwork of Carbon Regulation for Public Utilities, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 904, 931–
38 (2010). Those accounts, in turn, draw from two classic works in the field, BONBRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 513, and CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (3d ed. 1993). 
 539 Big investments such as a new power plant may be reflected in the test year so that the rates will 
allow the utility to recover the costs of that investment in the future when it will be “used and useful.” 
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 39 (emphasis omitted). 
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which companies and regulators are making cost projections.540 In 
determining the rate base, the regulator may choose to exclude investments 
it deems imprudent or not yet in use for the benefit of customers.541 Similarly, 
in determining recovery for operating expenses, the regulator can disallow 
any unreasonable or imprudent costs. Finally, once the test-year amounts are 
established, utilities, taxpayer representatives, and regulators may argue that 
the test-year data do not accurately represent the operating conditions that 
are likely to prevail in the future and that an upward or downward adjustment 
is appropriate. 
Setting the rate of return is equally, if not more, challenging. The 
general standard is that the regulator must set a rate of return on investments 
in the rate base that is sufficient to allow the utility to attract additional 
capital under prudent management.542 As is discussed below in Section 
III.D.2, PUC determinations as to appropriate rates of return have been 
subject to extensive legal challenges, and several Supreme Court decisions 
have provided guidance as to the standards and permissible range of 
methodological approaches for reaching such determinations. 
Rate-of-return regulation has endured as the preferred approach in 
regulated electricity markets543 despite some widely recognized problems.544 
One problem relates to information asymmetries: “[R]elative to regulators, 
firm managers enjoy vastly superior access to information about the firm’s 
true costs and opportunities for profit.”545 Regulators, who rely on 
submissions by the utilities for information, are therefore handicapped in 
their ability to accurately distinguish prudent expenses and investments from 
imprudent ones. A second problem is that the process of establishing the 
inputs to the rate-of-return formula is time consuming and expensive.546 
 
 540 Id. at 38–39. The utility proposes adjustments to the test-year data to reflect changes in costs that 
have occurred since then or will occur in the forecasted test year. Id. at 40. 
 541 For details of rate-of-return regulation methods, see REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra 
note 516, at 38–41, 45. 
 542 Id. at 42. In satisfying that requirement, regulators consider what the utility must pay in interest 
on long-term debt and stock dividends, in addition to what a reasonable profit would be. Mendiola, supra 
note 518, at 177. 
 543 However, a large number of retail electricity markets have been deregulated in some respects 
since the 1980s. See discussion infra notes 513–553. 
 544 Among the reasons for the persistence of this approach is that the outcomes of forays into price-
level regulation for natural gas and oil were “not encouraging.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price Level 
Regulation Based on Inflation Is Not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 665, 680 (1990) (reviewing JORDAN JAY HILLMAN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL 
REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES (1989)). 
 545 Chen, supra note 533, at 933. 
 546 Chen, supra note 535, at 1669. 
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A third, more fundamental issue is the perverse incentive inherent in 
setting rates based on operating costs: utilities have little reason to become 
more efficient if they can pass their expenses along to ratepayers and their 
revenue stream is based around building more infrastructure.547 In theory, the 
threat of having particular costs disallowed during rate review should 
incentivize utilities to avoid imprudent spending and investment decisions; 
in reality, the informational-asymmetry problem means this prospect may 
impose insufficient discipline.548 As a result, utilities may overinvest in 
infrastructure and operate less efficiently than they would in a competitive 
market or under alternative rate-setting schemes.549 
These and other complaints about the traditional model of price 
regulation for electricity led to a deregulatory movement in the 1980s and 
1990s.550 Consumers were groaning under the burden of high electricity 
rates, and both consumer groups and utilities complained that rate cases had 
become protracted, adversarial, and expensive. Many states responded by 
partially or fully deregulating the retail electricity market.551 Electric power 
generation was unbundled from power transmission and distribution, and 
retail customers were allowed to buy electricity from any supplier they 
chose.552 As of 2018, seventeen states and the District of Columbia had 
deregulated the retail electricity market to allow at least some choice of 
providers.553 
 
 547 Id.; Boyd, supra note 515, at 769. 
 548 Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 520, at 12. Moreover, if the PUC errs on the side of being too 
strict in disallowing expenses, it may scare off investors and jeopardize the utility’s ability to continue to 
provide service. Id. at 9. 
 549 This phenomenon reflects the Averch-Johnson Effect—the tendency of regulated firms to 
overinvest capital to increase property when their allowed return is a function of the amount invested. 
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 60–61 (discussing Harvey Averch & Leland L. 
Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962)). For 
further discussion, see Chen, supra note 533, at 935–36 (citing several classic works in the field advancing 
this theory). 
 550 Rebecca McNerney, Overview: What’s Changing and Why, WASH. POST, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/energy/report/article10.html [https://perma.cc/WPY4-DS9K] 
(summarizing factors driving electricity deregulation). 
 551 WARWICK, supra note 517, at 6.4–6.6. Additionally, at the federal level, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission deregulated wholesale electricity and natural gas prices as well as long-distance 
delivery charges in the 1990s but later backed off efforts to force states to restructure due to a variety of 
problems encountered. Id. at 7.1. For a general discussion of federal statutes that contributed to 
deregulation, see Chen, supra note 535, at 1638. For a summary of problems in federal restructuring, see 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 UTAH ENVT’L L. REV. 291, 
295 (2011). 
 552 WARWICK, supra note 517, at 6.5 fig.6.2. 
 553 Map of Deregulated Energy States & Markets (Updated 2018), ELECTRIC CHOICE, 
https://www.electricchoice.com/map-deregulated-energy-markets [https://perma.cc/3RBQ-Z2YZ]. 
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Regulators in these states (and at the federal level) did not completely 
abdicate oversight of rates, however. They adopted rules and procedures to 
try to prevent utilities from engaging in market manipulation,554 carved some 
components of a consumer’s energy bill out of deregulation, and protected 
retail customers against price increases arising from volatility in the 
wholesale electricity market by maintaining default rates provided by the 
utility that dominated the market before deregulation (effectively, price 
caps).555 Most retail-choice states have seen few consumers switch providers, 
suggesting that rate regulation remains important even in these markets.556 
This deregulatory history teaches that price regulation in the electricity 
industry has been a bumpy ride. Litigation brought by utilities under the rate-
of-return regime illuminates some of the reasons why. 
2. Legal Challenges 
The earliest challenges to rate regulation questioned whether it was 
permissible for states to regulate prices at all. This question was resolved 
definitively in Munn v. Illinois,557 in which the Supreme Court found that 
price regulation of “businesses affected with public interest” sat squarely 
within states’ police powers.558 However, because the Court articulated no 
test or standard to govern regulators’ rate setting,559 litigation then turned to 
disputes over the basis on which regulators were setting rates. In the 1898 
case of Smyth v. Ames, concerning railroads, the Court articulated the basis 
that was to hold for more than a half century, the “fair value” standard.560 
The Smyth standard held that the rate base should be set by reference to the 
fair value of the utility’s assets.561 
Implementing this standard quickly became a morass, the untangling of 
which was repeatedly thrust back upon the courts. Among the standard’s 
 
 554 One example of manipulation is restricting power generation to drive up price. WARWICK, supra 
note 517, at 6.8–6.9. 
 555 WARWICK, supra note 517, at 7.2. Price caps were also adopted for wholesale markets in some 
states. Id. at A.35. 
 556 Electricity Residential Retail Choice Participation Has Declined Since 2014 Peak, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37452 
[https://perma.cc/DF8L-QKBV]. 
 557 94 U.S. 113, 150 (1876). 
 558 Id. at 130; Boyd, supra note 515, at 750. 
 559 Boyd, supra note 515, at 751 (citing Walton Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest, 
39 YALE. L.J. 1089, 1094 (1930)). 
 560 169 U.S. 466 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 
(1942). 
 561 Id. at 546–47 (“[T]he basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of the rates to be charged 
by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property 
being used by it for the convenience of the public.”) 
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problems was that the fair value of a utility’s assets depended in part on the 
rates it would be charging; thus, asset valuation and rate setting had a circular 
quality.562 Further, when inflation skyrocketed during World War I and 
beyond, the fair-value method tilted away from the balance that courts sought 
to achieve between the public’s interest and those of utility investors: the 
value of the utility’s assets far exceeded investors’ investments in the 
company, and the method could not adequately protect the public from high 
prices.563 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court abandoned the fair-value standard in the 
1944 case of Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.564 Rather 
than looking at whether the regulator’s valuation of the rate base provided 
just compensation, the Hope Court held, courts should henceforth confine 
their review to whether the “end result”—the rate itself—was “just and 
reasonable,” as required by the governing statute.565 Though Hope concerned 
federal regulation of natural gas rates, its standard has had enduring force in 
federal and state regulation of electricity providers and other utilities.566 
The Hope Court had little to say about the specific method through 
which a PUC could arrive at its result, so long as basic hallmarks of 
procedural due process in agency decision-making were present (i.e., the 
decision was based on substantial evidence and was not an abuse of 
discretion).567 It confined its review to ensuring that, whatever method was 
used, “the resulting rates were not so low as to be confiscatory.”568 
Subsequent cases have made clear that this constitutional bar is quite low: 
even a rate-setting scheme that results in some utility providers not receiving 
 
 562 Boyd, supra note 515, at 762–63. 
 563 John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate 
Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65, 81 (1985). 
 564 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
 565 Id. at 600 (“Congress has provided . . . that all natural gas rates subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission ‘shall be just and reasonable . . . .’”); id. at 602 (“It is not theory but the impact of the rate 
order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, 
judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may 
contain infirmities is not then important.”). 
 566 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 42 (noting that Hope is one of two 
decisions that “set out the general criteria that commissions must consider when setting rates of return” 
for electricity providers). 
 567 Basil L. Copeland, Jr. & Walter W. Nixon, III, Procedural Versus Substantive Economic Due 
Process for Public Utilities, 12 ENERGY L.J. 81, 81, 89 (1991). 
 568 Boyd, supra note 515, at 766–67. Despite the language of confiscatory rates, Hope is generally 
read has having rejected Smyth’s view of rate setting through the lens of eminent domain. Instead, the 
Hope Court “treated ratemaking as one species of the legislative police power and recognized that 
stringent ratemaking could be confiscatory. It did not adopt the regulatory takings doctrine . . . as the 
constitutional limit on ratemaking.” Drobak, supra note 563, at 85 (citation omitted). 
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a fair rate of return may be permissible if it furthers the broad public interests 
that the PUC was created to promote.569 
Although Hope declined to set forth a range of permissible approaches 
to rate setting, it did explicitly approve the use of the utility’s historical cost 
of providing service.570 Under this “historical cost” standard, regulators set 
rates “at a level that allows the utility to recoup its reasonably and prudently 
incurred costs plus a reasonable rate of return; otherwise, the rate is held to 
constitute a taking.”571 If this sounds like rate-of-return regulation, that is no 
accident: since Hope, historical cost ascended to dominance in utility rate 
setting and has become closely identified with rate-of-return regulation.572 
The upshot of this brief history is that courts have moved over time 
from intensive review of the method and inputs into a PUC’s rate decisions 
to a high-level, deferential assessment of whether the end result is 
reasonable, and in some cases to even lighter review.573 A key purpose for 
establishing PUCs was ensuring universal access to a steady supply of 
electricity; so, among PUCs’ considerations should be what rate of return is 
needed to attract investors, cover operating expenses, and keep utility 
providers in business. Rates set too low may benefit the public in the short 
term, but if they damage the provider too much, consumers suffer in the long 
term574—an issue with notable parallels to innovation incentives in the drug 
context. Nevertheless, courts will generally leave judgments about how low 
is too low to PUCs, stepping in only to prevent grossly unfair treatment of 
investors—that is, confiscatory rates.575 And in addition to resolving disputes 
over rates that are purportedly too low, they are also called upon to review 
rates that consumers argue are too high.576 
 
 569 In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 821 (1968) (upholding an area-wide rate for 
natural gas although some individual gas producers did not receive a fair rate of return); see also Federal 
Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391–93 (1974) (reiterating that the Constitution requires 
only that the rate “be higher than a confiscatory level” and that courts need only assess whether the 
commission has balanced investors’ interests and the public’s interests in a reasonable way (quoting Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942))); Copeland & Nixon, supra note 
567, at 99–100, 102 (discussing the relevance of the interests entrusted to the commission in the overall 
assessment of the reasonableness of a rate). 
 570 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 604–05. 
 571 Brewbaker, supra note 513, at 703. 
 572 Chen, supra note 535, at 1681 (citing Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467, 485, 500 
(2002)). 
 573 See Copeland & Nixon, supra note 567, at 104. 
 574 Drobak, supra note 563, at 124–25. 
 575 Id. at 124 (citing JAMES BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1155 (1937)). 
 576 See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (challenging high 
gas rates in the District of Columbia). 
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3. Applicability to Prescription Drug Prices 
The public-utilities model has intuitive appeal as an analogue for 
prescription drugs577 and has attracted interest from state lawmakers. Its 
appeal derives from its longstanding place in the American regulatory 
scheme and the prospect of applying “a persistent, ongoing practice of using 
state power to curb unfair and oppressive practices” in the market.578 As 
discussed in Part I, Maryland and Maine have passed rate-setting legislation 
for prescription drugs579 and several other states have introduced similar 
bills,580 encouraged by NASHP.581 These rate-setting bills are often described 
as being modeled after public utilities regulation,582 but there are also 
important differences in the approaches, discussed below. 
There are striking similarities between public utilities and prescription 
drugs. Both markets are plagued by the specter of monopoly pricing: utilities 
because of their tendency toward natural monopoly and drugs due to the 
government-granted patent monopoly and other regulatory exclusivities. 
Both involve essential products, and therefore are “affected with a public 
interest.”583 States’ regulation of health insurance premiums and hospital 
charges over the last five decades buttresses the idea that the utilities model 
has application to healthcare.584 
 
 577 See Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57, 60 (2015) (arguing 
for the appropriateness of the public-utilities model for healthcare and concluding that “[t]he fit is 
natural”). 
 578 Id. at 61, 71 (discussing the approach’s suitability for healthcare generally); id. at 96–99 
(summarizing the history of hospital rate regulation). 
 579 See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text. 
 580 NASHP Tracker, supra note 85 (listing and summarizing bills introduced through February 2019 
in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon, in addition to 
Maryland). 
 581 NASHP’S PHARMACY COSTS WORK GROUP, STATES AND THE RISING COST OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS: A CALL TO ACTION 7–8 (2016), https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rx-
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QWD-62JW]. 
 582 See, e.g., id.; Ed Silverman, A Growing Number of States Consider Legislation to Treat Pharma 
as a Utility, STAT (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2018/10/10/pharma-legislation-
utilities-review-boards [https://perma.cc/G84B-BUPG] (characterizing prescription drug rate-setting 
initiatives in several states as “much like the rate-setting bodies that control public utilities”). 
 583 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 149–51 (1876); see also Bagley, supra note 577, at 75–79, 84–85 
(discussing what makes a business imbued with a public interest). 
 584 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 577, at 96–99 (briefly summarizing the history of insurance rate 
regulation). We have focused on electricity rather than insurance or hospitals because the regulatory 
approach originated in the energy sector. Additionally, rate regulation for hospitals has typically been 
implemented by limiting what particular payers will pay, rather than a formal imposition of price controls 
that apply to all customers. For a useful review of the history of hospital rate setting, see John E. 
McDonough, Tracking the Demise of State Hospital Rate Setting, 16 HEALTH AFF. 142 (1997). 
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The appeal of the utilities model also springs from its potential reach; it 
provides a conceptual basis for regulation of the base price of a drug, in 
addition to price increases.585 Although it is more straightforward to apply 
utility rate-setting methods to price increases, the “rate base” element of rate-
of-return regulation586 provides a way of thinking about how regulators could 
limit launch prices. 
Another normatively appealing aspect of the traditional ratemaking 
model for utilities is the idea of setting explicit limits on sellers’ returns in a 
manner that strives to be fair to all parties. Among the criticisms levied at 
biopharmaceutical companies is that their profit margins are too high. The 
industry is among the most profitable in the United States.587 Although there 
are large variations in margins across companies, in 2017 the average 
operating margin among the twenty-five largest drug companies was 22%.588 
Rate-of-return regulation strikes at the heart of this concern. It could also 
facilitate the curbing of high marketing and operational expenses. A recent 
study concluded that among twelve large biopharmaceutical companies, 
expenditures on marketing and administration (including executive pay) 
exceeded spending on research and development by up to 80%.589 An 
estimated $6.1 billion was spent on direct-to-consumer advertising alone in 
2017, not counting social media promotion.590 Although such advertising can 
help alert patients to the availability of therapies to treat their symptoms, it 
is responsible for driving demand for expensive, branded drugs where more 
affordable alternatives are available.591 Regulators who deem these expenses 
imprudent or not in the public interest could disincentivize them by 
disallowing them in rate-setting calculations. 
 
 585 A limit on its reach, however, is that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
29 U.S.C. § 1001, may prevent application of the upper payment limit to ERISA plans. See NAT’L ACAD. 
FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, ERISA PRESUMPTION PRIMER, https://nashp.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/ERISA_Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ6S-U5DE]. 
 586 See supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
 587 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS (2017). 
 588 Top 25 Global Pharma Companies by Market Cap (End of 2017), GLOBAL DATA (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.globaldata.com/top-25-global-pharma-companies-market-cap-end-2017 
[https://perma.cc/D3XN-AHH9]. In contrast, the average operating margin for the overall U.S. market 
for 2017 was 14.93%. Total Market Profitability. CSIMARKET.COM, https://csimarket.com/Industry 
/industry_Profitability_Ratios.php?&hist=4 [https://perma.cc/AXL2-ZRX8]. 
 589 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 89–90. 
 590 Alison Kanski, Pharma Advertising Up 14% Across All Media in October: Standard Media, 
MM&M (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.mmm-online.com/home/channel/pharma-advertising-up-14-
across-all-media-in-october-standard-media/[https://perma.cc/Q5B8-MC9L]. 
 591 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 90-93 (summarizing studies on the 
effects of direct-to-consumer advertising). 
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Given these benefits, how might the utilities model be applied to 
prescription drugs? At least two possibilities arise. First, rate-setting 
approaches from utilities could be used to evaluate whether a particular price 
increase is excessive. A federal statute of broad application or a state statute 
that (given likely patent-preemption challenges) focuses on medications for 
which federal exclusivities have expired592 could peg the definition of an 
unconscionable increase to a formula for calculating a non-unconscionable 
price (akin to the formula for a reasonable rate of return or price ceiling for 
utilities). When a regulator suspects that a price increase is excessive, it could 
require the company to show that, to the contrary, the increase satisfies the 
demand of the formula. The rate of return, a key part of the formula, could 
be set by reference to what is allowed for utilities. In recent years, regulators 
have chosen rates converging around 10%593 and courts have declined to 
intervene on the basis that those rates are too low. Because electricity is 
considered a low-risk investment, a higher rate of return would be 
appropriate for those biopharmaceutical companies funding high-risk 
research and development. 
The second alternative would be to adopt a pure rate-setting model. 
Rather than simply prohibiting unconscionable or excessive prices, 
regulators would impose formal price controls as they do for utilities, 
informed by the guideposts from utilities cases about what sort of rate is 
legally permissible and statutory guidance as to the goals the rate-setting 
commission is meant to pursue. 
In some respects, that approach resembles the rate-setting legislation in 
Maryland and similar bills proposed in other states.594 However, there are 
important differences. One technical distinction is that PUCs establish prices 
that may be charged to customers in the jurisdiction, whereas most state bills 
creating DABs would establish maximum amounts that payers in the state 
will pay. Reportedly, one reason for this frame shift in Maryland’s legislation 
is to minimize concerns about intruding on patentholders’ ability to 
monopoly-price their products—the DAB leaves drug manufacturers free to 
charge whatever they wish, although payers in the state may not pay it.595 A 
 
 592 Though even with a focus on generics, the dormant Commerce Clause could still pose challenges 
and may be foreclosed within the Fourth Circuit, as noted in the discussion of Ass’n for Accessible Meds. 
v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 666 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), supra notes 143–151. 
 593 Coley Girouard, How Do Electric Utilities Make Money?, ADVANCED ENERGY PERSPECTIVES 
(Apr. 23, 2015, 10:55 AM), https://blog.aee.net/how-do-electric-utilities-make-money 
[https://perma.cc/TJ8T-N286] (stating in 2015 that the average return on equity allowed for power 
companies was 10.13%). 
 594 See supra Section I.B.2. 
 595 Horvath, supra note 198. 
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second difference is that the triggering conditions for review are different. 
PUCs in most jurisdictions review rates whenever a stakeholder initiates a 
rate case, while DAB review only occurs when certain trigger conditions 
occur. Specifically, the Maryland DAB is authorized to review launch prices 
that exceed a specified dollar amount and annual price increases that exceed 
a certain percentage amount,596 an approach common in other states’ bills.597 
This difference in trigger is substantive as well as procedural. Because PUCs 
have historically grappled with predatory pricing in some industries, they 
review downward as well as upward adjustments in prices. In contrast, DAB 
review as described in current legislation is only triggered by certain price 
increases or a high initial price. 
Finally, the basis for making determinations that a price is excessive 
differs in the utilities and drug contexts. Unlike PUCs, DABs proposed in 
most states do not examine, in the first instance, the producer’s costs or 
calculate a reasonable rate of return when setting upper payment limits. The 
task of Maryland’s DAB, for example, is to determine whether a particular 
drug creates an “affordability challenge” for the state healthcare system or 
patients paying out-of-pocket costs.598 If it finds that an affordability 
challenge exists, then further regulatory action is triggered. NASHP’s 
model-legislation approach calls for a payment ceiling to be imposed.599 In 
Maryland, that provision was substantially enervated in the final version of 
the legislation.600 
The key point is that in taking further regulatory steps, the DAB does 
not focus on drug manufacturers’ revenue or profit, but rather on indicators 
that patients and health insurers in the state may have difficulty affording the 
 
 596 As discussed earlier, see supra Section I.B.2, nearly all prescription drug rate-setting bills to date 
have taken this approach because they are patterned on model legislation developed by NASHP. See 
NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180. 
 597 Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, supra note 
170. 
 598 See Prescription Drug Affordability Board Act, ch. 692, 2019 Md. Laws 692, §§ 21–2C–08(b)(2), 
(c)(3) (2019). 
 599 NASHP Model Rate Setting Law, supra note 180. 
 600 Whereas early versions of the bill would have required the DAB to set an upper payment limit 
for all Maryland payers when it found that an affordability challenge exists or will occur, the adopted 
version directed it to undertake further study of policy options and, if it determined an upper payment 
limit was desirable, to “draft a plan of action for implementing the process” for setting such limits. 
H.B. 768, 2019 Gen. Assemb. § 21–2C–13 (Md. 2019). It further provides that after January 1, 2022, 
with the approval of the state General Assembly’s Legislative Policy Committee, the DAB may begin 
setting upper payment limits, but only for drugs purchased by the Maryland Medicaid program and other 
state or local government payers. The legislation also commissions a study on the legality of setting upper 
payment limits for other payers. See id. 
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drug.601 Biopharmaceutical companies’ research and development costs, 
marketing costs, and gross and net revenues (as well as revenues realized by 
PBMs and wholesale distributors) are only considered if the DAB is unable 
to reach a determination whether the drug produces an affordability 
challenge based on the other factors. To date, only one state, New Jersey, has 
proposed a DAB model in which the board would focus on drug companies’ 
costs and other metrics.602 
Thus, except for New Jersey, the DAB approach focuses on burdens on 
consumers, while PUCs are supposed to balance the interest of the public 
with that of the utility. If the overall goal is cost containment, the 
affordability-based approach for drugs may be an effective strategy. As we 
describe below, applying rate-of-return regulation to drug companies would 
present numerous, intractable practical challenges. On the other hand, failing 
to consider the effect of an upper payment limit on producers’ rate of return 
entails inherent risk of improperly balancing consumers’ and companies’ 
interests. That is, affordability standards have the normative deficiency that 
they do not require fair treatment of all parties. Furthermore, if DABs err on 
the side of strict payment limits in the short term, they risk discouraging 
investment in drug research and development if the limits were widely 
adopted—an issue of obvious import for consumer welfare. 
Assuming these risks could be sufficiently mitigated in practice, the 
affordability-based rate-setting model is pragmatically preferable to the 
traditional utilities model. History teaches that rate-of-return regulation 
involves complex, technical determinations that invite legal challenges. 
Further, applying such an approach to pharmaceuticals would be 
substantially more challenging than applying it to electricity. In particular, 
calculating the rate base would be far more complex. Electricity companies 
produce a single product. Biopharmaceutical companies typically sell a 
range of products, and a price must be calculated for each. Does this mean a 
separate rate base should be calculated for each? How are the company’s 
assets and research and development investment to be allocated among its 
products? There is general agreement among economists that in calculating 
the cost of bringing a drug to market it is appropriate to include not just the 
cost of developing that product, but the amounts the company invested in 
products that never succeeded in reaching FDA approval as well, because 
 
 601 For details, see supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 602 See Comparison of States’ Prescription Drug Affordability Review Board Legislation, supra note 
170 (summarizing N.J. No. 583/983). 
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those amounts represent forgone investments.603 The entire pool of research 
and development investment for a given year would have to be allocated 
across the marketed products in that year, and it is not clear how that 
allocation should be performed. 
A related problem is how to think about historical cost for drugs. Since 
the Hope decision, a power company’s historical cost in a test year has served 
as the foundation of rate setting in regulated retail electricity markets.604 
Arguably, biopharmaceutical companies are subject to greater volatility in 
their year-to-year costs because of variations in their research and 
development costs depending on where their promising molecules are in the 
pipeline. Electricity regulators have evolved ways of dealing with lumpiness 
in investment and operating costs—for example, allowing power companies 
to present evidence of unusually high spending on large new construction 
projects and spread those costs over several future years of ratemaking.605 
But it adds complexity to the rate-setting process. 
A third challenge is what to do about entrants and exits in the 
pharmaceutical market. Rate setting for public utilities has been premised on 
the notion that one company will have the right to sell in a local retail market. 
In contrast, markets for treating particular health conditions will be subject 
to entries (and occasional exits) as new drugs are developed, older ones go 
off patent and generic competitors spring up, and existing sellers reevaluate 
what constitutes the best use of their resources. This poses challenges for 
regulating price using a traditional utilities model. What, for example, should 
be done with a new company that has no historical costs to use to set the rate 
base? When the number of alternative drugs for treating a particular 
condition increases, should regulators ratchet the allowable rate of return 
downward, approximating what would be expected to occur under fully 
competitive market conditions? Electricity sales within a territory can be 
projected with reasonable certainty, so as to calculate the appropriate rate by 
dividing revenue requirement by sales; estimating future sales for a given 
drug is harder, given uncertainties about new market entries by competitors 
and other factors. 
 
 603 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 88. For two prominent studies that have 
taken this approach, see Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New 
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016) and Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, 
Research and Development Spending to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After 
Approval, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1569 (2017). But see Emanuel, supra note 436 (objecting that the 
DiMasi study assumed an excessive interest rate for capital invested in research and development and 
noting that many failed drugs did not involve substantial investments in research and development 
because they failed at an early stage). 
 604 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 516, at 42. 
 605 See id. at 40. 
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For these reasons, pursuing rate-of-return regulation for drugs faces 
significant hurdles on many fronts. The technical and conceptual (let alone 
political) challenges are formidable. Even if regulators were able to 
surmount them, they would also need to have an appetite for fighting what 
seem to be inevitable, recurrent court battles about the permissibility of their 
judgments. Judicial decisions affording electricity regulators a wide berth for 
ratemaking decisions give cause for optimism about the eventual resolution 
of such disputes, but the fight may be long and expensive. Moreover, familiar 
concerns about the perverse incentive for inefficiency associated with rate-
of-return regulation are likely to surface for pharmaceutical production as 
they did for electricity production—notwithstanding regulators’ best efforts 
to disallow imprudent expenses. 
In summary, the public-utilities model is normatively attractive in its 
efforts to fairly regulate prices and useful in inspiring initiatives that imagine 
similar rate-setting exercises for drugs. Yet, it is less conducive to suggesting 
particular methods by which prices for drugs ought to be set. Alternative 
approaches such as Maryland’s affordability-based rate-setting model may 
be more pragmatic for controlling drug prices, although, as already 
discussed, are vulnerable to normative criticism on fairness grounds. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY DESIGN 
Our purpose is to identify approaches to imposing legislative 
restrictions on excessive drug prices that are likely to withstand void-for-
vagueness challenges while substantially advancing the government’s 
purpose of curbing the “financial toxicity”606 of high drug costs. In this Part, 
we offer a series of recommendations for drafting new legislation and 
strengthening previously introduced bills at the state and federal levels.607 
In arriving at recommendations based on our review of four relevant 
areas of law, we bear in mind that the approach must not only be legally 
defensible but should also satisfy the normative criteria previously 
articulated.608 First, it must withstand legal challenge. Legislation that is 
constitutionally or otherwise legally vulnerable will ultimately be ineffective 
policy—and more immediately—a waste of state or congressional resources. 
As discussed earlier,609 although our analysis focuses on vagueness 
 
 606 “Financial toxicity” is the concept that the cost of medicines causes patients financial hardship 
and stress. See, e.g., NAT’L CANCER INST., Financial Toxicity (Financial Distress) and Cancer Treatment 
(PDQ®)—Patient Version, https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/managing-care/track-care-
costs/financial-toxicity-pdq [https://perma.cc/2R4B-RJ3C]. 
 607 Our analysis is also summarized in Table 1, infra, for easy reference. 
 608 See supra Introduction. 
 609 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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challenges, state legislation in particular must also anticipate other potential 
avenues of challenge, such as patent preemption. Second, any plausible legal 
strategy must hold promise of substantially advancing the objective of 
curbing excessive prescription drug costs. Third, it must not be unduly 
subject to gaming. Fourth, proposals must be operationally feasible. Fifth, 
they should be fair to biopharmaceutical companies. Across the fields we 
have surveyed, which approaches hold the greatest appeal when measured 
against these criteria? We begin by offering four major conclusions in 
answer to that question and then apply our findings to generate specific 
recommendations for legislation. 
A. Findings Concerning Analogous Areas of Law 
We have analyzed four areas of law in which legal interventions to 
prevent excessive or unconscionable pricing have long been imposed and 
upheld by the courts: emergency price gouging laws, contract law, consumer 
lending, and public utilities rate-setting. In reviewing each, we have explored 
how the legal interventions operate, how courts have dealt with vagueness 
challenges, and the ease with which the approach could be applied to 
prescription drugs. Our analysis leads to several conclusions. 
First, although emergency price gouging laws would seem to be a 
natural model for price gouging laws for prescription drugs, the approach 
would need to be stretched considerably in order to accommodate 
prescription drugs. Even if agreement can be reached that it is reasonable to 
declare excessive prescription drug prices to constitute an emergency, the 
approaches taken in these statutes to benchmarking price increases would 
have to be adapted considerably to be applied to medicines (see Table 1). As 
we have discussed,610 it is difficult to find appropriate comparison prices for 
drugs. Further, because the pre-“emergency” prices arguably were already 
inflated, it is not as straightforward as it is for batteries or gasoline to deem 
a price increase of a given percentage reasonable. Supplementing this 
feasibility problem is a gaming concern that could undermine the approach’s 
effectiveness: it is not applicable to launch prices, and companies marketing 
new products likely will respond accordingly. These issues call into question 
the potential effectiveness, operational feasibility, and resistance to gaming 
of the emergency price gouging law approach. 
On the other hand, price gouging laws are strong in the domain of legal 
defensibility—they set out very clear criteria, rarely draw legal challenges, 
and are durable in the face of vagueness arguments when challenged. Their 
clarity and specificity are appealing on procedural fairness grounds. And 
 
 610 See supra Section III.A.3. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
954 
although they have not done so in the past, they could be drafted to set forth 
different allowable price increases for different kinds of products—for 
example, by allowing more permissive ceilings for drugs with a low initial 
price. Overall, the maximum-percentage approach of emergency price 
gouging laws is attractive in many respects, but new methods would have to 
be generated for identifying benchmark prices. 
Second, our review of contract law suggests that if legislators do not 
define the term “unconscionable” by statute, courts will apply common law 
understandings of that term from contract disputes—and that is not optimal 
for advancing the goal of regulating drug prices. Although the contracts 
approach has several appealing aspects, overall, its disadvantages caution 
against relying too heavily upon it (see Table 1). 
Its appeal arises from its flexible standards, which bolster its ability to 
meet the criteria of resistance to gaming and fairness. It can address 
situations of unfair pricing not expressly contemplated by legislative 
drafters. As discussed above, such flexibility would be advantageous 
because of the very different contexts surrounding prices for different drugs, 
which makes it challenging to simply “pick a number” and call prices above 
it excessive.611 Flexibility in what factors can be incorporated into a calculus 
of what is “unconscionable” is also appealing for this reason. 
However, a critical drawback of the common law conception is that, in 
most jurisdictions, a showing of procedural unfairness is required. This 
requirement could foreclose action against high drug prices in a broad swath 
of circumstances where it would be hard to argue that buyers have been 
subject to oppression and surprise. A second disadvantage we have noted is 
that the traditional benchmarks courts use to assess the substantive unfairness 
of a price term—the seller’s markup of the product, the seller’s profit, and 
prices charged by competitors—will often be difficult to apply to 
manufacturers’ prices for drugs. The concept of reseller markup does not 
apply, there may not be other sellers of similar products to compare to, and 
drug-specific profit is hard to gauge because the production cost is not easily 
quantified. A third disadvantage is its heavy reliance on judges for 
interpretation. Judges may be too timid in applying the doctrine612 and may 
not fully effectuate the legislature’s intent. They may also be inconsistent in 
their applications, undermining deterrence. For these reasons, the contract 
law approach presents effectiveness and feasibility concerns. 
 
 611 See supra Section III.B.3. 
 612 Beh, supra note 329, at 1013–14. 
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Our third conclusion is that traditional methods of utilities regulation 
likely would be impracticable to apply to prescription drugs. Rate-setting 
commissions like Maryland’s may be an effective strategy for addressing 
affordability issues, but as discussed, they depart from the rate-making 
method employed by PUCs for electricity—rate-of-return regulation.613 
Despite its potential fairness to all parties—consumers and companies alike, 
its resistance to gaming, and its potential effectiveness in reducing 
excessively high drug costs by regulating companies’ profit (see Table 1)— 
rate-of-return regulation for drugs fails the feasibility criterion. The history 
of electricity regulation demonstrates the difficulty of establishing a rate base 
even for simple products. The technical complexity involved in doing so for 
drugs would be much greater. New entries into the market by competitor 
companies present additional challenges in setting rates. Further, the 
electricity case suggests that although the prospects for withstanding 
vagueness challenges and other legal challenges are sunny, rate-of-return 
regulation invites costly and time-consuming litigation. 
Our final conclusion is that, of the four areas of law reviewed, consumer 
lending law offers the most promising model for regulating excessive drug 
prices. The two-pronged approach states have taken to regulating loan 
prices—coupling a usury statute with a prohibition on unconscionable 
business practices under a more general consumer protection act—is a very 
attractive approach for prescription drugs. The analogue for usury in the drug 
context would be a statutory provision establishing a maximum percentage 
ceiling for increases in the price of the drug, annually or cumulatively over 
some time period, with an exception for situations where the company can 
show a larger increase is required by an acute market condition such as an 
ingredient shortage. This price-increase law would provide a first line of 
defense in policing high drug prices; it would be sufficient to address many 
of the pricing practices of greatest concern in the current environment; and 
given its straightforward, clear standard for violations, it would be relatively 
easy to implement.614 But it would be supplemented by a backup strategy. 
 
 613 As discussed above, Maryland’s rate-setting commission would set upper payment limits based 
on a different method. See supra Section I.B.1.b. 
 614 It may be noted that we recommend the usury approach here although we dismissed as infeasible 
the emergency price gouging law approach, which bears some similarities to usury laws. The distinction 
is that the emergency price gouging approach consists solely of a comparison of the price at a designated 
emergency time to the price of the same product at the pre-emergency time, or to the price of the same 
product in another market area or retail outlet (the latter two options are not helpful prescription drugs, 
as we have discussed). If the baseline price is already inflated, it is not a helpful benchmark. The usury 
approach also has this problem, but the problem can be overcome by coupling it with provisions allowing 
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Analogous to the role of general CPAs in consumer lending law, a consumer 
protection act specific to medicines could impose a general prohibition on 
“unconscionable” or “excessive” drug prices (either at launch or as a result 
of price increases). The statute would provide a definition of 
“unconscionable” or “excessive” in order to untether them from the UCC 
and common law understandings of unconscionability.615 The general 
provision would be deployed where the price-increase provision is not 
suitable for addressing the price problem posed by a particular drug. 
Before discussing what that definition might look like, we offer a few 
reflections on why this two-pronged model is attractive (see Table 1). First, 
because it addresses both price increases and high base prices, it has strong 
potential to be effective in curbing drug costs and to limit opportunities for 
gaming. Further, the ability to write a definition of “unconscionable” into the 
statute that does not require a showing of procedural unfairness means that 
this approach can be consumer blind—that is, applicable to all purchasers of 
prescription drugs regardless of their sophistication. The legal defensibility 
of the approach against vagueness challenges is high. In the usury context, 
courts have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to defer to 
legislatures’ choice of a maximum interest rate, and in the CPA context, they 
have rebuffed vagueness challenges to statutory definitions of 
unconscionable business practices. (It should not be forgotten, however, that 
for state laws other legal challenges could be problematic if the laws were 
not carefully drafted and applied.) Applying the standards does not raise 
significant feasibility problems, if appropriate benchmarks for the general 
standard are identified. It does, of course, raise the issue of which prices are 
to be evaluated—as do all price regulations. 
Objections to this proposal will likely relate to its fairness and collateral 
effects. Regarding the general unconscionability standard, companies will 
take a dim view of efforts to assess a substantively unreasonable base price, 
 
assessment of the excessiveness of the base price. Thus, although looking at price increases alone is not 
sufficient, it is useful as part of a broader regulatory scheme. 
 615 Our recommendation in this regard is inspired by Professor Bender, supra note 363 (discussing 
the advantages of statutory, as opposed to common law, definitions of unconscionability in the consumer 
lending context). Notably, Maryland took this approach in HB 631. However, the definition it provided 
in the statute was not a model of clarity. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 2–802 (West 2017); see also 
Brief of Appellees at 35–63, Assoc. for Accessible Medicines v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (No. 
17-2166). Further, in briefings responding to the AAM’s vagueness challenge, Maryland took the position 
that the provision was not vague because decades of common law in the contracts arena provided ample 
guidance as to the meaning of the term. That strategy muddies the waters as to what the legislature 
intended in establishing the statutory standard. If the statutory definition had been more specific (for 
example, if it had connected the general definition to the specific conditions that triggered a notification 
from the state Medicaid program of a potential affordability problem), an alternative defense that simply 
defended the clarity of the statutory language might have been more feasible to pursue. 
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even when they are anchored in cost-effectiveness calculations or other 
transparent methods. Attempts to overtly cap drugs’ base prices involve a 
risk of failing to reward companies for their investment at a level sufficient 
to ensure their continued commitment to innovation, and applying an 
unconscionability standard to the base price risks similar consequences. 
Regarding price increases, drug companies may, of course, also claim that 
capping price increases is unfair. If the law permits exceptions for situations 
where market disruptions justify larger increases as well as substantial 
discretion over setting the initial price, however, this objection will be partly 
answered. 
B. Recommendations for Policy Design 
We now turn to specific recommendations for legislators wishing to 
apply the consumer lending-inspired, two-pronged model we have outlined. 
We discuss five important decisions that will need to be made. 
First, should the law be state or federal? The approach could be 
implemented through either Congressional or state legislative action. 
Although states are the historical locus of consumer protection law and in 
many ways the most natural choice to carry out the approach we have 
described, congressional action is far preferable in light of the numerous 
legal challenges states are likely to face beyond issues of vagueness, 
depending upon how the law is written. One model for federal–state 
coregulation might be for states to address the excessive pricing of generic 
drugs while a federal statute focuses on products possessing federal 
exclusivities. Yet, Maryland’s recent attempt at regulating unconscionable 
generic price increases was struck down. Given the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause in that case and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision not to grant certiorari,616 a state-level consumer 
protection law focused on generic drug prices is still risky. At the very least, 
such laws ought to be explored within a different jurisdiction. Teeing up a 
circuit split attractive enough for the U.S. Supreme Court’s attention may be 
a strategy to push for a final resolution of this issue, although it risks a 
Supreme Court holding adverse to the states’ interests. 
Second, what remedies should the statute provide? A full discussion of 
remedies is beyond the scope of our analysis, but the importance of providing 
meaty remedies is clear. Given the size of many biopharmaceutical 
companies and the billions in revenue associated with the sales of many 
 
 616 Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2017), rev’d, 887 F.3d 
664 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019). 
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drugs, laws that do not provide significant financial consequences for 
violations will be ineffectual. The types of remedies specified in the CURE 
High Drug Prices Act and Prescription Drug Price Relief Act, for example, 
have real bite.617 Legislators should also ensure that the statute explicitly 
supplements other remedies at common law or under state or federal 
statutory law.618 
Third, which price should be evaluated? Some federal bills propose to 
use the average manufacturer price (AMP), while most state price gouging 
bills for medicines specify the WAC (some state bills do not define a specific 
price, however).619 The WAC, which is often referred to as the list price, is 
the offering price set by the manufacturer for wholesalers and direct 
purchasers, before discounts and rebates.620 The AMP is the average price 
actually paid by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class 
of trade, after prompt-pay discounts but before rebates.621 It is calculated 
based on actual sales according to specifications set out by statute.622 AMP 
is, on average, considerably lower than both the WAC and AWP.623 
The WAC is published in various private datasets and therefore, readily 
obtainable by anyone (albeit for a fee).624 It is also simple: it is one number, 
set by the manufacturer and adjusted periodically at its discretion. In 
contrast, AMP data are proprietary and nonpublic. However, drug 
manufacturers are required to report the AMP for all Medicaid-covered drugs 
to the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on a quarterly 
basis.625 The AMP thus has the benefit of already being in the hands of a key 
regulator. Further, manufacturers’ AMP reporting is subject to audit from the 
 
 617 See supra Section I.A. 
 618 This recommendation is offered by Professor Bender, supra note 363, at 796–97, 803, for 
consumer lending laws. 
 619 For details, see Gudiksen, supra note 98, tbl.1. For example, Illinois’s HB 4900 used the WAC 
as a benchmark for evaluating drug price increases, see id., while the federal Prescription Drug Price 
Relief Act of 2019 used the AMP, see supra note 66. A third alternative is the Average Wholesale Price 
(AWP), another representation of the list price, which includes no discounts or rebates. See DANIEL R. 
LEVINSON, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-05-05-00240, 
MEDICAID DRUG PRICE COMPARISONS: AVERAGE MANUFACTURER PRICE TO PUBLISHED PRICES 3 
(2005), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-05-00240.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F28-PFHE]. Colloquially 
known as “Ain’t What’s Paid,” see Patrick Mullen, The Arrival of Average Sale Price, 4 BIOTECHNOL. 
HEALTHCARE 48, 53 (2007), the AWP is the least meaningful of the alternatives, in terms of its 
relationship to actual acquisition costs, and has the disadvantage of not being publicly available. 
 620 LEVINSON, supra note 619, at 3. 
 621 Id. at 4. 
 622 Id. at 3. 
 623 Id. at ii. 
 624 Id. at 3. 
 625 Id. at i. 
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Office of Inspector General to ensure compliance with Medicaid 
requirements, and is believed to be quite accurate.626 
A third possibility is to peg price standards to the average net price after 
rebates and discounts paid by the first purchaser (for federal laws, to avoid 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges, state laws could specify the initial 
purchaser in the state). This approach more accurately represents the real 
prices paid—which can be substantially lower than either the WAC or the 
AMP. Another advantage is the avoidance of gaming. Under the rebate 
system, manufacturers can attempt to recoup lost revenue from a lower WAC 
or AMP by reducing the rebates they are willing to give, with the result that 
health plans and patients see little or no improvement in their own drug 
costs.627 
For these reasons, targeting average net price is most consonant with 
the goals of drug price regulation. The price-regulation statute should set 
forth a detailed explanation of how this net price is to be calculated, including 
which purchasers are to be included, which discounts and rebates are to be 
netted out before the calculation is performed, and what the relevant time 
period for sales is. We consider the AMP to be the second-best option, and, 
where the AMP is unavailable, the WAC as next best.628 
Targeting net price is likely to encounter political resistance. Not only 
is that information not publicly available, many drug manufacturers and 
PBMs treat it as a trade secret.629 Manufacturers also argue that having to 
reveal the discounts and rebates they offer to particular buyers would 
undercut their ability to offer them, because other purchasers would demand 
the same deal. Mitigating this concern is the fact that it is unnecessary to 
disclose average net price publicly in order for a price gouging law’s 
objectives to be carried out. Disclosure need only be made to the relevant 
 
 626 See, e.g., BRIAN P. RITCHIE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
A-06-13-0014, AVERAGE MANUFACTURER PRICE DETERMINATIONS BY SELECTED DRUG 
MANUFACTURERS GENERALLY WERE CONSISTENT WITH FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS, at i (2014), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region6/61300014.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6NK-BH4A] (concluding that 
“[t]he methodologies that selected drug manufacturers used to determine [AMPs] for drugs reimbursed 
by Medicaid generally were consistent with Federal requirements”). 
 627 Uninsured patients and patients paying coinsurance and deductibles at the pharmacy would, 
however, benefit from lower list prices, because their payments are typically pegged to the list price. 
 628 Using either net price or the AMP would involve a delay in implementing the price-increase 
ceiling for newly launched products. The first price increase for a new product may not be observed until 
after twelve months after market entry, and then a year beyond that point would be required in order to 
calculate the average net price over the past year. 
 629 Lee et al., supra note 18, at 865 (noting drug manufacturers’ defense that disclosing drug pricing 
under state laws would affect commerce in other states). 
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oversight body.630 Lawmakers who find the trade-secret argument credible 
can choose to protect it from further disclosure on that basis. 
Fourth, what should the maximum increase in price permitted by the 
price-increase provision be? Here we do not have a strong recommendation 
other than that a numeric limit ought to be expressed clearly in the statute. 
However, we offer two points for consideration. First, if the ceiling is to be 
pegged to inflation, we believe the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers (CPI-U) is a better choice than the CPI for Medical Care. 
Prescription drug prices comprise 15% of the CPI for Medical Care,631 so 
using that index as a benchmark involves a circularity. The CPI-U is a better 
measure of how much the prices of other goods in the economy are rising.632 
Second, the statute ought to permit the manufacturer to provide evidence that 
an unanticipated shock necessitates a price increase above the statutory 
maximum. Such circumstances might arise, for example, in a time when key 
ingredients rapidly escalate in price or a problem at a particular 
manufacturing facility forces the company to switch facilities to avert a 
shortage. 
A fifth question is how should the general CPA-style provisions of the 
statute define an excessive drug price (for purposes of evaluating a drug’s 
overall price rather than price hikes)? Our review of other areas of law using 
this type of standard suggests that if the statute uses the word 
“unconscionable,” that term should be defined in a manner that explicitly 
requires no showing of procedural unfairness. Additionally, the statute 
should set forth a definition of substantive unconscionability that does not 
require comparisons that, though entrenched in the common law or general 
CPAs, are hard to make for drugs.633 Value-based pricing models can vary,634 
but one reasonable approach would be to adopt a value-based pricing 
standard informed by, for example, the value assessment framework 
 
 630 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 128–29 (suggesting that body be the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). 
 631 Measuring Price Change in the CPI: Medical Care, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 21, 
2019), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/factsheets/medical-care.htm [https://perma.cc/6EKG-X2LM]. 
 632 See CPI-All Urban Consumers (Current Series), BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/help/one_screen/cu.htm [https://perma.cc/KXR6-S47T] (defining the CPI-U as “a 
monthly measure of the average change over time in the prices paid by consumers for a market basket of 
consumer goods and services”). 
 633 See supra Part III. 
 634 See, e.g., Rachel Sachs et al., Innovative Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid’s Best-
Price Rule, 43 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 5, 7–12 (2018) (describing different value-based pricing 
models). 
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proposed by the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER).635 
Value-based pricing is based on the normative position that “there should be 
a relationship between price and benefits.”636 It pegs the price a payer is 
willing to pay for a drug to the amount of clinical value the drug is shown to 
generate—that is, the magnitude of the improvements in quality of life, 
functioning, and longevity the drug is shown to produce, either overall or for 
defined populations or indications. Value is typically established by using 
cost-effectiveness analysis to quantify gains in quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) or disability-adjusted life years (DALYs).637 Dividing a 
treatment’s cost by the number of QALYs or DALYs generated produces a 
cost-effectiveness ratio. A price regulation statute employing a value-based 
standard could set forth a numeric cost-effectiveness ratio (or other measure 
of value) above which the drug’s price would be considered excessive or call 
for a broader assessment along the lines of ICER’s framework. 
Value-based pricing raises a thicket of difficult technical and normative 
issues,638 which are beyond the scope of this Article to explore and resolve. 
For example, should value calculations be performed at the time of a drug’s 
launch based on information from clinical trials, or should they await data 
from a broader group of real-world patients? Should value be measured 
based on clinical improvement alone, or also on the basis of whether 
improvement in functioning or longevity allows the person to contribute to 
society, as some have argued?639 Are QALYs an ethically defensible metric 
given that in practice they value therapies for young, able-bodied persons 
higher than those for the aged and disabled?640 Because of ongoing debates 
over these technical issues, a 2017 National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine consensus report concluded that value-based 
 
 635 INSTIT. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REV., OVERVIEW OF THE ICER VALUE ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK AND UPDATE FOR 2017–2019, at 6 (2018), https://icer-review.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/ICER-value-assessment-framework-Updated-050818.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A6LQ-YTBY] (examining a drug’s long-term value for money as a function of its 
estimated incremental cost-effectiveness, comparative clinical effectiveness, and other benefits and 
disadvantages, as well as contextual considerations). 
 636 Emanuel, supra note 425, at 606. 
 637 Id. at 607; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 54–55. 
 638 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 53–55, 58. 
 639 See Emanuel, supra note 425, at 606 (“A drug that allows the average person to obtain a normal 
education or continue to work should be priced higher than one that merely keeps someone alive but not 
well enough to be employed . . . because it saves costs in other nonmedical domains.”). 
 640 For a summary of this debate, see, for example, David L.B. Schwappach, Resource Allocation, 
Social Values and the QALY: A Review of the Debate and Empirical Evidence, 5 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 
210 (2002); William S. Smith, The U.S. Shouldn’t Use the ‘QALY’ in Drug Cost-Effectiveness Reviews, 
STAT (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/22/qaly-drug-effectiveness-reviews 
[https://perma.cc/8RT3-HLJ7]. 
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pricing approaches were not yet ready to take to scale.641 However, it 
recommended the continued development and testing of these strategies.642 
We believe value-based pricing, particularly approaches that are 
grounded in cost-effectiveness, holds promise as a future basis for regulating 
excessive prices. It is worth noting, however, that the most valuable drugs 
may also be the most expensive. Thus, this approach could permit very high 
drug prices to persist, provided the drug offers commensurate benefits.643 It 
simply provides a means of identifying prices that are excessive relative to 
the benefits delivered to the public. 
Another possibility for defining substantive unconscionability would 
simply be to name a dollar amount above which the price may not rise—that 
is, establish a price cap (perhaps waivable if the company can show good 
value for money). Maryland’s HB 631, for instance, drew upon a price cap 
approach as a trigger for the state’s Medicaid program to report a drug to the 
attorney general for possible enforcement action.644 There are ethical 
arguments in favor of such an approach. Professor Ezekiel Emanuel has 
argued, for example, that people should have enough earnings left over, after 
paying for their prescription drugs, to allow them to pursue “valuable [life] 
activities and life goals” beyond paying for necessities and their children’s 
college expenses.645 After extensive calculations, he concluded that to satisfy 
this principle, the cumulative lifetime cost of a drug must not exceed 11% of 
total lifetime disposable income for a college-educated male, or $70,715.646 
Despite the moral appeal of such arguments, our view is that the dangers 
of setting an absolute price cap either too high (thereby missing opportunities 
for regulatory action against nevertheless excessively priced drugs, as 
measured by a value-based standard) or too low (thereby chilling investment 
in research and development) are, on balance, too great.647 A price cap would 
 
 641 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 6, at 72, 127. 
 642 Id. at 127. 
 643 For example, the Hepatitis C drug, Sovaldi, was launched at a list price of $84,000 for a twelve-
week course of treatment. Amidst the controversy over this price, experts pointed out that the higher cure 
rate of Sovaldi relative to alternative therapies for Hepatitis C meant that it would save more than it cost. 
See, e.g., John LaMattina, What Price Innovation? The Sovaldi Saga, FORBES (May 29, 2014, 8:25 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2014/05/29/what-price-innovation-the-sovaldi-saga 
[https://perma.cc/4CYF-KWPA]. 
 644 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 645 Emanuel, supra note 425, at 606–08. 
 646 Id. at 608–09. 
 647 The National Academies report also did not endorse “direct controls or setting limits on drug 
prices” because of concerns about chilling new drug development. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & 
MED., supra note 6, at 132–33. 
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also create clear incentives for manufacturers to set the price just below the 
statutory maximum, to the extent that market conditions allow it. 
What about the possibility of pegging substantive unconscionability to 
the company’s investment in developing the drug? For example, one 
criterion for excessive price in Maryland’s HB 631 was whether increased 
drug prices were justified by the cost of producing the drug or expanding 
access to it.648 As we discussed in our review of other areas of law, definitions 
of excessive price that involve assessment of a company’s return on its 
investment are likely to be troublesome. Implementing Maryland’s 
approach, for instance, would require agreement about which costs are 
appropriate to include in these calculations, as well as agreement about a 
reasonable return on investment (though that is more a concern for novel 
drugs than for generics). Because the calculation also requires understanding 
the company’s expected revenue stream for the drug at various prices, it also 
implicitly requires estimation of the size of the global market for the drug, 
the prices that the company will be able to get for the drug around the world, 
the range of current and future market exclusivities the company is likely to 
get, and the likelihood and timing of market entry by generic competitors. 
These bumpy roads are best avoided. 
We turn now to a final question: among products covered by the statute, 
how should agencies charged with enforcing the statute decide which drugs 
to target? With the price-hike provision, the answer is clear: anything and 
everything above the maximum. Given the clear limit it imposes, this 
provision should not be complex or costly to enforce. Harder choices may 
have to be made about which products to target under the general 
unconscionability provision, the enforcement of which may involve higher 
complexity and more resources. High-priced, newly launched drugs are a 
natural target for regulatory scrutiny, especially since they are not yet subject 
to the price-increase provision. Among older drugs, priority should be placed 
on reviewing for possible enforcement products that are most important from 
a public-health perspective and/or have the highest prices for a typical dose 
or course of treatment.649 Drugs that meet both criteria should receive the 
highest priority. 
Work by Professor Mariana Socal and colleagues at Johns Hopkins 
University is helpful in analyzing factors relevant to assessing the public-
 
 648 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 649 This review may determine that some very high-priced drugs should not be enforcement targets 
because they offer commensurately great clinical benefit. 
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health importance of a drug.650 In recommending criteria for the Maryland 
Attorney General’s office to act under HB 631, Professor Socal and 
colleagues suggest that key considerations might include (1) whether the 
drug saves lives or averts serious harms; (2) the number of people dependent 
on the drug; and (3) how many alternative therapies are available for the 
health condition(s) the drug treats.651 Drugs used by children may merit 
particularly close monitoring “because of the smaller set of drugs available 
for use” in pediatric populations.652 These criteria, in combination with the 
high-price criterion, would target scarce resources for enforcement to the 
drugs that present the most objectionable prices. Notably, they would point 
regulators toward drugs in the clinical area that are consistently identified as 
the most important driver of the nation’s prescription drug bill: specialty 
oncology medicines.653 To help foreclose vagueness challenges, these criteria 
should be set forth clearly in the statute’s text or implementing regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have investigated how federal and state legislation 
aimed at curbing excessive drug prices might be crafted so as to survive void-
for-vagueness challenges. Insights are available from each of four adjacent 
areas of law we have reviewed in which a standard of “unconscionable” or 
“excessive” price has been operationalized: price gouging laws relating to 
times of emergency, contract law, consumer lending laws, and public utilities 
rate regulation. Based on our examination of these areas, we have argued that 
there are viable and promising ways to pursue regulation of drug prices using 
a standard of unconscionable or excessive price. As we summarize in Table 
1, consumer lending law offers the most promising model, particularly if 
advanced via federal legislation. Any state legislation along these lines will 
have to run the gauntlet of litigation alleging dormant Commerce Clause and 
patent-preemption claims, which pose formidable challenges. But vagueness 
challenges can be headed off if legislators provide standards up front. Being 
clear also increases the deterrent force of the statute by putting companies 
on notice of what type of conduct will trigger enforcement action. 
 
 650 Memorandum from Mariana Socal et al. on behalf of the Johns Hopkins Drug Access and 
Affordability Initiative to Josh Auerbach, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maryland 1–5 (Sept. 21, 
2017) (on file with authors). 
 651 Id. 
 652 Id. at 3. 
 653 See Bradford R. Hirsch et al., The Impact of Specialty Pharmaceuticals as Drivers of Health Care 
Costs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1714 (2014); Vinay Prasad et al., The High Price of Anticancer Drugs: Origins, 
Implications, Barriers, Solutions, 14 NATURE REV. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 381 (2017). 
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In his classic 1967 article about the vagueness of unconscionability 
doctrine in contract law, Arthur Allen Leff urged drafters of legal standards 
to avoid the temptation of “say[ing] nothing with words,”654 citing Karl 
Llewellyn’s admonition that “‘[c]overt tools are never reliable tools.’”655 
Heeding this advice will move lawmaking in the prescription drug pricing 




 654 Leff, supra note 321, at 559. 
 655 Id. (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in 
English and Continental Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939)). 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF  
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